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 A growing body of research has outlined that humans gain social rank through two 
pathways: prestige and dominance. This dual model of social hierarchy advocates that 
individuals either attain positions of high rank though signals of an ability and willingness to 
either inflict harm (dominance) or confer benefits (prestige) to group members. While there is 
growing support for the dual model of social hierarchy, the extant empirical evidence has 
been cross-sectional and has neglected the impact that time and context has on the efficacy of 
prestige and dominance as long-term processes. The present research outlines a theoretical 
framework for the trajectories of prestige, dominance and social rank over time, and further 
provides longitudinal evidence of their temporal dynamics. In addition, the current research 
tests the longitudinal associations that prestige and dominance have with social networks, 
Results of study 1 suggest that, in collaborative task groups, prestige has a positive and 
bidirectional temporal association with social rank, while the association that dominance has 
diminished over time. Study 2 indicated that in these task groups those high in prestige were 
more likely to be asked advice and prestige was transmitted through advice ties but had a 
limited association with friendship. Those high in dominance were less likely to be 
nominated as friends, but dominance was transmitted through friendship ties.  Results from 
Study 3 suggest that those high in prestige status were more likely to aid in food sharing and 
food production, and that the prestige status of an individual’s food sharing and food 
production partners increased their prestige status over a period of twelve years among the 
Tsimane forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia. Overall, the present research highlights the 
distinction between prestige and dominance over time and shows that prestige, dominance, 
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 The present body of work investigates how prestige and dominance operate in 
human groups over time. While the extant literature has suggested that there are two 
distinct routes to rank attainment, dominance—through fear, manipulation and 
coercion—and prestige—through respect and admiration—the empirical evidence has 
provided only a cross-sectional snapshot of how the processes operate. The 
effectiveness of dominance and prestige as long-term as long-term processes remains 
an open question. The present research aims to address this gap by first assessing the 
dynamic relationships that dominance, prestige and social rank have in collaborative 
task groups. The current research further examines the relationships that prestige and 
dominance have with social networks over time among both collaborative task groups 
and the Tsimane forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia. This chapter provides an 
overview of the literature and offers a theoretical framework for the longitudinal 





The differentiation of social rank within and between social hierarchies has 
been an important piece in solving the puzzle of human evolution. Humans are social 
animals, living in groups and often seeking contact with others (Leary & Baumeister, 
2017).  Social hierarchy—the differentiation in social rank between individuals—
seems universal to these social groups (Brown, 1991), being observed from the most 
egalitarian of cultures (von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2010) to the formalized 
organizational structures that characterize contemporary businesses (Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008). Social rank is defined as an individual’s or group’s relative position 
within a social hierarchy based on their social influence and agency (Anderson & 
Kilduff, 2009b; Báles, Strodtbeck, Mills, & Roseborough, 1951; J. Berger, 
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Rosenholtz, & Morris Zelditch, 1980; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Rank 
asymmetries develop informally and relatively spontaneously in groups (Bass, 1985; 
Blau & Scott, 2003). The relative social rank of individuals becomes established 
through the perceptions of proximate others (Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001) 
and group members tend to agree upon judgments of rank positioning (Mast & Hall, 
2004). Based on these judgements of social rank, individuals defer to high-ranking 
group members, conferring them substantial influence over the discourse of the group 
(Cheng et al., 2013).  
 
The salience of social hierarchy and rank differentiation is on account of the 
group and individual benefits that it grants (Christian, 1970; Kaiser, Hogan, & Craig, 
2008). At a group level, rank differentiation—and the outcomes of rank 
differentiation (i.e. leadership)—can provide a platform for solving coordination 
problems, facilitating cooperation and further limiting costly conflict between 
individuals (Glowacki & von Rueden, 2015; Lorenz, 1966; Szabó & Fath, 2007). 
Attaining social rank, at an individual level, also affords many benefits, with those in 
the apex strata of a hierarchy enjoying greater well-being (Anderson, Willer, Kilduff, 
& Brown, 2012) and considerable influence over social, sexual and material resources 
(Barkow, 1975; Betzig, 1986; Buss, 2005; Patton, 2005). Social hierarchy may also 
have deleterious outcomes for low-ranking individuals, such as when material or 
social benefits are not equally portioned and corruption is institutionalized, or when 
asymmetries result from structural coercion or lack of available exit options(Brief, 
Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001; Leavitt, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). However, the 
many functional aspects of rank differentiation that provide stability, cooperation and 
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order may explain the ubiquity of the phenomena (Alexander, 1979; Anderson & 
Brown, 2010; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Van Vugt, 2006; Von Rueden, 2014).   
 
A longstanding literature provides a trait-based framework for rank 
attainment. Stemming from personological models of leader emergence (Carlyle, 
1993; Cowley, 1928) that claim that high social rank was the property of 
extraordinary individuals who possessed personal qualities that defined their 
effectiveness (Galton, 1869).  Some of such relatively stable individual differences 
are the individual’s cognitive abilities (Kickul & Neuman, 2000), their physical 
strength and size (Knapen, Blaker, & Pollet, 2017; Stulp, Buunk, Verhulst, & Pollet, 
2013) or their personality (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002; Lord, De Vader, & 
Alliger, 1986). A preference for a number of these traits has also been highlighted in 
small-scale societies.  For example, egalitarian groups tend to confer social rank to 
those harbouring a prosocial personality (Bird & Power, 2015; Hawkes & Bliege 
Bird, 2002; Von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2008). These traits may, at times, stably 
predict social rank across situations.  For example, evidence from task-based groups 
has indicated that those who organically emerge as leaders in one group will also 
become leaders when placed in a group that is focussed on an unrelated task and is 
composed of different members (Zaccaro, Foti, & Kenny, 1991).  
 
1.2. The dual model of social hierarchy 
  
While these relatively stable traits may individually predict social rank, 
evidence suggests that their efficacy may also be variable. Considering the joint 
contributions of these rank-enhancing characteristics may provide a more realistic 
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representation of how individuals attain and maintain social rank (Yukl, 2008; 
Zaccaro, Kemp, & Bader, 2004). These rank-enhancing characteristics are defined as 
a collection of qualities that may reliably distinguish those that are high-ranking from 
their low-ranking conspecifics across environments (James & Mazerolle, 2001; 
Zaccaro, 2007). Although some may argue that combining such qualities may not 
capture some of the potentially important disparities in the association that these traits 
have with social rank in isolation (Cowley, 1928; Judge et al., 2002; McCrae & Costa, 
1997), the complex behaviours that may amount to leadership are rarely grounded in a 
limited number of individual determinants (Stogdill, 1948; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). 
For example, experimental evidence suggests that social rank can be predicted by an 
individual’s generosity (Barclay, 2013; Barclay & Willer, 2007; Hardy & Van Vugt, 
2006) as it honestly signals an individual’s quality and ability to access resources (G. 
Roberts, 1998).  
 
However, one needs to fully recognise the process that amounts to the 
individual’s generosity and extract the antecedents of that individual’s access to 
resources. Thus, to gain a more holistic understanding of the process, the 
constellations of traits that lead to resource acquisition must be assessed in unison, not 
in isolation. Assessed in isolation generosity does not make a good hunter or a hard 
worker. Rather, those high in conscientiousness (Anderson et al., 2001; Hogan & 
Ones, 1997), those harbouring embodied capital (i.e. physically stronger and larger: 
Kaplan, Lancaster, & Robson, 2003), and those possessing relevant knowledge and 
skills (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), are likely the most able to produce and acquire 
resources. Only jointly can these personal qualities amount to the individual being 
able to honestly signal their quality through generosity and to focus solely on one trait 
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in isolation may blur the broader picture. In combination, many of the narrower traits 
that predict social rank comprise two distinct psychological profiles (Cheng & Tracy, 
2014; Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), signalling an 
individual’s ability and willingness to either inflict harm upon, or confer benefits to, 
group members.  
 
1.2.1 Dominance  
 
Traits that successfully signal an ability and willingness to impose costs 
comprise a dominance profile. Attaining social rank through dominance is reliant on 
an individual’s propensity to induce fear of psychological, material and physical costs 
that the individual may impose upon their conspecifics (Buss & Duntley, 2006; 
Chance, 1967). Dominance has a deep phylogenetic legacy and likely persisted due to 
the prevalence of intergroup conflict throughout human prehistory that created a 
selection pressure for both physical and behavioural formidability (Manson & 
Wrangham, 1991; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996).   
 
Physical formidability, resource control and the ability to impose costs 
 
  Given the importance of discerning who is most able to inflict harm upon 
others, it seems that humans have evolved cognitive capacities for extracting 
formidability-relevant information from morphological, or non-verbal, signals to 
dominance (Sell et al., 2009). Some of these signals may be the individual’s physical 
strength and size (Blaker & Van Vugt, 2014), which may indicate to others their 
perceived aggression and ability to succeed in agonistic encounters (Archer, 1988; 
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Gallup, White, & Gallup, 2007). Other visual characteristics, such as masculine facial 
characteristics (i.e. height-to-width ratio, more prominent feature brow), are believed 
to be signals of an individual’s dominance (Little & Roberts, 2012). These facial 
characteristics, with links to testosterone, signal an individual’s formidability, fighting 
ability and propensity for dominance-related behaviors (Carré, Putnam, & 
McCormick, 2009; Stirrat, Stulp, & Pollet, 2012). Alongside this, auditory cues may 
signal an individual’s dominance. Deeper vocal acoustics can convey an individual’s 
threat potential through its stable relationship with physical strength and size and 
testosterone (both endogenous and exposure during development:(Bruckert, Liénard, 
Lacroix, Kreutzer, & Leboucher, 2006; Feinberg, Jones, Little, Burt, & Perrett, 2005). 
Expressions of vocal pitch are, however, dynamic and it seems that those high in 
dominance are disposed to modulate their pitch to invoke signals of their 
formidability, whilst those lower in rank or dominance reactively modulate their pitch 
to accommodate their high-dominance counterpart (Cheng, Tracy, Ho, & Henrich, 
2016). While some evidence indicates that these markers do predict an ability to 
impose costs on others—and have further been observed to predict an individual’s 
social rank (Keating, Mazur, & Segall, 1981; Klofstad, Anderson, & Peters, 2012)— 
recent evidence suggests that these relationships are likely to be small (Haselhuhn, 
Ormiston, & Wong, 2015).  
 
Individuals high in dominance may maintain power through a monopoly over 
resources, be they material or sexual (Mazur, 1985). Individuals who are physically 
formidable, and thus have a greater chance of success during agonistic encounters 
(Archer, 1988), are more able to aggressively control group resources and face fewer 
costs (Hammerstein & Parker, 1982; Petersen, Sznycer, Sell, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
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2013). The defensibility of these resources has broad implications for the steepness of 
social hierarchies. When resources are scarce and certain individuals have 
disproportionate control, competition and rank asymmetries become heightened 
(Pierce & White, 2006). Low ranking individuals are likely to acquiesce to the wishes 
of a physically dominant individual through fear of both physical harm and also of the 
individual withholding valuable resources (Hawley, 1999; Mazur, 1985).  
 
However, physical formidability alone is a noisy signal and can also signpost 
an individual’s ability to generate benefits for others (Blaker et al., 2013; 
Lukaszewski, Simmons, Anderson, & Roney, 2016), thus also being an attribute 
associated with prestige. Physical formidability is a form of embodied capital, 
whereby the narrower traits that comprise formidability (i.e. muscle mass and height) 
are biologically costly investments that take a great deal of time and energy to 
develop (Kaplan, Lancaster, & Robson, 2003). The information conveyed by physical 
formidability is multidimensional as the development of such traits can improve an 
individual’s hunting and foraging ability (Apicella, 2014; Gurven, Kaplan, & 
Gutierrez, 2006; Jones & Marlowe, 2002) and aid in community defence (Van Vugt, 
Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008), alongside cueing an ability to inflict harm. The combination 
of physical formidability and individual differences in personality, motivations and 
emotional profile that signal an individual’s willingness to inflict harm upon others 
(Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010) delivers a distinct profile that disposes certain 
individuals to propagate fear among group members.  
 




There are stable individual differences in the psychological profiles that make 
certain individuals disposed to dominance (Henrich, 2016). Individuals high in 
dispositional dominance are high in a combination of narrower personality traits, 
having high levels of aggression and extraversion, and dominance being marginally 
associated with neuroticism (Cheng et al., 2010). Moreover, those high in dominance 
are also narcissistic self-aggrandizers and dominance has a negative association with 
genuine self-esteem and agreeableness (Cheng et al., 2010). This profile is linked with 
hubristic pride, which is marked by arrogance and conceit, and is further associated 
with poor mental health, lack of conscientiousness and an inability to forge and 
maintain stable, positive relationships (Tracy, Cheng, Robins, & Trzesniewski, 2009). 
However, hubristic pride may have evolved to motivate a willingness to impose costs 
on others. The related subjective and egocentric ideals of grandiosity and superiority 
may provoke anti-social behaviors that induce fear among conspecifics, which has 
reproductive and social benefits that balance the negatively associated outcomes 
(Ashton-James & Tracy, 2012). Furthermore, the combination of these stable traits 
and egocentric status motivations increases an individual’s willingness to inflict costs 
on others to obtain goals (Sijtsema, Veenstra, Lindenberg, & Salmivalli, 2009). 
 
The costs and benefits of dominance and cost imposition 
 
There is a plethora of individual benefits for high-ranking individuals whose 
positions are derived from signalling an ability and willingness to impose costs on 
others. In several small-scale societies, males high in dominance have greater 
reproductive success (von Rueden & Jaeggi, 2016) and achieve positions of 
considerable influence (Konečná & Urlacher, 2017). Experimental evidence has also 
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indicated that males perceived high in dominance are more attractive as short-term 
mates (Kruger & Fitzgerald, 2011). Those high in dominance also have a greater 
likelihood of becoming leaders and to receive deference and achieve positions of high 
rank in both formal (Magee & Galinsky, 2008) and informal hierarchies (Cheng, 
Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013). 
 
While individuals high in dominance may impose costs on their counterparts, 
evidence also suggests that groups may, on certain occasions, benefit from the 
dominant inclinations of certain group members. There are fewer individuals vying 
for influence in dominance hierarchies, which may ease tensions within a group, 
facilitate effective coordination (Ronay, Greenaway, Anicich, & Galinsky, 2012; von 
Rueden, Gurven, Kaplan, & Stieglitz, 2014), and punishment of norm violators 
(O’Gorman, Henrich, & Vugt, 2009). Individuals high in dominance may also provide 
group benefits during times of intergroup conflict (Wilson, Hauser, & Wrangham, 
2001). Such individuals may inflict costs on an out-group, increasing the 
competitiveness and success of an in-group (Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008). It is 
important, however, to note that these group benefits are by-products of those high in 
dominance creating fear to attain their egocentric goals. Recent evidence indicates 
that dominance-related social rank does not depend on (mis)perceptions of 
contributions from high dominance individuals (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, in prep). 
Thus, the benefits that may result in rank-relations weighted by dominance are a 
result of the fear of retribution that subordinate individuals harbour.  
   




In many human groups there are several mechanisms that restrict an 
individual’s ability to impose costs on group members. Humans are unusual in the 
ease with which they form cooperative groups and coalitions(Gintis, van Schaik, & 
Boehm, 2015). Coalitional groups can attain a multitude of fitness-enhancing 
outcomes in comparison to individuals acting in isolation (Price, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
2002). One such outcome is the ability to coordinate action against those who impose 
costs on others (so-called ‘reverse dominance’: Boehm, 2009). Many groups exhibit 
an aversion towards exploitative dominance-related strategies and groups members 
are more likely form alliances (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2017; Gavrilets, 2012); spread 
negative gossip (M. Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014); dislike (Anderson & Willer, 
2014); or exit the group when there are available options (Price & Van Vugt, 2014) to 




 In contrast with dominance, human groups tend to exhibit a near-universal 
preference for individuals harbouring a distinct constellation of traits, which comprise 
a prestige profile, and signal an individual’s ability and willingness to confer benefits 
to others. This profile is centred on fostering respect and admiration from proximate 
others (Barkow, 1975). Alongside the combination of traits that signal an individual’s 
ability and willingness to confer benefits, there is also a set of traits and abilities for 
those potentially low in prestige to detect the signals displayed by their willing and 
able group members (Henrich, 2016).  Human prestige likely intensified alongside the 
increased interdependence of individuals within societies for subsistence, with 
humans pooling both labour and resources to make possible the skill-intensive 
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foraging niche (Winterhalder, 1986). Within this niche, resource-sharing facilitated 
the evolution of high fertility and a long juvenile period of development as mothers 
and children are often subsidized by other community members (Gurven & Walker, 
2006). Through this increased interdependence there became an enhanced need for 
cooperation, coordination of collective efforts and leadership (Van Vugt, Johnson, 
Kaiser, & O’Gorman, 2008). Alongside this, specializations in labour by sex, age and 
ability allow individuals to amplify their reputational gains from resource sharing 
(Hooper, Demps, Gurven, Gerkey, & Kaplan, 2015), with individuals being able to 
offer inalienable commodities of value to others (Lewis, 2002).   
 
Cultural evolution, prestige bias and the ability to confer benefits. The increasing 
ability for specialization in a domain relevant to survival has facilitated more complex 
subsistence strategies and technology, of which is costly for individuals to develop 
and learn alone (Boyd & Richerson, 1988). Individuals often opt to acquire 
information from proximate conspecifics rather than learning asocially as it provides 
greater payoffs in a wide range of environments ((Henrich & Boyd, 1998), aiding in 
learning complex skills (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993) and reducing 
uncertainty(Kameda & Nakanishi, 2002). The remarkable ability of humans to 
transmit cultural information across generations has allowed a vast accumulation and 
modification of adaptive knowledge, allowing us to harness symbolic systems (such 
as language) and advanced technologies, and settle in a diverse array of environments 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1988, 1994; Caldwell & Millen, 2008). Cultural learning, in 
combination with the evolved cognitive mechanisms and capabilities to share and 
learn cultural information (alongside other capabilities: Alexander, 1990; Barkow, 
1989; Barrett, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007; Csibra & Gergely, 2009), has been central 
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to human adaptation, conveying adaptive information about the environment, and has 
shaped human behaviour (Alexander, 1979; Boyd & Richerson, 1988, 2005; Boyd, 
Richerson, & Henrich, 2011). Innovations within a cultural system often emerge 
through individuals asocially learning and tracking changes within the environment; 
however, the majority of individuals rely on learning from others (Henrich & 
McElreath, 2003).  
 
There are a number of flexible strategies that individuals employ when 
choosing from whom to learn. These are so-called ‘model biases’, which often enable 
the avoidance of unreliable or redundant information. Individuals preferentially learn 
from, for example, those who are successful (Mesoudi, 2008), or use conformist or 
frequency-dependent biases (Henrich, 2001; Laland, 2004; Rendell et al., 2011). One 
of such model biases used is prestige-bias cultural transmission. Prestige-bias cultural 
learning is a process learners discern who to learn from through the attention and 
deference that a potential learning model receives from proximate others (alongside 
other sources of information about a model’s quality: Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). 
While many other sources signalling an individual’s success and skill may vary across 
time and context the deferential actions of proximate others can reliably discriminate 
good from bad models across environments (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). 
Experimental evidence has indicated that both children (Chudek, Heller, Birch, & 
Henrich, 2012; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; Whiten & Flynn, 2010) and adults (Atkisson, 
O’Brien, & Mesoudi, 2012) utilize prestige-bias cultural learning when assessing 
from whom they should learn. In return for the informational, social and material 
goods that a prestigious learning model may provide, learners within a group confer 
deference, giving them disproportionate social influence and decision-making 
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power—and thus high social rank—within the community (Cheng et al., 2013; 
Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Price & Van Vugt, 2014). 
 
A potential learning model must harbour several traits that aid in the 
development of skills, knowledge and afford the ability to confer adaptive benefits to 
others. Individuals may be skilled in a socially-valued area, such as hunting, or have a 
breadth of knowledge that can be imparted for a model to attract potential learners 
(Henrich &Gil-White, 2001). For example, evidence suggests that children have an 
ability to discriminate between competent models who provide reliable information 
over unreliable (Over & Carpenter, 2012), copying reliable models when learning 
how to use artefacts (Zmyj et al., 2010) and novel words (Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 
2004). Some evidence has suggested that prestige has a curvilinear associate with age, 
with those in mid-life being deemed most prestigious (Von Rueden et al., 2010) and 
children being disposed to copying older learning models (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 
2013). This may be due to age cueing a greater wealth of opportunity to accumulate 
knowledge, skills, wealth and potentially coalition partners (Benoit-Smullyan, 1944; 
Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Reyes-Garcia et al., 2008; Von Rueden, 2014). Physical 
strength and size may also be an important signal of an individual’s ability to confer 
benefits as it is associated with greater hunting ability (Gurven et al., 2006; Jones & 
Marlowe, 2002). 
 
Dispositional prestige and the willingness to confer benefits. The ability to confer 
benefits alone does not found prestige. A potential learning model must also be 
willing to provide benefits to those around them. Dispositional prestige is associated 
with high genuine self-esteem, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness and 
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openness (Cheng, Tracy & Henrich, 2010). Those high in conscientiousness are more 
likely to focus on learning and practicing skills (B. Roberts, Jackson, Fayard, 
Edmonds, & Meints, 2009). Genuine self-esteem reflects self-perceived social 
acceptance (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995) and also has a strong 
relationship with prestige.  Prestige is further related to high social acceptance and 
agreeableness as these trait provide a marker for individuals to monitor their prestige 
and for others to observe their disposition towards a more humble, prosocial approach 
to social rank (Ames & Flynn, 2007; Leary, Cottrell, & Phillips, 2001; Paulhus, 
Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004).  In line with this, prestige has a negative 
relationship with aggression and neuroticism. This reflects the tendency for 
individuals high in prestige to be emotionally stable and relatively unreactive to 
interpersonal stress (Cheng, Tracy & Henrich, 2010). Those high in prestige are also 
disposed to being cooperative and generous, signalling the quality of their cooperative 
intent (Bliege Bird & Smith, 2005; Price, 2003).  
 
The benefits and costs of prestige. There are a multitude of individual benefits—and 
relatively limited costs—related to prestige for those high and those low in social 
rank. Experimental evidence suggests that those high in prestige are more attractive as 
long-term sexual partners (Kruger & Fitzgerald, 2011) and in a myriad of small-scale 
societies prestige is linked with higher reproductive success (Alden Smith, 2004). 
Among the Tsimane, individuals high in prestige are more likely to exhibit superior 
physical health (Reyes-Garcia et al., 2008) and have lower offspring mortality than 
other group members ( von Rueden et al., 2010). For individuals low in social rank, 
deference to a high-prestige conspecific facilitates social learning. Proximity to those 
high in prestige may also provide coalitional and reputational benefits, which may 
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afford low-ranking individuals beneficial skills and knowledge. Consequently, the 
association may increase an individual’s overall fitness, providing a safety net of 
support during times of need, and elevate their prestige (see Chapters 4 and 5; Boone 
& Kessler, 1999; Patton, 2005; Polly Wiessner, 2005). At a group level, prestige may 
heighten the overall levels of cooperation among non-kin, facilitating more ethical 
leadership and effective collective action (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Hooper, 
Kaplan, & Boone, 2010; Van Vugt, 2006; Von Rueden, 2014).  
 
 
1.3 Dynamics systems and the plasticity of social hierarchy 
 
 
Social rank is not solely dependent on the potentially high-ranking 
individual’s trait expression, but also co-dependent on the trait levels and behavioural 
reactions of all group members. Humans live in complex, dynamic systems that 
govern all aspects of their daily lives.  These systems are characterised by 
interlocking components that, over time and at different levels, impact one another bi-
directionally (Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003; A. Nowak & Vallacher, 1998). These 
systems can give rise to many group-level qualities and processes. Individuals invest 
in social learning within the systems, which may give rise to flexibility and relative 
plasticity of behaviors in adapting to change or to different environmental pressures 
(Baldwin, 1896; Oyama, Griffiths, Gray, & Russell, 2001; Richerson, 2018).  
Examples of such processes are assortment due to trait-based similarity, cooperation 
and normative cultures, which can develop through a number of simple rules that may 
be guided by the ecological pressures (Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Cosmides & Tooby, 
1994; Henrich, Chudek, & Boyd, 2015; M. A. Nowak & Sigmund, 2004; Schoener, 
2011). By reducing these processes of selection and social influence down to 
 
 17 
understand the impact of a narrower trait on a dependent outcome, some paradigms 
often neglect the detail that certain behavioural processes are not isolated and provide 
an incomplete snapshot of temporally-isolated states of a system (Kenrick, Li & 
Butner, 2003).  
 
1.3.1. The dynamics of prestige, dominance and social rank 
 
Approaching human social hierarchy as a complex, dynamic system can 
provide important insight as to why prestige and dominance may be successful for 
rank acquisition and maintenance in some groups, but not in others. Through this, the 
current perspective extends upon previous integrative approaches to leadership and 
social hierarchy (Volberda & Lewin, 2003; Yukl, 2006; Zaccaro, 2007), marrying 
trait-based and state-based paradigms proposed in the extant literature. While trait 
models of rank attainment and leadership emergence may variably predict an 
individual’s ascendance in social rank, their social rank is situated in context. 
Individuals who are high-ranking in one situation may not necessarily have the 
qualitites to be high-ranking in a different situation (Dorfman & Howell, 1988; 
Fiedler, 2006; Stogdill, 1948). It seems that, whilst the recognition that prestige and 
dominance are distal profiles that form the core foundations of human social 
hierarchy (Cheng & Tracy, 2014), there are multiple dynamic signalling systems that 
may proximally impact an individual’s social rank (Bro-Jørgensen, 2010).  
 
Natural selection may have favoured dynamic, proximate behavioural displays 
that flexibly communicate an individual’s motivations associated with rank 
attainment. The causal dynamics of the prestige-dominance model of social hierarchy 
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are inherently bidirectional and, whilst this has yet to be empirically tested, facultative 
flexibility in the expression of both prestige and dominance behaviors may remain 
throughout development and during adulthood (Cheng, Tracy &Henrich, 2010). The 
prestige of an individual may exhibit flexibility as their specialized skill or knowledge 
is centred on information beneficial to specific domain, culture or environment (Flinn, 
2005; Lopreato, 1984; Meltzoff, 1995). Moreover, prestige may catalyse a diffusion 
of prosociality, generosity and cooperation across generations through cultural 
learning (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Henrich, Chudek, & Boyd, 2015). Thus, those 
initially low-ranking, low-prestige learners, over time may become more similar to 
their prestigious models through social influence and imitation. This, however, has 
yet to be empirically tested. Individuals may also react to the success or failure of 
expressions of prestige or dominance, and further modulate their behaviors between 
the two profiles to accommodate the selective pressures of their current environment. 
For example, empirical evidence seems to suggest that, when routes to social rank 
through prestige are blocked, individuals attempt to seize rank through dominance-
related behaviors (Fast & Chen, 2009; Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky, 2012; Redhead, 
2016). Overall, prestige and dominance may exhibit relative plasticity in expression 
over time.  
 
Given these oscillations in expression, the history and environmental context 
in which an individual is placed may explain some of the variance in who becomes 
high ranking but may not be as important for understanding the difference between 
high-ranking and low-ranking individuals (Zaccaro et al., 2004). For example, 
prestige and dominance seem to have a relatively linear relationship with social rank 
across many situations, suggesting that those disposed to expressing high levels of 
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either prestige or dominance become high ranking, whereas those displaying low 
levels are likely the low-ranking individuals (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001; Maner, 2017). However, the divergent routes to attaining and 
maintaining social rank through either prestige or dominance may be contextually-
dependent. For example, in many contemporary cooperative groups and small-scale 
societies there seems to be a premium placed on prestige (Anderson & Kilduff, 
2009b; Barkow, 1975; Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989), with 
many sanctioning expressions of dominance (Boehm, 2009). On the other hand, 
dominance is salient during both childhood and adolescence (Hawley, 1999; Redhead, 
2016; Redhead, Cheng & O’Gorman, 2018), in some small-scale societies (Chagnon, 
1989; Garfield & Hagan, in press; Von Rueden et al., 2010), in periods where 
intergroup tensions rise and conflicts may emerge (Laustsen & Petersen, 2017; Van 
Vugt & Grabo, 2015) and in unacquainted groups or organizations with formalized 
power structures (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).  
 
1.3.2 A relational approach to understanding social hierarchy 
 
It seems that, although selection may favour prestige and dominance profiles 
as predictors of social rank, situational dynamics may weight the contributions of 
these dispositions.  The fluctuations in rank maintenance over context and time may 
be rooted in the inherently relational nature of social hierarchy, Rank differentiation is 
complex, dynamic and multi-layered, with individuals operating in networks of 
interpersonal relationships (Avolio, Walumbwa, & Weber, 2009; Carter, DeChurch, 
Braun, & Contractor, 2015; DeRue & Ashford, 2010). Emerging evidence suggests 
that social rank impacts the networks of interpersonal relationships that characterize 
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groups, whilst these networks of relationships may concurrently influence social rank 
(Torlò & Lomi, 2017).  
 
At a dyadic level, there cannot be a leader without a follower (Katz & Kahn, 
1978) and the efficacy of an individual’s prestige or dominance in attaining more 
favourable rank may be dependent on the levels similarity (or dissimilarity) of their 
counterpart. At a transitive level some aspects of social rank can be linearly ordered, 
such that if individual i was higher in rank than individual h, and h higher than j, then 
i would be higher in rank that j (Gazes et al., 2017). Analogous to this, the attentional 
structures related to rank allocation suggest that if individual j is paying attention to 
individual h and individual h to individual i, then individual j is more likely to attend 
and defer to individual i (Chance, 1967; Cheng et al., 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001). At a population-level, the cultural norms and ecological pressures weight the 
contribution that the networks of relations have on social rank as responses to the 
dynamic organizational requirements that they pose (Yukl, 2008; Zaccaro, et al., 
2004). Therefore, rank differentiation has relative plasticity, with those embedded in a 
group exhibiting dynamic strategies that are produced by interactions between 
particular evolved decision rules and environmental inputs (Gangestad & Simpson, 
2000; Van Vugt, 2006).  
 
 The relational behaviors that individuals exhibit are guided by their 
dispositional prestige and dominance, but also impact both perceptions of prestige and 
dominance. It seems that people-oriented relational behaviours (i.e. emotional 
support, generosity: Bass, 1990; Yukl, 2006) are associated with the social rank of 
individuals in situations when the interests of individuals may be relatively divergent 
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(House, 1971; Van Vugt, Hogan, et al., 2008). For example, during experimental 
paradigms—where individuals may maximize their personal payoffs through selfish 
acts—individuals tend to attain high social rank through displays of material 
generosity (Barclay, 2013; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Milinksi et al., 2002; Willer, 
2009). A similar tendency for high-ranking individuals to demonstrate prosocial 
relational behaviors, such as friendship ties and altruistic exchanges, has been 
observed in W.E.I.R.D. groups (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and 
Democratic:Anderson & Kilduff, 2009b; Ball & Newman, 2013) . A similar 
preference has been shown in small-scale societies. For example, the most skillful 
hunters tend to share meat among the community (Bliege Bird, Smith & Bird, 2005; 
Boone, 1998) and prestigious individuals tend to lend high amounts of social support 
(Power & Ready, 2018; Von Rueden et al., 2008).  
 
In situations when the interests of group members converge, individuals high 
in prestige may be more likely to invest in task-oriented relational behaviors (Yukl, 
2008; Van Vugt, Hogan & Kaiser, 2008). In such situations, individuals high in 
prestige may use non-forceful persuasive direction and instrumental advice—for 
example, that related to the task at hand (House, 1981)—to keep others focussed, 
promoting the successful coordination of the group and further heightening their 
social rank (i.e. Anderson & Willer, 2014). Individuals lower in prestige and social 
rank may also actively seek such advice and freely defer to the non-forceful direction 
of their high-prestige counterpart as it facilitates their social learning in a domain of 
instrumental social value and may provide net payoffs for the group (Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001). Moreover, such social learning from a skilled and knowledgeable 




 Individuals high in dominance seem disposed towards negative relational 
behaviours to obtain and maintain social rank. The success of these negative ties may 
be situation-dependent and contingent on a plethora of factors associated with the 
cultural norms of a group and the composition of a group (Redhead, 2016). For 
example, in communities where dyadic fighting is not formally or heavily sanctioned, 
or warfare between other communities is frequent, the aggressive behaviours 
associated with dominance may be most potent. For example, among the Tsimane of 
Bolivia, who have no recently reported incidents of inter-community conflict, 
individuals who have, and also prevail in, dyadic conflicts within the community are 
often granted high social rank (Von Rueden et al., 2010). In more extreme cases, 
warriorship success during agonistic conflict is a route to reproductive success and 
being conferred social rank among the Achuar (Patton, 2005) and the Yanomami 
(Chagnon, 1989). However, there has also been contradictory evidence for the 
reproductive success of warriors among the Waorani (Beckerman et al., 2009; 
Robarchek, 1998). Among adult W.E.I.R.D populations—for example in fraternities, 
romantic partnerships and formalized organizational hierarchies—individuals 
potentially disposed to dominance often tease other group members, make forceful 
task-related demands, are verbally aggressive, spread negative gossip, and ostracise 
others to attain positions of high ranked (i.e. Case & Maner, 2014; Keltner et al., 
1998; Van Kleef et al., 2011). A similar tendency for those high in dominance to 
generate negative relational ties has been observed in childhood and adolescence with 
individuals who bully and are verbally or physically antagonistic often being popular 
and high ranking (Hawley, Little, & Card, 2007; Redhead, Cheng, & O’Gorman, 
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2018; Sijtsema, Veenstra, Lindenberg, & Salmivalli, 2009; Veenstra, Lindenberg, 
Munniksma, & Dijkstra, 2010).  
 
While dominance may be associated with negative relational ties, the converse 
may be observed with its connection to positive relational ties. Dispositional 
dominance is associated with hubristic pride, which propagates behaviors deleterious 
to achieving and maintaining social relationships (Tracy & Robins, 2014; Tracy, 
Cheng, Robins, & Trzesniewski, 2009). Through this, those high in dominance are 
expected, during adulthood, to be less likely attain and maintain friendships with 
others and be less socially accepted among groups that sanction dominance-related 
behaviors (Cheng & Tracy, 2014). 
 
1.3.3. Overview of the current research 
 
 
 The main aim of the current research is to ascertain whether the processes 
fundamental to social hierarchy in humans are dynamic. That is, do prestige, 
dominance, social rank and social relationships change over time, and does change in 
one of these processes impact change in the others? The current research proposes 
three central hypotheses in relation to this question:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Prestige, dominance and social rank will fluctuate over time, 
with changes in one of these processes will impact change in the other.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Social hierarchies are embedded in social networks, which are 





Hypothesis 3: There are distinct social networks that relate to cooperation in 
humans, which are multiplex (i.e. ties in one network impact ties in the other) and 
inherently linked to social hierarchy.   
 
The following chapter (Chapter 2) provides a brief overview of the statistical 
methods that can best parse dynamic relationships over time and, thus, effectively test 
the present dynamic theories. Chapter 3 provides a further overview of the dynamic 
relationships between prestige, dominance and social rank, proposing and testing 
several predictions related to hypothesis 1 by utilizing a longitudinal design that 
captures peer-perceptions of prestige, dominance and social rank from the initial 
formation of naturalistic task groups through to the end of a 16-week semester. 
Chapter 4 provides both theoretical rational for hypotheses 2 and 3, and empirically 
tests the proposed relationships by tracking the temporal associations between 
prestige, dominance, instrumental network ties—operationalised as advice—and 
expressive network ties—operationalized as friendship—among North American 
undergraduate students. Moreover, Chapter 5 delivers a further test of hypothesis 2 by 
assessing the association between instrumental network ties—captured through 
nominations of food-sharing and help with food-production— and prestige among the 
Tsimane hunter-horticulturalists of Bolivia over a 12-year period. Finally, Chapter 6 
synthesises the current body of research, highlighting the implications that it has for 
the relevant fields of study and further outlines the future questions posed that the 

















2.1. Modelling Temporal Dynamics: Continuous time structural equation models 
 
Dynamic models cover a broad range of statistical modelling techniques that evaluate 
how certain processes function within-subjects over time. These processes often follow a 
smooth trajectory, are sequentially dependent (i.e. autocorrelation/autoregression), have 
cross-lagged impacts (change in one process causing change in the other), and are guided by 
small levels of stochastic inputs (i.e. there is a small amount of randomness in changes over 
time). Until recently, dynamic models have been measured in discrete time, assessing 
temporal parameters in equal steps, which has constrained the comparability of results and 
has several data requirements that are not consistently met.  Discrete time models centred on 
the strict assumption that points of measurement are made with the same interval of time 
between them and, in most cases, this assumption is not satisfied, which can cause bias in 
parameter estimates. This is due to the strength of autoregressive and lagged effects on 
processes that are inherently dependent on time (Oud, 2007).  Moreover, the assumption of 
equally spaced time intervals also limits the comparability of studies using discrete time 
models, with results only being fully comparable between those measuring data in the same 
timeframe (Voekle, Oud, Davidov & Schmidt, 2012).  
 
Processes unfold over continuous time and continuous time structural equation 
models can be used to analyse both panel and time series data, with multiple models (such as 
cross-lagged panel and latent growth curve models) being available (Driver et al., 2017). The 
focus of this section will be on cross-lagged panel models (Lazarsfeld & Fiske, 1938), which 
can assess multivariate processes by analysing the lagged effects of predictor variables on a 
given dependent while controlling for the autoregressive effect of the dependent variable on 
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itself (Kenny, 2005).  The relationship between the predictor and dependent variables is 
dynamic, with predictor variables, if specified, also being simultaneously and temporally 
dependent (Oud, 2002).  In place of discrete time, the current models consider the discrete 
observations as part of a latent, continuous time process by estimating the unobserved 
process using a stochastic differential equation (Driver, Oud, & Voelkle, 2017; Oud, 2002).  
In doing this, the models account for latent, stochastic processes that have not been measured 
within the design, parsing informative unpredictable fluctuations in the trajectory of the 
process (innovation variance)—which may be useful for future predictions—from deviations 
that are not meaningful (measurement error) and do not offer any predictive value (Driver & 
Voelkle, 2018). Through this, the models reduce noise and providing a more representative 
interpretation of the processes under question. The equation below is taken from Driver, Oud 
and Voelkle (2017) and interpretation of the equation bares similarity to the interpretation 
that they present.  
 
(Equation 1: Continuous time dynamic model) 
 
1)   d =  +   +  + d + GdW 
 
Within the multivariate stochastic differential equation, d ∈ ℝ is the vector of the 
variable, , process of interest for the subject, , dependent on the time, , parameter.  
A ∈ ℝ× is the matrix assessing the temporal relationships of the variable process, 
comprising the cross-effects of the variable on the off-diagonal and the auto-effects 
positioned on the diagonal.   is the longitudinal process level, which is governed by the 
-length vector for the random variables, , which include the continuous time intercepts 
and subject-level covariance.    fixes the longitudinal process level and the subject-level 
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longitudinal differences.  ∈ ℝ× is the matrix showing the effect of the -length vector of 
temporally constant, time independent, predictor variables,  ∈ ℝ.   is the effects of 
time dependent predictors variables, that is predictors that show temporal variation. These 
time dependent predictors are distinct from the process system in focus and their effects are 
only assessed during the observation periods.  However, this can be modelled differently to 
include the evolution of the predictors within the model.  dW is the stochastic error term, 
which is an immeasurably small augmentation of the Weiner process, and G ∈ ℝ× is a 
lower triangular matrix representing the variance-covariance of the diffusion process over 
continuous time (a continuous Markov process modelling the temporal trajectory of the 
process).  Overall, continuous time structural equation modelling assesses the expression of 
traits or behaviours as being products of a process of continuous time, whilst accounting for 
the dynamic effects of related, modelled processes and time dependent and independent 
predictors.  By doing so, the approach provides a platform for robust and representative tests 
of relationships between variables.  Moreover, extensions of the model allow for multi-level 
testing with multiple endogenous groups (Driver et al., 2017), and models using Bayesian 
and hierarchical Bayesian inference with random coefficients (Driver & Voelkle, 2018).  
While continuous time modelling does overcome many issues relating to modelling 
longitudinal data, many approaches do not account for the potentially hierarchical nature of 
temporal processes. More traditional approaches (i.e. autoregressive cross-lagged panel 
models) often estimate a single set of fixed-parameter effects, which assume that the 
processes unfold in exactly the same way for all subjects. However, it is common for the 
intercept in dynamic models to vary between subjects and not accounting for the subject-
specific differences in the average level of a process may bias parameters within the model 
that are assessing the temporal dynamics (Hamaker, Kuiper, & Grasman, 2015). A 
hierarchical Bayesian formulation of continuous time structural equation modelling provides 
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a middle ground between fixed-effects models and subject-specific models by estimating 
population distributions for model parameters (For a full outline and mathematical 
description see Driver & Voelkle, 2018). Through this, the model simultaneously estimates 
the population distribution mean and variance, which serves as prior information and informs 
the sampling of the subject level parameters as hyperpriors. Hyperpriors are priors that reflect 
the expectations for the population distribution. Thus, the subject specific parameter 
estimates are joint-posterior population distributions that are conditional on a combination of 
the estimated population distribution, which fully accounts for between-subject differences, 
and the calculated likelihood of parameters being subject specific.  
 
 
2.2. Modelling network dynamics: Stochastic actor-oriented models  
 
Stochastic actor-oriented models are used to analyse panel data, both social networks 
and attributes, that have been measured at discrete time points. These data could be 
naturalistic, survey or pseudo-experimental, if the measures are administered to the same 
individuals within a network over two or more time points. These models can be applied to 
networks that are undirected or directed, weighted/ordered, one-mode or bipartite, multiplex 
(Snijders, Lomi, & Torló, 2013) and multi-level, which either comprise nested actors or sets 
of endogenous actors (Snijders, 2016; Snijders & Baerveldt, 2003). However, the data must 
consist of complete networks constructed by participant nomination or explicit interaction. 
This is due to the models’ assumption that—unlike other models within social network 
analysis (i.e. ERGMs: Lusher, Koskinen, & Robins, 2013) that are tie-oriented—networks 
are actor-oriented, and actors actively make the decisions that inspire change in network 
structure.  The approach assumes structural individualism—with SAOMs implementing 
Luce’s (1959) choice axioms assumption—that change within the social networks are 
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contingent on the choices of the individuals (or actors) embedded in the network. The actor-
driven changes are further assumed to be products of a Markov process, in which the current 
state of a network can solely predict its future state, and that these changes are driven by 
actors evaluating the current network and aiming to maximize its future state (T. A. Snijders, 
2009).  
 
This actor-driven change is assumed to be a continuous process, with actors making 
evaluations at latent periods between observed time points.  To meet these assumptions, 
Snijders (2001) combined mini-step Markov models (Holland & Leinhardt, 1977) with 
random utility models (Manski, 1977) with actor’s choices to create change based on whether 
such change would maximize their utility. Method of moments estimation implemented by 
Monte Carlo (MC) methods and stochastic approximation (Robbins & Monro, 1985) is 
commonly used to estimate such models, given the lesser computational burden of the 
estimation procedure compared to other methods (Sniders, 2009). However, these models can 
also be estimated through maximum likelihood using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods 
(MCMC) and stochastic approximation (T. A. Snijders, Koskinen, & Schweinberger, 2010), 
and multi-level models can be estimated with Bayesian estimation using MCMC methods 
(Koskinen & Snijders, 2007).  
 
Simulations of the process of change are implemented between discrete time points to 
capture the cumulative sequences of the smallest possible latent changes that amount to the 
more substantial observed changes.  The simulations are conditionally dependent on the state 
of the first observed network, which is not modelled but used as the starting point for the 
estimation (Snijders et al., 2010).   The opportunity for actors to make these changes are 
simplified into microsteps, whereby multiple changes are decomposed into the smallest 
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possible change and only one tie variable can either be created, dissolved or maintained 
(Snijders, 2009).  The rate of opportunity for change for actors is modelled by the rate 
function (See Equation 1) and is dependent on an actor’s position within the network and 
their attributes (Snijders, 2001).  The rate function is formally defined as: 
 
(Equation 1: Rate Function) 
 
 2   λ  =     
 
Within the rate function, the models speed differences between actors, , and, alike to 
Poisson regression,  λ  is a parameter of an exponential distribution of waiting times for a 
change to occur (i.e. the amount of microsteps between observed periods).    is the degree, 
and the  statistics of actor ’s neighbourhood within  are weighed by the model 
parameters .   Thus, the rate function produces an estimate of the frequency of change 
opportunities.  For example, if the rate estimate for choice of friends in a classroom network 
produces an estimate of 3.210 it indicates that actors had 3.210 opportunities to change their 
outgoing ties between the two observed time points.   
 
Actors’ evaluations are modelled using the objective function (see Equation 2), which 
estimates the probabilities of actors making the choice to create, terminate or continue ties 
within their network.  Theoretically and empirically derived effects (see Table 1) can be 
modelled into the objective function to assess their impact on actor decisions.  Several effects 
are structural, assessing endogenous network tendencies, and should be included in the 
models as controls, such as tendency to create ties (outdegree/density), the tendency for 
reciprocity and at least one network closure effect (i.e. geometrically-weighted transitive 
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group formation).  Actor-attribute, or covariate, effects may also be modelled to test 
hypotheses relating to the effects of exogenous mechanisms on a network.  There is a diverse 
array of effects, and interaction terms, that can be used to test complex processes that affect 
network dynamics (see Ripley, R., Snijders, T., Boda, Z., Voros, A., & Preciado, P., 2018)).  
The objective function for network dynamics is formally defined as: 
 
(Equation 2: Objective Function) 
 
3       " #,  =  ∑ # & . 
 
Within this linear function, the value for an actor each, , is expressed as " #, , with the 
evaluation being dependent on the state of the network, , at each microstep and is subject to 
statistical inference.  #  weights are the statistical parameters and & are the included effects that 
should be theoretically and empirically grounded. Some of such effects  that are included in the 
models are the generally tendency to nominated others (the outdegree or density) and the tendency 
towards reciprocity.  Actor choice between microsteps is modelled as a multinomial model with the 
outputs interpreted as log-odds ratios.  An assumption of this function is that actors maximise their 
scores and, therefore, a positive estimate produced by the model would indicate that actors are more 
likely to create or maintain ties based on that attribute, whereas a negative estimate would infer the 
converse.   
 
Stochastic Actor-Oriented Models for Network and Behaviour Dynamics 
 
Behaviors of actors may have effects on their network’s composition, but this relationship is 
dynamic and the networks in which actors operate may also affect their expression of individual 
attributes.  Actors may create ties with those expressing similar traits (homophily: (McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) but the expression of an actor’s traits may also be influenced by those 
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whom they are proximate (Marsden & Friedkin, 1993).  SAOMs have been extended to 
simultaneously estimate changes in both networks and dependent ‘behaviours’ (Burk, Steglich, & 
Snijders, 2007; Steglich, Snijders, & Pearson, 2010). These models can parse selection and influence 
processes, and, highlighting mechanisms for both network and behaviour dynamics.  In-keeping with 
SAOMs terminology and literature, endogenous traits, attributes or behaviours will be referred to as 
behaviours throughout this section.  
  
It is important to understand that the relationships between behaviours and social networks is 
fundamentally dynamic and that the outcomes of these relationships should be examined as mutually-
dependent products of continuous temporal processes (Steglich, Snijders & Pearson, 2010; Stokman 
& Doreian, 1997). The relationships between conspecifics emerge through thick webs of complex 
interactions and are contingent on the relationships, or lack thereof, between others proximate to them 
(Veenstra & Steglich, 2012). Therefore, it is important for these dynamic relationships to be 
considered using complete network data for group, with soundly determined boundaries being 
imposed. This captures the complexities of both direct and indirect ties between individuals. 
Moreover, the relations being examined are not necessarily stable, with ties between conspecifics 
changing due to stochastic events, such as arguments or individuals entering or leaving the group, or 
endogenous network characteristics, for example transitive group formation (Van de Bunt, Van Duijn 
& Snijders, 1999). Without capturing both the relationships and behaviours at multiple points in time, 
a cross-sectional design may misattribute the similarity of tied conspecifics as being selection when, 
indeed, it may be a product of an influence process that arose before measurement (Feld, 1981). It is, 
thus, important for any complete network data to collected using a longitudinal design and for the 
statistical model to assess selection and influence processes simultaneously. This dynamic statistical 
approach can be achieved using stochastic actor-oriented models for the coevolution of networks and 
behaviours (Snijders et al., 2007; for a detailed review of selection and influence processes see 




SAOMs for networks and behaviours operate in a similar fashion to models solely assessing 
network dynamics.  Behaviour dynamics are decomposed into microsteps, with the processes 
unfolding over continuous time and being products of a Markov process.  Changes in behaviour are 
also assumed to be actor-oriented, with actors having agency in the expression of their behaviour as 
well as their outgoing ties.  To fit the current requirements of this model, measures of behaviour must 
either be, or be transformed into, integer-valued ordinal scales and should have a conservative number 
of values (with 10 being recommended as relatively high:(T. Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 
2010)).  This is due to the assumption of the model that, alike to tie changes, alterations in behaviour 
can only be at value of one at a single microstep.  There are several viable strategies for ensuring that 
measurements meet these requirements.  For example, if working with personality scales, scores may 
be rounded to the nearest integer, could be transformed into categories using the sample mean and +/-
1 standard deviation, or converted into categorical (Ntile) percentile rank. 
 
 
(Equation 3: Objective Function for Network and Behaviour) 
 
4  "(#, , ) =  ∑ #(&( , ) . 
 
 
Akin to the objective function for network dynamics,  "(#, , ) is the value for an actor and 
behaviour, with the parameters for network, , and behaviour,  ), evaluation being distinct.  The 
weighting of effects on behaviour change is expressed by the parameters #(.   The linear combination 
of the included effects,  &( , ), are modelled as dependent upon the actor’s behaviour, their 
position within the network and the behaviour of alters whom they have ties with.  As with the 
objective function for network dynamics, actors are assumed to maximize scores and a positive 
parameter estimate would indicate an increase in the expression of the behaviour, whilst negative 























 Rank differentiation is ubiquitous in human societies, with social asymmetries being 
ever present within and between groups (Leavitt, 2005; Wiessner & Schiefenhövel, 1998). 
Social rank is defined as an individual’s or group’s relative social influence and agency 
within a hierarchy (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009a; Báles, Strodtbeck, Mills, & Roseborough, 
1951; Berger, Rosenholtz, Zeldtich & Morris, 1980; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008). Throughout our evolutionary history social rank and outcomes of rank 
differentiation, such as leadership, have played important roles, determining group success 
and providing a platform for facilitating effective coordination, collective action and group 
decision-making (Glowacki & von Rueden, 2015; O’Gorman, Henrich, & Van Vugt, 2009). 
An emerging literature across the behavioural sciences indicates that variation exists in the 
origins and expression of rank differentiation in human groups (i.e.Borgerhoff Mulder, 1987; 
Hawkes & Bliege Bird, 2002; Power & Ready, 2018). Many forms of rank differentiation 
appear to be the result of conflict and imposition, but co-existing with this and also prevalent 
in human societies are hierarchies based on freely conferred deference. How these distinct 
hierarchies emerge in human groups over time remains an unanswered question. By 
addressing such a question the current research provides substantial insight into why certain 
antecedents of social rank prevail in some groups yet appear redundant in others.  
 
The current research provides a theoretical outline of, and tests, the dynamic, 
temporal relationships between prestige, dominance and social rank. We predicted that both 
profiles would be effective routes to attaining social rank during initial group formation, but 
the longitudinal trajectories of the two profiles would diverge with only prestige having a 
impact on social rank over time. Within collaborative groups, comprised of individuals 
focussed on performing a specific task and exhibiting no formalized positions of power is 
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likely to be countered (Boehm, 2009; Boehm & Flack, 2010; Price & Van Vugt, 2014; Van 
Vugt, 2006), resulting in unstable and thus potentially diminished longitudinal relationship to 
social rank. Consequently, in groups and societies that have developed strong norms that may 
either place a premium on prestige, or sanction dominance, the relationship that dominance 
has with social rank may be muted, whilst in groups and societies that lack these norms, 
dominance may remain an effective route to social rank (Pandit & van Schaik, 2003). 
 
 
2. Dominance and Prestige: Two Routes to Social Rank 
  
Humanity draws on a deep phylogenetic history of individuals gaining rank through 
dominance: the strategic implementation of fear and coercion (Barkow, 1975). Individuals 
attend to a multitude of visual, auditory and behavioural cues to a peer’s dominance, all of 
which may be signals of their ability to inflict harm and control resources (Maynard Smith & 
Price, 1973; Mazur, 1985; Sell et al., 2009; Wrangham, 1980). Individuals not only attend to 
cues of a conspecific’s ability to inflict harm, but also to signals of an individual’s propensity 
for behaviours that propagate fear, which comprise a dominance psychological profile (i.e. 
aggression, disagreeableness, narcissism: Cheng, Tracy & Henrich 2010; Henrich, 2016).  
 
 Evidence suggests that dominance in humans does indeed provide some distinct 
fitness pay-offs. In certain contexts, males and females expressing dominance-related traits 
can be high in social rank and have control over social, sexual, informational and material 
resources (Buss & Duntley, 2006; Chagnon, 2012; Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & 
Henrich, 2013; Griskevicius et al., 2009). Complementary to this, meta-analytical evidence 
across non-industrial societies indicates that dominance-conferring traits are linked to 
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reproductive success (von Rueden & Jaeggi, 2016). For example, males perceived high in 
dominance among Tsimane hunter-horticulturalists of Bolivia (von Rueden, Gurven, & 
Kaplan, 2010) and males with lower voice pitch among the Hadza (Apicella, Feinberg, & 
Marlowe, 2007) have a greater number of offspring within their community.  
 
Whilst dominance does seem to predict social rank in some societies, contradictory 
evidence has emerged that suggests a zero or negative relationship between dominance and 
social rank in task-based groups (i.e. Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006; 
Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989). In such groups, dominant individuals may not possess 
exceptional instrumental social value and are neither willing nor able to facilitate the 
accomplishment of a group’s shared goals. Individuals operating in collaborative groups are 
more likely to defer to conspecifics through processes of respect and esteem, rather than 
threat and coercion (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Chase, 1974; Chase & Lindquist, 2016; Price 
& Van Vugt, 2014). Contradictory evidence is also found in small-scale societies, whereby 
dominance seems to relate to social rank in some groups (i.e. Chagnon, 1989; von Rueden et 
al., 2010), but not in others (i.e.Boehm, 2009; Cashdan, 1980; Kaplan, Hooper, & Gurven, 
2009). These inconsistent findings may in-part be due to the different ways that dominance 
has been operationalized, with measures of physical strength and size, fighting ability 
(especially in times of conflict) and authority potentially being confounded by perceptions of 
prestige, providing instrumental value and propagating respect—rather than fear—within a 
group.  
 
 This potential premium placed on respect, skill and esteem in collaborative groups 
likely emerged alongside humanity’s increased interdependence for subsistence 
(Winterhalder, 1986), the increased reliance on social learning (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) 
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and the enhanced need for coordination of collective efforts and leadership (Hooper, Kaplan, 
& Boone, 2010; Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008). Prestige bias refers to the process by 
which individuals preferentially learn from and defer to those who signal valued skills, 
knowledge and prosocial attributes, also focussing on the attention and respect that potential 
learning models receive from proximate others to detect the best model (Bliege Bird & 
Smith, 2005; Henrich & Broesch, 2011). Alongside this, groups are often attentive to cues of 
an individual’s generous intent, signalling a propensity to effectively and ethically steer the 
group’s direction (Glowacki & von Rueden, 2015; Willer, 2009). Therefore, to facilitate 
coordination and gain proximity to these prosocial, talented individuals and access their 
skills, individuals confer deference and yield decision-making (Cheng et al., 2013; von 
Rueden et al., 2014).  
 
It is likely that humans have developed a prestige psychology, which encompasses a 
wide range of emotions and personality traits that are associated with both being and finding 
an optimal learning model, with individuals signalling and attending to both an ability and 
willingness to confer benefits (Cheng et al. 2010; Henrich, 2016). These prosocial reputations 
relate to the amount of socio-economic support and deference an individual receives (Hardy 
& Van Vugt, 2006; Macfarlan, Quinlan, & Remiker, 2013) and are crucial for prestige to be a 
stable strategy, as behaving arrogantly or with entitlement may squander away a prestigious 
individual’s status (Ames & Flynn, 2007). This is due to the market-like relationship that 
underpins prestige, as prestigious individuals do not take, but are afforded social rank and are 
freely granted distinct fitness-enhancing benefits (i.e. higher reproductive success, positions 
of leadership: Alden Smith, 2004; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; von Rueden & Jaeggi, 2016).  
 




Although the extant literature indicates that dominance and prestige are both fruitful 
for attaining social rank in either unacquainted or pre-existing groups, extant theoretical and 
empirical research has not outlined the impact that time has on these processes. In the 
following section, we propose a theoretical framework that integrates time into the dual 
model of social hierarchy, hypothesising that time may further give rise to a longitudinal 
distinction between the two processes and their relationship with social rank. We further 
highlight that whilst prestige and dominance are universal strategies for acquiring social rank, 
the relative context-specificity of rank allocation norms produces context-specificity in the 
efficacy of both dominance and prestige for the accrual of social rank. 
 
Social hierarchy and rank relations are inherently dynamic and, in part, context 
specific. While social hierarchy is thought to be universal (Van Vugt & Tybur, 2015), there 
are striking differences in the extant cross-sectional evidence examining the antecedents and 
dimensions of rank differentiation (reviewed in Ridgeway, 2017). It seems that, while we all 
have a motivation to obtain social rank and feel valued (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 
2015), the means by which these positions are obtained may be culturally and contextually 
determined (Benoit-Smullyan, 1944; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Leary, Jongman-Sereno, & 
Diebels, 2014). Individuals operate in multiple hierarchies in their day-to-day lives. They 
may be the head of their household, but subordinate in their network of friends or coasting as 
the middle man in their workplace, with each hierarchy operating on a distinct set of rules for 
rank allocation (Sewell, 1992). These rules may be governed by the social dynamics of the 
group, with rank allocation norms being contingent on the reactionary nature of deference 
within the group. More specifically, the deference behaviors of group members are in 
response to the actions and traits observed in those around them and, through this reactive 
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relational dependence, those composing a group often confer social rank to the same 
individuals (Báles, Strodtbeck, Mills, & Roseborough, 1951; Blau, 1964; Zaccaro, 2007). 
The norms surrounding rank allocation may further be guided by the task that a group faces, 
operating in a manner that may maximize group success (Ellis, 1994; C. Ridgeway & 
Diekema, 1989) or reduce the costs inflicted upon the group by others (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; 
Mazur, 2005). 
 
However, differences between contexts need time to become salient. In the nascent 
stages of group formation, or in transient groups of unacquainted individuals, rank 
asymmetries may be unstable and the norms surrounding the traits that promote social rank 
are, in most cases, unclear. Therefore, in such groups, rank allocation patterns may differ 
from those observed in long-term groups.  Given the reactionary nature of deference in 
groups, time is important as it facilitates observations of who other members of the group are 
attending and deferring to. Evidence confirms that reputation correlates more strongly with 
history of acts and behaviors for the most prominent individuals in a community (Anderson 
& Shirako, 2008). Over time, the relationship between contextually-important traits and 
social rank within a group is not only expected to strengthen, but also be dynamic, with 
anterior social rank increasing future social rank and potentially feeding back into and 
increasing perceptions of the processes that increased social rank previously. These dynamic 
aspects of rank differentiation would suggest that the processes relating to rank acquisition 
may have divergent impacts on social rank in the different stages of group formation.     
 
Given that individuals high in dominance gain social rank through fear, it is easier for 
dominance to operate effectively in the nascent stages of group formation, or in transient 
groups of unacquainted individuals. Evidence suggests that humans possess evolved 
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cognitive capacities for extracting formidability-relevant information from both 
morphological and behavioural signals to dominance (Holbrook, Fessler & Navarette, 2016; 
Sell et al., 2009; Toscano, Schubert, & Sell, 2014). Those high in dominance are also likely 
to cue social formidability and are more inclined to speak and attempt to forcefully direct 
group-related tasks. For example, dominant individuals are prone to deepen their voice 
during initial interaction, speak with force and subtly tease or ostracise others to produce fear 
(Bendersky & Hays, 2011; Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Case & Maner, 2014; Cheng, Tracy, 
Ho, & Henrich, 2016; Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998; Manson, Gervais, 
Fessler & Kline, 2014). Through these behaviours, the individuals who become more 
conversationally domineering and interrupt during task-related conversations are perceived 
higher in dominance and, in turn, higher in social rank in groups of unacquainted individuals 
(Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013; Farley, 2008). This evidence 
suggests that, unlike prestige, the efficacy of dominance in promoting social rank is less 
reliant on a history of interactions and that cues to dominance may be salient even with 
limited information.   
 
 
It is possible that temporally-extended group interactions will mitigate the 
effectiveness of dominance. Human groups accurately monitor status dynamics and the 
behaviour of individuals, which may supress the effects of dominance on rank acquisition 
over time (Anderson et al. 2001; Boehm & Flack, 2010; Wiessner & Schiefenhövel, 1998). 
For example, as group members become acquainted with one another and exchange 
information and experiences, the perceived value of members develops (Baumeister, Zhang, 
& Vohs, 2004; Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014). Individuals who initially attained social 
rank due to dominance behaviours may not be perceived as high in social capital or 
 
 45 
instrumental social value (i.e. both their ability and willingness to help accomplish an 
individual’s or group’s goals: Leary et al., 2014; Lin, 1999). Specifically, cross-sectional 
evidence suggests that in task-groups of individuals cooperating to accomplish a shared goal, 
perceptions of an individual’s allocentric motives, generosity and task-related competence are 
most salient in promoting social rank (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009a; Flynn, Reagans, 
Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006; Griskevicius et al., 2009), which are traits antithetical to those 
associated with dominance (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010). 
 
We propose that the context of time and place is fundamental to the nature of human 
dominance, with dominance relations being relatively malleable based on the composition of 
group. Unlike non-human primates, physical strength and size are not necessarily the most 
essential determinants of victory during agonistic contests between humans. The presence of 
allies and coalitions shrinks the perceived size and muscularity of a foe (Holbrook, Fessler & 
Navarrete, 2016; Fessler & Holbrook, 2013) and the widespread development of lethal 
weaponry potentially neutralizes human physiological dominance (Gintis, van Schaik, & 
Boehm, 2015). The diminished potency of physical dominance, and increased reliance on 
manipulation (Clutton-Brock, 2009) and coercion through psychological fear (Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001) has altered the manifestation of dominance relationships.  This, paired with the 
aforementioned temporal dynamics associated with rank allocation and maintenance, has 
constrained the efficacy of dominance as a long-term strategy for attaining social rank in 
many settings.  
 
For dominance to remain an effective rank acquisition strategy over time, there must 
be a number of social and socio-structural antecedents. Within groups where aggression, 
bullying and violence are prevalent and normative, individuals high in dominance-related 
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traits may take power and increase their rank (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996; Henry et al., 
2000; Redhead 2016). In developmental hierarchies, for instance, dominance is associated 
with popularity and social rank (Redhead, Cheng, & O’Gorman, 2018) and seems most 
potent for rank acquisition during periods of transition (i.e. between primary and middle or 
junior high school), when groups and hierarchies are forming (Faris & Felmlee, 2011; 
Pellegrini & Long, 2003). Moreover, in periods when usually peaceful groups are warring, 
individuals perceived high in dominance may be preferentially selected as leaders (Little, 
Burriss, Jones, & Roberts, 2007). A similar partiality for leaders harbouring dominance-
related traits has also been observed in formalized hierarchies, whereby the official position 
of an individual may afford them power and the increased ability to inflict costs on others via 
reward and punishment (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). In sum, the efficacy of dominance is 
expected to be less stable and more variable across environments.  
 
 Prestige, on the other hand, seems to be universally promoted by groups and 
communities, and should remain a near-universal stable and effective route for attaining 
social rank over time. Prestige is marked by the deference of others within the group and 
should become more potent in promoting rank when greater information is gathered, or needed, 
about a potential learning model. Whilst there seems to be an innate ability to track and 
preferentially learn from accurate models (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008), during the 
initial phase of a group’s formation all individuals are relatively naïve learners and may not 
be able to precisely understand a causal connection between a potential learning model’s 
practices and their success (Henrich, 2016). Their judgements about a potential learning 
model’s prestige may rely on less accurate cues to their adaptive knowledge suitable for the 
given situation, such as attribute-similarity (Losin, Iacoboni, Martin, & Dapretto, 2012) and 
cross-domain prestige biases (e.g. being carried over from an unrelated field: Henrich & Gil-
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White, 2001). This, paired with the amount that potentially dominant others speak and 
interrupt, are attended to, and are afforded social rank in the initial period of a group’s 
formation may cause these cues to be weaker in the nascent stages of group formation. 
 
This is not to say that prestige is an ineffective process among unacquainted groups, 
nor that prestige is constrained solely to social learning, but that prestige may become 
increasingly effective as group members become more acquainted and there are more 
opportunities to directly perceive success as well as indirect cues to prestige. Additionally, 
prestige is founded on the desire of others within the group to please prestigious learning 
models, which is cued by the proximity that peers strive for and maintain, and the deference 
that these individuals provide to a learning model (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). 
Consequently, the accumulation of deference that a model receives and the growing number 
of proximate others talking positively about them, wanting to be close to and mimicking them 
may also feed back into the individual’s future prestige (Chudek, Heller, Birch & Henrich, 
2012). Thus, through a learners’ tendency to track prestige cues given off by other learners 
(i.e., to whom do others attend, defer, and emulate), social rank and prior prestige breed 
greater future prestige.  
 
 
4. The Current Research 
 
Given the theoretical grounds for suspecting that dominance may lead to social rank 
in the early stages of group formation but yield to prestige over time, we designed a study 
using newly-formed task-based student groups to directly assess the outlined temporal 
dynamics of the dual model of social hierarchy. We predict that prestige and dominance will 
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have distinct temporal effects on social rank in collaborative task groups, but over time these 
relationships will be bidirectional and social rank may also impact on an individual’s 
perceived prestige, but not dominance. The current study utilizes peer ratings of prestige, 
dominance, and social rank within task-based groups for which membership was randomly 
determined. The timescale of the present research captured the measures from the stage of 
group formation through to the completion of the task that the group faced. The current 
context provides a fruitful platform for evaluating the effects of prestige and dominance, as a 
sizable collection of individuals collaborated on projects that had a substantial impact on their 
academic grade—an outcome that is given substantial weight in this model group. Thus, 
individuals had a vested interest in ensuring that the group functioned effectively, which 
parallels the dynamics of a wide range of project-based groups that represent how many far-
reaching, crucial decisions are made in WEIRD societies (i.e. work groups and teams in 
organisations, leaders and policy-makers in government: Anderson & Kilduff, 2009a; Ronay, 
Greenaway, Anicich, & Galinsky, 2012).  
 
4.1 Hypotheses  
In light of previous evidence and the theory outlined above we hypothesised that: 
 
H1: Prestige and dominance both predict social rank at the initial time of measurement. 
 
H2: Whilst individuals perceived as high in dominance will have high social rank initially, 
this relationship will diminish over time.  
 
H3: Individuals perceived as high in prestige will have relatively high social rank initially 




H4: Individual’s social rank will feedback and increase their subsequent prestige. 
 
H5: Prestige and dominance will operate independently as distinct processes, such that they 




5.1. Participants. Students (N = 263, 60% female, ̅age = 20.67, +, = 1.38) at a North 
American University participated in exchange for course-credit. Participants comprised two 
classrooms enrolled in the same course taught by the same instructor over two years 
(classroom 1: n = 123 individuals, classroom 2: n = 140 individuals), and were nested in 66 
randomly assigned mixed-sex task groups (classroom 1: n = 30 groups, classroom 2: n = 36 
groups) that each had between 3-5 members (̅ = 4.02, +, = 0.33). Participants worked in 
the task groups to complete a course project throughout the 16-week semester worth 30% of 
their final grade.  
 
5.2. Procedure. Every week, participants attended a large lecture for two hours and 
spent a further four hours working in-person in their randomly-assigned task groups in 
laboratory sections. At the start of the semester, participants completed a self-report 
questionnaire in week 1, before meeting the rest of their group. In the remainder of the 
semester, they completed a further four self- and peer-report questionnaires (in weeks 2, 6, 10 
and 16) online. The extra two weeks between the fourth and fifth questionnaires (weeks 10 
and 16) were due to the week-long holiday and mid-term exams during this period. 
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Participants were assigned a unique ID and allotted up to 7 days to complete each 
questionnaire.  
 
 5.3. Self-Report Measures. 
Gender. Participants reported the gender that they identify as at the beginning of the study 
(week 1). Participants were given the choice of 4 categories: ‘male’, ‘female’, ‘neither male 
nor female’ and ‘prefer to not say’. 
  
5.4. Peer-Report Measures. 
 
Prestige and Dominance. Throughout the peer-report questionnaires (weeks 2, 6, 10, 16), 
participants rated all other members of their task groups on prestige and dominance, using an 
abridged version (in order to reduce participant fatigue) of the Prestige and Dominance 
Scaled Questionnaires (Cheng et al., 2010). All ratings were made on a scale ranging from 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Ratings comprised four items assessing perceived 
prestige (e.g. “Their unique talents and abilities are recognized by others in the group”) and 
four items measuring perceived dominance (e.g. “They enjoy having control over other 
members of the group”). Ratings were then averaged across raters at each time wave to obtain 
prestige and dominance scores for each participant. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all 
variables. Both prestige and dominance had excellent reliability, with / > .80, and were not 
correlated at every time point (see Table 2 for internal consistency and raw correlations at 
each time point).  
 
Social Rank. Prior work has used and established the validity of this set of items in predicting 
actual decision-making capacity within groups (Cheng et al., 2013). Here, participants rated 
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all other members of their group on three items assessing perceived social influence and three 
items assessing their perceived agency. The items capturing social influence comprised: 
“This person leads the task group”, “I paid attention to this person” and “This person had 
high status”. The items capturing agency were adapted from the Revised Interpersonal 
Adjective Scale (Wiggins, Trapnell, & Phillips, 1988) and consisted of: “This person was 
assertive”, “This person was self-confident” and “This person is timid”. Responses across all 
6 items were averaged at each time wave to yield a composite score for their perceived social 
rank that had adequate internal consistency at every time-point (see Table 2). 
 
5.5. Analytical Strategy 
 
We assessed the dynamic relationships between prestige, dominance and social rank 
from the point that the collaborative task groups formed and cast initial peer ratings (week 2 
of the study, referred to as T1 from this point) to the end of the semester (week 16, referred to 
as T4) using a hierarchical Bayesian continuous-time structural equation model (from this 
point referred to as ctsem: for an introduction see Driver & Voelkle, 2018), using the ctsem 
package (version 2.4.0. Driver, Oud, & Voelkle, 2017) in R (version 3.3.3: R core 
development team). ctsem utilizes stochastic differential equations that assess processes 
operating continuously over time and accounts for a number of important short-comings of 
typical discrete time models (see Driver, Voelkle & Oud, 2017; Driver & Voelkle, 2018). A 
central strength of ctsem is that hypotheses relating to how change in one process may predict 
later change in a different process (i.e. cross-lagged effects) are assessed while accounting for 
stable factors, such as the average level of the process, and also correlated changes at that 
time point (via the diffusion matrix, see Driver et al., 2017). Through a hierarchical Bayesian 
framework, ctsem allows for the estimation of continuous time processes of a sample while 
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accounting for potential subject-level deviations by using population model estimates to 
inform subject-level model priors, which is a fruitful compromise between more traditional 
fixed-effects and subject-specific models (Driver & Voelkle, 2018). See supplementary 
materials for detailed information about the modelling approach. 
 
The ctsem that was applied to our data represents a first order, three-process model of 
prestige, dominance and social rank dynamics. We specified the default model priors outlined 
in Driver and Voelkle (2018). Whilst we did not predict effects of gender, gender 
composition of groups, size of group and cohort, we ran models that controlled for the 
potential main effects of these variables on the average level of model processes by including 
them as time-independent predictors. In fact, none of these variables had an impact on any 
processes, nor did they improve model fit.  Moreover, to assess and account for any 
interdependencies in ratings of prestige, dominance and social rank at the task-group level, a 
model was estimated where prestige, dominance and social rank were group-mean centred. 
This also had no impact on our results. Outputs from any of these models are available upon 
request. Figure 1 illustrates the final estimated model and Equation 1 represents the matrix 
specification of our subject-level model.  
 
The focus of the model was the drift matrix of temporal dynamics, represented in 
Figure 1 as regression paths between dominance, social rank and prestige, and the diffusion 
matrix, which is represented as the correlations between prestige, dominance and social rank 
at a given time point. The drift matrix illustrates the lagged interrelatedness of the processes 
on one another (e.g. the effects of dominance at time 1 on social rank at time 2), and the 
within-subject temporal stability (i.e. the auto effects of prestige on prestige over time). The 
diffusion matrix represents uncertainty, or noise, in the dynamic model – at any time there 
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may be changes occurring in the latent processes that the deterministic dynamics given by the 
drift matrix do not predict, and these random changes can be correlated across processes.  In 
interpreting the model outputs, we assessed the parameter’s posterior mean in relation to its 
posterior standard deviation (SD) and posterior credibility intervals (CI). The CI indicate, 
with 95% credibility, the probability that the parameter falls between the lower (2.5%) and 
upper (97.5%) limits. For some parameters it is important to consider if they genuinely differ 
from zero – for these, if zero does not fall within the upper or lower limits the CI of the 
parameter, then we conclude that the non-zero parameter estimate is not due merely to 




6.1. Do dominance and prestige predict social rank initially in the newly formed groups 
(H1)?  
 
To examine the impact of perceived prestige and dominance on social rank at the 
initial time of measurement, we examined the correlations between all three variables at the 
initial point of the groups meeting (see Table 2 and Figure 2). Non-informative priors were 
specified, which expressed ignorance to the value and direction of the relationships between 
prestige, dominance and social rank1.  
 
There were no significant differences in perceptions of prestige, dominance and social 
rank based on gender. Nor were there any substantial gender differences in the relationship 
between prestige, dominance and social rank when assessing males and females separately. 
Thus, the correlations reported are collapsed across genders. Correlations were consistent 
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with Hypothesis 1 and suggest that at time 1 prestige had a strong, positive relationship with 
social rank with the 95% credibility intervals being much greater than zero (ρ = 0.38, CI = 
[0.26, 0.48]). A positive relationship was also found between dominance and social rank (ρ = 
0.20, CI = [0.08, 0.31]).  
 
6.2 Do prestige and dominance predict social rank over time (H2 and H3)?  
 
The results presented in Table 3 are the posterior mean, standard deviation and CI 
estimates of the means of the population distributions of the model represented by Figure 1. 
All parameter estimates reported have far greater than 100 effective samples and the 2 3 for all 
parameters fell between 1.00 – 1.03. As shown in Table 3, there were no notable main effects 
of gender on the average levels of the three processes, with the credibility intervals 
encompassing 0.  
 
The population means for the T0 mean parameters in Table 3 represent the 
relationship between the subject’s initial states with their later states throughout the latent 
process. A negative T0 mean implies that the initial state of the process was lower than future 
states, whereas a positive value would suggest that the initial state was higher. Results 
indicate no strong tendency for prestige (̅ = −0.82, +, = 0.54, 67 =  [−1.73,0.65], 
dominance (̅ = 0.19, +, = 1.20, 67 =  [−1.54,3.72] or social rank (̅ = −0.66, +, =
0.57, 67 =  [−1.07,0.85] to increase or decrease substantially over time, as for all 
parameters zero falls within the CIs. The manifest mean parameters represent the average 
level of the processes, while the manifest variance parameters reflect random measurement 




The drift parameters of prestige on prestige, dominance on dominance, and social 
rank on social rank denote the autoregression effects of the processes. The closer these 
estimates are to zero, the more temporal stability there is in the process – that is, changes in 
prestige, dominance and social rank persist longer in time. As shown in Table 3 and Figure 
3a, changes in dominance persist, as the estimates are closest to zero (̅ = −0.23, +, =
0.16, 67 = [−0.59, −0.02]. Changes in social rank are the next most persistent (̅ =
−0.66, +, = 0.19, 67 =  [−1.07, −0.32], while changes in prestige appear to dissipate 
fastest (̅ = −1.07, +, = 0.22, 67 =  [−1.52, −0.66].  
 
To assess the effects of prestige and dominance on social rank over time we first 
evaluate the drift matrix parameters that represent the cross effects in Table 3 and are shown 
in Figures 3b. When a positive value is estimated it reflects that when one process rises, so 
too does the other, whereas a negative value would suggest a negative effect. Results support 
Hypothesis 3, indicating that prestige had a positive effect on social rank over time (̅ =
0.33, +, = 0.15, 67 = [0.05,0.66]). Consistent with Hypothesis 2, evidence for the effect of 
dominance on social rank over time is less clear, with results indicating that there was no 
substantial effect, with CI’s including zero (̅ = 0.12, +, = 0.12, 67 = [−0.09,0.38].  
 
To further understand the temporal relationships that prestige and dominance have 
with social rank, we turn to the diffusion matrix correlation parameters shown in Table 3. 
Unlike the results above, which present the causal relationships between processes, these 
parameters represent the within-subject correlation in the random changes of the latent 
processes and highlight the extent to which the processes may share common causes. The 
results align with those of the drift parameters, providing strong evidence that the random 
changes in prestige and social rank over time may share some common causes (̅ =
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0.71, +, = 0.12, 67 = [0.46,0.90]. Random disturbances affecting dominance and social 
rank processes do not seem related (̅ = −0.03, +, = 0.12, 67 = [−0.25,0.20]. 
 
Furthermore, the between-subject correlations shown in Table 3 indicate that average 
levels of prestige had a high correlation with average levels of social rank (̅ = 0.78, +, =
0.12, 67 = [0.42,0.90]. Whereas, the near-zero between-subject correlation for dominance 
and social rank indicate average levels of the processes tended to have a limited correlation 
(̅ = −0.02, +, = 0.20, 67 = [−0.48,0.31]. With respect to our hypotheses about the 
temporal effects that dominance has on long-term social rank (H2), results are inconclusive – 
if dominance does have an effect, it is not substantial in this sample.  
 
6.3. Does social rank increase prestige, but not dominance, over time (H4)?  
 
To assess the concurrent effects of social rank on prestige and dominance over time, 
we examined the drift matrix parameters in Table 3 and Figure 3c-d that illustrate the 
processes’ cross effects. Results provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 4 and imply that 
social rank markedly increases an individual’s prestige over time (̅ = 1.10, +, = 0.23, 67 =
[0.66,1.58], to a greater extent than prestige affects social rank (see above). On the other 
hand, the effect of social rank on dominance was negligible (̅ = −016, +, = 0.15, 67 =
[−0.11,0.47]. As outlined above, both the between-subject correlations and diffusion matrix 
correlations between prestige and social rank were positively related, while the between-
subject correlations and diffusion matrix correlations between dominance and social rank 
indicate little to no relationship. The results support our hypothesis suggesting that social 





6.4. Are prestige and dominance distinct temporal processes (H5)?  
 
As shown in Table 2, prestige and dominance did not have a substantial correlation at 
any time point in the study. Both of these results are consistent with Hypothesis 5. 
 
The drift parameters and diffusion matrix correlations between prestige and dominance 
assess the interrelatedness of changes in the processes over the observed time range, while 
the correlation between the average level of the processes points to their relation in a cross-
sectional sense. As shown in Table 3 and Figure 3c-d, all such parameters include zero in the 
CI, providing evidence in support of Hypothesis 5 and suggesting that if there is a 
relationship between prestige and dominance, it is not as substantial as that between other 
processes discussed. Results support our hypothesis that, whilst prestige and dominance 
tended to have a negative impact on one another, the relationship was limited, and they may 




The current research extends prior work on human social hierarchy by proposing a 
theoretical account of how prestige and dominance fare over time. We also provide the first 
longitudinal empirical assessment of the hypothesised dynamic relationships. Through a 
longitudinal task-group design the present research examined the unique effects that prestige 
and dominance had on social rank from the initial formation of collaborative groups through 
to the completion of those group’s tasks using an advanced analytical technique. In line with 
previous research (Cheng et al., 2013), results replicate that both prestige and dominance 
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coexisted as successful rank acquisition strategies in newly acquainted groups. These results 
align with previous work that suggests that humans have a predisposition to defer to those 
that they perceived as able and willing to either confer benefits or inflict harm, even among 
groups of undergraduate students, whereby fear and threat may not be particularly potent. 
 
 Critically, however, in the weeks following group formation, dominance did not have a 
substantial effect on social rank, whilst prestige strongly increased social rank over time. The 
present findings also demonstrated that the relationship that prestige had with social rank was 
bidirectional, with an individual’s social rank having a positive temporal effect on prestige. 
Finally, results support the notion that prestige and dominance are distinct processes, with 
neither process having a substantial temporal impact on one another and random disturbances 
on the two processes having a limited correlation.  
 
The current research highlights that time is of both theoretical and methodological 
importance in the assessment of processes relating to social hierarchy. The present findings 
supported the prestige-dominance account of human social hierarchy and further highlight the 
complexities of human rank attainment and maintenance over time. Specifically, we argue 
that in collaborative task-based groups, which is a widely generalizable context, there is a 
premium placed on prestige, such that prestige maintains an individual’s social rank whilst 
social rank further increases their prestige. This relationship is important for the interpretation 
of cross-sectional assessments of the relationship between prestige and social rank. Cross-
sectionally, a significant relationship between the two processes in previously acquainted 
groups is often interpreted as prestige impacting social rank. However, the present research 
highlights that these cross-sectional findings should be interpreted with caution as the 
converse relationship may in fact be what they are observing.  The following section outlines 
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the broad implications of the current research for understanding social hierarchy and rank 
allocation in human groups. 
 
7.1 Implications for the Dual Model of Social Hierarchy 
 
The dual model of social hierarchy outlines that, in human hierarchies, individuals 
may attain social rank through prestige and dominance (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). 
Expanding upon this, the current research provides a theoretical framework for the distinction 
between these two processes over time demonstrating that dominance and prestige have no 
substantial within-person temporal relationship or between-subject correlation throughout the 
period observed. This finding stands in contrast with the concept that social rank acquired 
through dominance is only made viable as the cues to dominance are misinterpreted by peers 
as indications of prestige-related traits, such as competence (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009b; 
Chapais, 2015; Lukaszewski et al., 2016). These results provide clear indication that 
dominant individuals are not simply confused as prestigious, neither concurrently nor over 
time. Rather, the current findings support that individuals in unacquainted groups may attain 
rank through two distinct, concurrent routes either centred on producing fear through 
aggression and coercion or obtaining respect through skill and competence (Cheng et al., 
2013, 2010; Sijtsema, Veenstra, Lindenberg, & Salmivalli, 2009). Importantly, the present 
findings indicate that prestige and dominance have divergent temporal relationships with 
social rank, with prestige having a strong, positive and sustained relationship with social 
rank, whilst the effect that dominance has on rank attainment, in this context, is negligible 




The question raised by these results, therefore, is not whether dominance is a 
successful rank acquisition strategy but when. In which contexts and at what times in an 
interaction is dominance a viable route to acquiring and maintaining social rank? In the 
nascent stages of group formation, the context-dependent norms that constrain dominance 
may have limited potency for two reasons. Firstly, dominance-related traits and behaviours 
may be incredibly potent in newly-formed groups, signalling their threat potential and 
allowing them to acquire rank among unacquainted individuals who have limited cues to 
attend to (Bruckert, Liénard, Lacroix, Kreutzer, & Leboucher, 2006; Cheng et al., 2016; 
Farley, 2008; D. R. Feinberg, Jones, Little, Burt, & Perrett, 2005). Secondly, previous 
research has indicated that leveling mechanisms that may produce such context-dependent 
norms, for example coalitions, negative gossip and group sanctions, monitor behaviours and 
supress the relationship between dominance and social rank (Boehm, 2009; Dunbar, 1996; 
Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014). Unacquainted individuals do not have high degrees of 
relational closeness and may not be able to or feel comfortable to discuss an absent other as 
part of monitoring and gossip (Burt & Knez, 1996; Dunbar, 1996), thus the potency of these 
leveling mechanisms would be limited. The current research highlights that these norms may 
come into fruition only once individuals have become better acquainted and that suggests that 
the levelling mechanisms underlying such norms may explain the present finding that 
dominance is effective only in the initial period and not over the entire period of study. 
Directly assessing the emergence and success of a vast array of leveling efforts aimed at 
preventing coercive leadership, in order to understand why certain individuals manage to 
acquire and retain influence over time through force and fear and why some groups succeed 





Antithetically, the present findings offer the first empirical evidence indicating that, 
whilst prestige is related to social rank among unacquainted individuals when groups initially 
form, this relationship remains strong over time. These results support the theoretical account 
outlining that prestige-based social rank may have developed dynamically alongside the 
remarkable capacity for cultural learning that humans exhibit, with cultural learning 
providing an opportunity for prestige-based rank and also being propagated by prestige 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1988; Henrich & McElreath, 2003). Among unacquainted individuals, 
those assessing who to learn from, and support or cooperate with, are relatively naïve and 
may attend to cues that are weakly associated to an individual’s skill, knowledge and ability 
(Henrich, 2016). At the same time, dominance may operate effectively, with those high in 
dominance commanding the attention of others. However, once individuals collect more 
information about their peers over time, more robust impressions of an individual’s prestige 
can form, which are based on repeated observations of cues to both their ability and to a 
cooperative, prosocial disposition. Moreover, the extremely high continuous-time between-
subjects correlation and raw discrete-time correlations observed in the present study indicate 
that, over time, prestige and social rank become close to being indistinguishable.  The current 
research suggests that, over time, individuals can more readily discern prestige, are more 
likely to confer deference and, thus, suggest an association between prestige and social rank 
becomes incredibly strong over time.  
 
One of the hypothesized central cues to a potential learning model’s prestige is the 
attention, deference and followership that they receive from proximate others (Henrich, 
Chudek, & Boyd, 2015; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Individuals with high social rank are 
likely to receive greater attention, deference and followership from their peers and, thus, an 
individual’s social rank should have positive feedback into their prestige over time. The 
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present findings not only provide the first empirical evidence that prestige has a positive 
temporal effect on social rank, but that social rank also has a strong temporal effect on 
prestige, emphasizing that the relationship between prestige and social rank is dynamic and 
the processes may be mutually dependent. Taken together, the present findings suggest that, 
through this process, the dynamic relationship between prestige and social rank may be 
wedded together in human hierarchy, highlighting that over time prestige becomes incredibly 
potent and that social rank also increases an individual’s prestige over time.  
 
 
7.2 Limitations and future directions. 
 
The present findings pose questions as to when exactly dominance is a viable pathway 
for both attaining and maintaining social rank, and further empirical investigation is needed 
to directly assess the mechanisms that may level dominance over time. Previous research 
outlining group mechanisms that level dominance has been theoretical (i.e. Boehm, 2009) 
and further research should directly test how the outlined mechanisms affect dominance over 
time, such as through gossip (Feinberg, Cheng, & Willer, 2012), coalitions (Fessler & 
Holbrook, 2013; Gintis et al., 2015) , and potentially the concurrent prestige effect (Chudek 
& Henrich, 2011; Henrich et al., 2015). Moreover, future research may assess the strategies 
that those high in dominance may implement to maintain their social rank in light of potential 
group leveling mechanisms. For example, there may be certain contexts where dominance 
fares well over time, such as when operating in dyads (Ridgeway, 2017); or when group size 
is large and relatively fragmented, and members share the diffused costs inflicted by 
dominant individuals and thus show a great willingness to tolerate them; when individuals 
have formalized power (Magee & Galinsky, 2008); when groups are directly competing 
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against neighboring others and dominance is potentially complemented by an individual’s 
perceived competence in outcompeting or inflicting harm against the outgroup (i.e. Cheng et 
al., 2010; Halevy et al., 2008; Neave & Wolfson, 2003); or in groups where dominance-
related traits are promoted by social norms (Henry et al., 2000; Redhead, 2016). Moreover, 
dominant individuals may attempt to ostracise their competition (Case & Maner, 2014), and 
may potentially modify the structure of a group so as to prevent group leveling mechanisms 
from having an impact on their position.  
 
In terms of the modelling approach, while stable individual differences and common 
causes have been accounted for, reducing the possibility of spurious cross-effect results, with 
observational data causality is never clear. We cannot determine whether it is precisely 
changes in social rank that cause changes in prestige, or whether it is rather changes in 
something highly related to social rank. Moreover, the scales used to measure prestige, 
dominance and social rank were created and tested using a between-subjects application 
(Cheng et al., 2010). Future research assessing and validating the current scales and their 
within-subject temporal relationships would further disentangle how measures distinctly load 
onto the latent concepts of prestige, dominance and social rank.  
 
A key limitation of the current research is the reliance on North American 
undergraduate students in assessing the proposed evolutionary framework. This population is 
often not representative of the world’s populations (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). 
Whilst there has been previous research assessing the effects of prestige and dominance on 
rank attainment a number of populations, such as the Tsimane of Bolivia (von Rueden et al., 
2010), the Chabu of Ethiopia (Garfield & Hagan, Under Review), in a developmental setting 
in rural Romania (Redhead, 2016) and the United States and Canada (Cheng et al., 2013, 
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2010; Johnson, Burk, & Kirkpatrick, 2007), all studies have been cross-sectional. Thus, 
despite an important advantage of providing larger sample sizes for more accurate parameter 
estimates and the ability to track groups from the point of their formation, the current task-
group setting potentially limits the processes discussed to the dynamic relationship between 
prestige, dominance and social rank to task-groups in WEIRD settings or to these processes 
during young adulthood.  
 
Future research investigating the temporal dynamics of prestige, dominance and 
social rank is needed on a broader timescale that encompasses multiple ages among 
geographically and culturally diverse societies to further generalize how effective both routes 
are for attaining and maintaining social rank in human groups and ascertain when dominance 
becomes a long-term strategy for maintaining social rank. Through this, such future research 
may further capture the effects of prestige and dominance in different tasks over time and 
further measure dominance in contexts where aggression is potent and more dramatic 
displays of dominance and aggressive intent may be observed.  Future research may also 
provide a further understanding of the generalizability of the present results over a longer 
timescale, as multiple observations spanning years may exhibit less temporal stability than 




 In conclusion, the current research provides the first empirical assessment of the 
longitudinal relationships between prestige, dominance and social rank. The present findings 
offer support for both dominance and prestige being effective in initial rank attainment but 
suggest that only prestige is an effective process for maintaining social rank over time. 
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Moreover, the current research delivers considerable insight—both theoretically and 
methodologically—into the complex temporal dynamics of prestige, dominance and social 







Equation 1. Matrix specification of the subject-level model for the relationships between social rank, dominance and prestige. Notations that are 
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  Table 1.  
Descriptive statistics for all variables.  
Variable n Mean (SD) Median Min Max 
Prestige T1 259 5.04 (0.76) 5.06 2.36 7.00 
Prestige T2 256 4.87 (1.00) 4.88 1.00 7.00 
Prestige T3 250 5.03 (1.04) 5.08 1.25 7.00 
Prestige T4 249 5.09 (1.07) 5.17 2.00 7.00 
Dominance T1 259 2.80 (0.62) 2.75 1.62 5.50 
Dominance T2 256 2.64 (0.85) 2.62 1.00 6.00 
Dominance T3 250 2.68 (0.94) 2.62 1.00 6.50 
Dominance T4 249 2.61 (0.96) 2.62 1.00 5.62 
Social Rank T1 259 4.56 (0.93) 4.67 1.83 6.67 
Social Rank T2 256 4.63 (1.00) 4.82 1.00 6.79 
Social Rank T3 250 4.90 (0.98) 5.08 1.17 7.00 
Social Rank T4 249 4.95 (0.94) 5.00 2.25 6.92 
Gender a. 262 0.60 (0.49) - 0.00 1.00 
Note. N = 263. 
Total percentage of missing data = 14.54%. 




Table 2.  
Bayesian correlations between prestige, dominance and social rank. 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1.Social Rank T1 
a .71 - - - - - - - - - - - 
2.Social Rank T2 0.66** 
 
a .79 - - - - - - - - - - 
3.Social Rank T3 0.58** 0.71** 
a .74 - - - - - - - - - 
4. Social Rank T4 0.48** 0.66** 0.77** 
a.68 - - - - - - - - 
5.Dominance T1 0.20* -0.00 -.05 -0.07 
a .82 - - - - - - - 
6. Dominance T2 0.27** 0.14 0.06 0.07 0.52** 
a .86 - - - - - - 
7.Dominance T3 0.20* 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.49** 0.63** 
a .91 - - - - - 
8. Dominance T4 0.19* 0.19* 0.04 0.06 0.46** 0.60** 0.65** 
a .93 - - - - 
9. Prestige T1 0.38** 0.31** 0.35** 0.32** -0.11 -0.04 -0.07 -0.13 
a .88 - - - 
10. Prestige T2 0.48** 0.84** 0.64** 0.57** -0.09 -0.03 0.04 0.06 0.40** 
a .89 - - 
11. Prestige T3 0.45** 0.67** 0.82** 0.68** -0.18 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.38** 0.73** 
a .88 - 
12. Prestige T4 0.43** 0.64** 0.70** 0.80** -0.15 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.30** 0.67** 0.80** 
a.90 
Note. N = 263 
*BF10  > 10 **BF10 >100. Bayes Factor (BF) assesses the relative predictive performance of the alternative hypothesis (H1) compared to 
the null hypothesis (H0) by restricting the prior distribution of ρ under H0 to zero, whilst relaxing the restriction for ρ under H1 (Marsman 
& Wagenmakers, 2017).  






Means, standard deviations and posterior credibility intervals (CI) for means of estimated population distributions.  
 Dependent Process 
 Social Rank Dominance Prestige 
Parameter  ̅ SD CI  
[2.5%, 97.5%] 
̅ SD CI  
[2.5%, 97.5%] 
̅ SD CI  
[2.5%, 97.5%] 
T0 Mean -0.66 0.57 [-1.46, 0.85] 0.19 1.20 [-1.54, 3.72] -0.82 0.54 [-1.73, 0.65] 
Manifest 
Means 
5.13 0.58 [3.60, 5.93] 2.53 
 
1.20 [-1.01, 4.24] 5.34 0.54 [3.89, 6.25] 
Manifest 
Variance 
0.28 0.06 [0.13, 0.36] 0.47 0.04 [0.38, 0.54] 0.25 0.10 [0.02, 0.38] 
Main Effect 
of Gender a 
0.14 0.10 [-0.05, 0.32] -0.13 0.09 [-0.30,0.04] 0.14 0.10 [-0.60, 0.33] 
Between-subject Parameters 
b 
Social Rank - - - - - - - - - 
Dominance -0.02 0.20 [-0.48, 0.31] - - - - - - 
Prestige 0.78 0.12 [0.42, 0.90] -0.28 0.24 [-0.81, 0.17] - - - 
Drift Parameters 
Social Rank -0.66 0.19 [-1.07, -0.32] 0.16 0.15 [-0.11, 0.47] 1.10 0.23 [0.66, 1.58] 
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Dominance 0.12 0.12 [-0.09, 0.38] -0.23 0.16 [-0.59, -0.02] -0.20 0.16 [-0.50, 0.11] 
Prestige  0.33 0.15 [0.05, 0.66] -0.05 
 
0.13 [-0.31, 0.20] -1.07 
 
0.22 [-1.52, -0.66] 
Diffusion Parameters 
Social Rank 0.62 0.07 0.50 0.79 - - - - - - 
Dominance -0.03 0.12 -0.25 0.20 0.50 0.11 [0.32, 0.74] - - - 
Prestige  0.71 0.12 0.46 0.90 -0.22 0.18 [-0.60, 0.14] 0.74 0.11 [0.55, 0.94] 
Note. n = 263. T = 4.  
 a. Gender was coded 0 for males and 1 for females. Thus, a positive parameter indicates that being female had a 
positive main effect on the process, whilst a negative parameter would suggest that being male had a positive effect 
on the process.  























Figure 1. A triadic (three-process) continuous time structural equation model. The model comprises 3 manifest variables 
(dominance, social rank and prestige) and one time-independent predictor (gender). Black circles indicate the latent 
continuous time processes that load onto the 3 manifest variables. Regression paths are solid black lines between variables 
or processes, variance/covariance paths are dashed black lines between variables or processes and light grey paths 
represent those constrained to a function of other parameters. Manifest intercepts are not represented. 
D = Dominance 
Gen = Gender 
P = Prestige 
SR = Social Rank 























































Figure 2. Correlation plots, variable densities and posterior densities 






















































The current research proposes that social hierarchy is a complex dynamic 
system that is embedded in the social networks in which humans operate. Social 
networks are patterns of interpersonal relationships, operationalized as ties between a 
group of people, termed nodes or actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). This approach 
to understanding social relationships provide a foundation for understanding social 
interdependence—both theoretically and analytically—in assessing social and 
relational processes (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass & Labianca, 2009; Sniders, 2016). These 
webs of interpersonal relationships are dynamic and change over time through 
processes endogenous to the networks and through exogeneous processes associated 
with an individual’s personal characteristics and attributes (Snijders, 2001; Snijders, 
Steglich & Van De Bunt, 2010). Changes in such relationships may be as much as 
cause of changes as a consequence of changes related to social hierarchy (Carter et 
al., 2015; Torló & Lomi, 2017).  
 
A growing body of cross-sectional evidence from human social hierarchies 
has suggested that prestige—a profile centred on an individual’s ability and 
willingness to confer benefits to others—and dominance—a profile linked with the 
ability and willingness to inflict harm on others—predict social rank in an array of 
settings (Cheng et al., 2013; Garfield & Hagan, in press; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; 
Redhead, 2016; Von Rueden et al., 2010). However, given the complex relational and 
hierarchical systems in which humans operate, the strengths of the relationships that 
these profiles have with social rank vary over context and potentially over time. The 
present research utilizes a longitudinal network dynamics approach to assess the 
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potentially bidirectional relationships between prestige, dominance and social 
networks. 
 
4.1.1. The Dual Model of Social Hierarchy 
 
Social hierarchy is a universal phenomenon among human groups (Brown, 
1991; Mazur, 1985). The differentiation of social rank—defined as an individual’s 
relative position within a social hierarchy based on their social influence and agency 
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009a; Báles, Strodtbeck, Mills & Roseborough, 1951; Berger, 
Rosenholtz, Morris & Zelditch, 1980; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001)—forms 
spontaneously and develops informally in groups (Hollander, 1945) and the desire to 
attain positions of high social rank is believed to be a fundamental human motive 
(Alexander, 1979; Anderson et al., 2015; Barkow, 1975).  
 
Across environments, individuals attain high social rank through two distinct 
profiles: dominance and prestige (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Those high in 
dominance are habitually aggressive, narcissistic and extraverted, and harness social 
rank through fear, coercion and manipulation (Chance, 1967; Cheng, Tracy & 
Henrich, 2010; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). This fear is produced through these traits 
signalling an ability and willingness to inflict harm on others. Dominance may have 
evolved alongside hubristic pride (Cheng, Tracy & Henrich, 2010). Hubristic pride is 
marked by arrogance, conceit, lack of conscientiousness and an inability to form and 
maintain stable interpersonal relationships (Tracy et al., 2009). Individuals high in 
dominance appropriate social rank, with individuals conferring deference in an 
attempt to lessen the costs imposed by them (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Empirical 
evidence indicates that individuals attain social rank through dominance in 
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unacquainted groups (Cheng et al., 2013; Redhead et al., under review), in 
developmental settings (Redhead, 2016; Redhead et al., 2018), and in some small-
scale societies (Garfield & Hagan, under review; Konecna & Urlacher, 2017; Von 
Rueden et al., 2010).  
 
 Unlike dominance, the social rank of those high in prestige is granted by 
group members through freely-conferred deference. The traits that comprise a prestige 
psychological profile signal an individual’s ability and willingness to confer benefits 
to others. Individuals high in prestige often express high levels of genuine self-
esteem, extraversion, agreeableness and conscientiousness (Cheng, Tracy & Henrich, 
2010), and the traits that these individuals harbour rouse respect and admiration from 
others (Anderson et al., 2001; Blau, 1964; Cheng, Tracy, Henrich, 2010; Henrich & 
Gil-White, 2001; Krackhardt, 1990; Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989). Prestige is 
associated with authentic pride, which drives achievement-oriented motivations and 
promotes a prosocial disposition (Ashton-James & Tracy, 2012).  Evidence from a 
diverse range of societies indicates that those high in prestige are conferred deference 
as they can provide inalienable goods of value to the group, which promote 
coordination, cooperation and social learning and, thus provide net benefits to the 
group (Cheng et al., 2013; Garfield & Hagan, under review; Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001; Lewis, 2002).  
 
4.1.2 A network dynamics approach to understanding social hierarchy 
 
Human social life is structurally patterned (Kilduff, Tsai, & Hanke, 2006; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Human behaviours are embedded within networks of 
interpersonal relationships (Granovetter, 1985), which are principal elements in 
defining the identities of individuals (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003), govern individual 
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positions within a group (Torlò & Lomi, 2017), and provide benefits to both 
individuals and groups that have been fundamental to human evolution (Ohtsuki, 
Hauert, Lieberman, & Nowak, 2006). The characteristics of human social networks 
have been attributed to our success as a species, as they seem to facilitate cooperation 
among kin and non-kin (Apicella, Marlowe, Fowler, & Christakis, 2012; M. A. 
Nowak, 2006b).There are several structural processes have been shown to lead to the 
emergence of interpersonal relationships across a diverse range of human groups, 
indicating that the observed regularities in social networks between societies may 
tackle problems faced throughout human evolution. More specifically, humans tend to 
reciprocate positive relationships, which facilitates cooperation (Boyd & Richerson, 
1988) and form transitive groups (i.e. friends of friends become friends), which 
promotes trust and facilitates social norm reinforcement (Coleman, 1988). Connected 
individuals also exhibit behavioural and attitudinal similarity (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin & Cook, 2001), and further foster cooperation (Henrich, Chudek & Boyd, 
2015). Certain individuals also seem to be more central to these networks of relations, 
whereas others remain on the periphery of the structure, which may reflect the 
inherently hierarchical nature of human groups and enable effective group 
coordination (von Rueden & van Vugt, 2015).  
 
 These social networks—while following many generalizable patterns—are 
dynamic, with the positions of individuals and the overall network structures 
exhibiting relative plasticity over time and context (Adams & Blieszner, 1994; T. A. 
Snijders, 2001). Human social networks are complex systems that are multi-level in 
nature (Snijders, 2016). For example, in contemporary organizations, workers often 
comprising autonomous task-based teams that form that form the larger company, and 
small-scale societies are collections of individuals that are nested in families of 
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consanguineal and affinal kin, which further comprise larger groups of distantly 
related individuals (i.e. Blurton-Jones, 2000; Chagnon, 2012). Differences in network 
structures likely emerge in response to both the organizational needs of a group 
(Carter et al., 2015) and the ecological pressures and constraints that a group faces 
(Hamilton, Milne, Walker, Burger, & Brown, 2007). Evidence indicates that the 
structure and size of hunter-gatherer social networks adjust to accommodate spatial 
and temporal fluctuations in the distribution of available resources (Hamilton et al, 
2007). Moreover, in contemporary societies, leader-follower team structures exhibit 
different levels of density, centralization and core-periphery structures between tasks 
and further impact team group performance and efficiency (Balkundi & Harrison, 
2006; Mehra, Dixon, Brass, & Robertson, 2006). It seems that the social networks in 
which human are relatively stable, however they are dynamic and display flexibility 
to accommodate the group needs.  
 
 Social networks are the dynamic social systems in which social hierarchy 
operates. Social hierarchy is inherently relational (Carter et al., 2015; DeRue & 
Ashford, 2010). The structural properties of these systems govern who rises to the top 
of a social hierarchy by constraining or facilitating an individual’s ability to act, and 
also signpost the social influence that individuals harness within a group (Balkundi & 
Kilduff, 2006). Networks create power, with ties between individuals creating flows 
and exchanges of resources and information that produce social capital. Thus, greater 
centrality within these networks may be beneficial for both an individual’s social rank 
(Burt, 1982; Coleman, 1988; Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, & Yamagishi, 1983; Lazega, 
Mounier, Snijders, & Tubaro, 2012; Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & Kraimer, 2001) and 





Expressive ties result in positive affect, which promotes social and emotional 
support, indicate normative behaviours and provide a sense of identity for those 
involved (Coleman, 1988). Being central, and occupying strategic positions, within 
these networks—especially friendship—allows individuals to harness greater social 
influence, control information exchange within their groups and have improved well-
being and longevity(DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009; Holt-Lunstad, Smith, & Layton, 
2010; Hruschka, 2010; Li & Kanazawa, 2016). Such expressive ties are also usually 
stable among non-human primates and have also been linked to success of certain 
individuals within their groups (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2011).   
 
We propose that instrumental and expressive network ties form two 
components of human cooperation, and these ties have important consequences for 
the success of prestige and dominance in human groups. Instrumental network ties are 
forms of cooperative behaviours, such as food-sharing, advice-giving and labour-
sharing, that are integral to the striking interdependence that characterizes human 
groups (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Winterhalder, 1986). Expressive ties facilitate  
these cooperative acts and are antecedents of instrumental ties. For example, 
individuals are more likely to deliver advice to and share resources (i.e. instrumental 
ties)—and reciprocate such acts—with the friends (i.e. expressive ties) that they have 
within a group (Majolo, Lehmann, de Bortoli Vizioli, & Schino, 2012; Trivers, 1971). 
Concurrently, instrumental ties may forecast expressive ties, with, for example, 
instrumental advice being found to lead to friendships (Snijders, Lomi & Torló, 2013) 
and cross over to more expressive areas of advice, such as emotional support. 
Therefore, the longevity of cooperative relationships may have emerged alongside the 
multiplexity and coevolution of instrumental and expressive networks within human 
 
 83 
groups. That is, instrumental ties of cooperation are as much a consequence, as they 
are a cause of, concurrent networks expressive ties.  
 
Prestige, instrumental and expressive network ties. Prestige has been linked with 
fostering group cooperation and cohesion (Barkow, 2014; Henrich, Chudek & Boyd, 
2015; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Von Rueden, Redhead et a., in prep). With that in 
mind, prestige is likely to have a positive connection with both instrumental and 
expressive network ties. The association between prestige and the plethora of 
instrumental ties is founded by the central notion that prestige is associated with 
social learning (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Thus, those high in prestige, who cue 
both an ability and a willingness to confer benefits to others, may be nominated as 
providing some form of instrumental support as individuals aim to gain proximity, 
gleam knowledge from them and have access to the resources that these successful 
individuals may harbour (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Rossman, Esparza, & 
Bonacich, 2010). Within this exchange, those high in prestige receive deference. For 
the lower-prestige counterpart, the ties operated as an avenue for them to improve 
their social position and increase their own prestige over time.  
 
The dynamics of this relationship may also provide further benefits to those 
already high in prestige.  Individuals cannot maintain such instrumental relationships 
over time without having the correct knowledge or appropriate skills that the current 
context may demand, so it becomes improbable for individuals feigning such ability 
associated with prestige to sustain such ties (Gintis, Alden Smith, & Bowles, 2001; 
Gintis et al., 2015; Zahavi, 1977). While an individual who is high in prestige may 
attract more incoming ties, the presence of those ties are important signals to 
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proximate others of that individual’s ability and willingness to confer benefits and are 
therefore likely to increase the individual’s perceived prestige.  
 
Given this potentially dynamic association, it is likely that those high in 
prestige may also be less likely to seek others for instrumental support, as this may 
signal an inability to confer benefits to others and have a deleterious impact on their 
perceived prestige (Agneessens & Wittek, 2012), but may reciprocate the relationship 
indirectly, through other, potentially expressive, ties that may secure the longevity of 
the cooperative relationships. That being said, there is an element of stochasticity in 
relation to human need and humans are highly interdependent, with individuals 
needing to buffer against potential losses caused by sickness (i.e. Gurven & Kaplan, 
2007). Therefore, it is important to stress that different forms of instrumental ties and 
expressive ties may have greater weighting for survival, giving greater premium to 
direct reciprocity, and those high in prestige will also receive instrumental support 
over a given timeframe. However, those high in prestige will not seek instrumental 
support but may be less likely to need—and thus ask for—instrumental support and, 
thus, on average, prestige would not have a positive relationship with outgoing 
instrumental support nominations.  
 
As expressive ties facilitate the longevity of instrumental ties, prestige is 
predicted to have a positive relationship with both sending and receiving expressive 
ties. Indeed, the personality correlates of prestige (i.e. agreeableness) have been found 
to predict incoming friendship ties (Selfhout et al., 2010) and the prosocial disposition 
that individuals high in prestige harbour make them more likable (Cheng et al., 2013), 
suggesting that prestige would have a positive impact on expressive ties. 
Experimental evidence further lends support for the association that prestige has with 
 
 85 
expressive ties, such as friendship, with individuals seeming to preferentially choose 
social partners who exhibit an ability and a willingness to confer benefits to others 
(Barclay, 2013; Barclay & Willer, 2009). Concurrently, these expressive ties may also 
act as relatively weak signals to an individual’s prestige and incoming ties may 
further increase an individual’s prestige.  
 
Alongside this, the potential similarity between connected individuals based 
on prestige may be a product of network influence (i.e. behavioural similarity 
between individuals due to network ties: Steglich, Snijders, & West, 2006; Steglich et 
al., 2010), as opposed to network selection (i.e. initial trait-based homophily: 
McPherson et al., 2001.  Networks of relationships concurrently influence social rank, 
with social rank seeming to be contagious and diffusing through ties between low-
ranking and high-ranking conspecifics (Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994; Podolny, 2001; 
Torlò & Lomi, 2017). This relationship is expected for prestige as there is market-like 
competition between those high in prestige for followers low in prestige and, thus, 
also competition between those low in prestige to gain proximity to their high-
prestige counterparts.  
 
Dominance, instrumental and expressive network ties. Dominance is 
expected to have an entirely different association with both expressive and 
instrumental ties. Those high in dominance are characterized as being aggressive, 
antisocial, narcissistic and high in hubristic pride (Cheng et al., 2010), and these traits 
are not positively related with choice in social partners during adulthood (Barclay, 
2013), nor with a motivation to provide instrumental support (Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001). Moreover, dominance has a negative relationship with cooperation (Cheng et 
al., 2010), with those high in dominance potentially undermining the cohesive fabric 
of groups to keep hold of their position (Case & Maner, 2014).  Therefore, in many 
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contexts, dominance is hypothesised to have a negative impact on expressive ties that 
promote positive affect and with instrumental support. Those high in dominance are 
not expected to seek social relationships and, given the antisocial characteristics of the 
profile, are likely to be unable to maintain social relationships and, over time, may be 
less socially accepted (Cheng & Tracy, 2014). Moreover, dominance is not associated 
with a lack of skills or knowledge, and those high in dominance are not expected to be 
less able that there low-dominance counterparts; thus, a lack of instrumental support 
nominations should not be based on inability. Rather, dominance is expected to be 
ether unrelated or negatively to instrumental support as it is not contingent on advice-
giving ability and is associated with a lack of motivation to help others (Cheng, Tracy 
& Henrich, 2010; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) 
 
 In settings where an individual high in dominance may wield enough 
structural power within a network, dominance may be positively associated with 
expressive ties. Such settings may be where those high in dominance can successfully 
produce fear and disproportionate control over resources (i.e. in formalized 
hierarchies where communication, resource flow and power come from the top: 
Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Other settings may be when dominance is not actively 
sanctioned by social norms, for example in delinquent gangs (Henry et al., 2000; 
Pandit & Van Shaik, 2003; Redhead, 2016), or when groups are transient and do not 
display the levels of cohesion to facilitate coalition formation that levels dominance 
(Boehm, 1999; Case & Maner, 2014; Pellegrini & Long, 2003). In such situations 
dominance may be associated with expressive ties that promote positive affect, such 
as friendship, alliances or coalitions that act as strategic relationships for others to 
reduce the costs that an individual high in dominance is willing to inflict. For 
example, evidence from developmental psychology suggests that during childhood 
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and adolescence indicates that antisocial, egocentric, relationally aggressive 
individuals and bullies receive relatively high numbers of friendship nominations and 
have high social rank, although they are not liked (Hawley, 1999; Pellegrini & Long, 
2003; Redhead, Cheng & O’Gorman, 2018; Sijstema et al., 2009). Thus, the success 
of dominance in human social networks may be constrained to a minority of situations 
where expressive ties are not associated with cooperation but are forged through fear.  
  
 Additionally, an individual’s dominance may be differentially impacted by 
expressive and instrumental networks. Given the relationship that these ties have with 
cooperation, and that these ties may honestly signal prestige, incoming expressive and 
instrumental ties are expected to reduce an individual’s perceived dominance. 
Similarity in dominance between individuals may be a product of both network 
selection and network influence, with individuals potentially initially seeking those of 
a similar level in dominance, as individuals low in dominance may fear high-
dominance counterparts and avoid making connections with them. Network influence 
may further spread dominance between connected individuals, as individuals tend to 
mimic the behaviours of friends. For example, evidence suggests that, during 
adolescence an individual’s centrality within friendship networks has a curvilinear 
relationship with aggression, highlighting that aggression may be most common 
during status struggles (Faris & Felmlee, 2011), and that the average levels of 
aggression that individual’s friends display increases an individual’s exhibited level 
of aggression (Faris & Felmlee, 2011; Laninga-Wijnen et al., 2017). 
  




Extending on previous work outlining that social rank has a dynamic relation 
with social networks (Torló & Lomi, 2017), the current research proposes that 
changes in perceptions of prestige and dominance have bi-directional relationships 
with changes in the social networks that these individuals are embedded. The present 
research utilizes a longitudinal approach to parse network-based selection and 
network influence, which are often confounded in cross-sectional observational 
networks (Aral, Muchnik, & Sundararajan, 2009; Steglich et al., 2010) and further 
assesses the associations that changes in prestige and dominance have with changes 
across multiple network domains (Snijders, Lomi & Torló, 2013; Torló & Lomi, 
2017). 
 
To assess predicted associations that prestige and dominance have with 
network dynamics, we designed a longitudinal study that tracked university students 
working in collaborative task-based groups throughout a 16-week semester. These 
groups are a fruitful platform for investigation as they provide a fixed boundary of 
actors (i.e. classrooms) within organic, informal hierarchies. This allowed us to track 
the same individuals from the initial formation of the group to the end of their 
assigned projects. Such groups are reflective of the structure of contemporary 
organizations and of the collaborative decision-making processes that represent how 
many impactful decisions are made in contemporary societies (Anderson & Kilduff, 
2009; Ridgeway & Berger, 1986; Ronay et al., 2012).  
 
We propose three overarching hypotheses: 
 
1.)  Expressive and instrumental networks have emerged, with both networks 




2.) Prestige will have a strong, bi-directional and positive (true?) relationship 
with both expressive and instrumental ties. 
 
2.) Dominance will have a negative impact on expressive ties in most contexts 
and will have a limited association with instrumental ties.  
 




Participants. Using the same sample as Study 1 (see Chapter 3), students 
(N=236, 63% female at a North American university participated in exchange for 
course-credit. Throughout the study participants worked in the task groups to 
complete a course project throughout the 16-week semester worth 30% of their final 
grade.  
 
4.2.2. Procedure. Data were collected from two cohorts of students enrolled 
in a 16-week semester course over two years. Per week, participants attended a large 
lecture for two hours and spent a further four hours working in their randomly-
assigned task groups in laboratory sections. Online surveys were administered in 
monthly intervals over the semester, with participants completing a self-report 
questionnaire in Week 1. Following this, participants met their group members and 
completed four self- and peer-report questionnaires during Week 2, Week 6, Week 10 
and Week 16 of the semester. There were an extra two weeks between the 
administration of the fourth (Week 10) and fifth (Week 16) questionnaires to account 
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for the week-long holiday and mid-term exams during this period. Participants were 
assigned a unique ID and were allotted up to 7 days to complete each questionnaire 




Task group. The course instructor provided information about the task groups 
that participants were nested in. Altogether there were 66 randomly assigned mixed-
sex task groups, which each had between 3-5 members (̅ = 4.02, +, = 0.33).  
 
Gender. Participants reported the gender that they identify as during the self-
report questionnaire at the beginning of the study (week 1). Participants were given 
the choice of 4 categories: ‘male’, ‘female’, ‘neither male nor female’ and ‘prefer to 
not say’. 
 
Prestige and dominance. Throughout the peer-report questionnaires (weeks 2, 
6, 10, 16), participants rated all other members of their task groups on prestige and 
dominance, using an abridged version (in order to reduce participant fatigue) of the 
Prestige and Dominance Scaled Questionnaires (Cheng et al., 2010). All ratings were 
made on a scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Ratings 
comprised four items assessing perceived prestige (e.g. “Their unique talents and 
abilities are recognized by others in the group”) and four items measuring perceived 
dominance (e.g. “They enjoy having control over other members of the group”). 
Ratings were then averaged at each time wave to obtain an overall prestige and 
overall dominance score for each participant. To achieve the data requirements for 
analysing dependent ‘behaviors’ in in the current analytical strategy (See Ripley et al. 
 
 91 
2018), the continuous prestige and dominance composite scores were transformed 
into ordinal percentile rank scores with 10 levels that were approximately evenly 
distributed, with 1 encompassing the lowest scorers (the 10th percentile) and 10 the 
highest scorers (the 90th percentile). See Table 7 for descriptive statistics for all 
variables. Both prestige and dominance had excellent reliability, with / > .80 at 
every time point (see supplementary materials for internal consistency at each time 
point). 
 
Friendship networks. To construct sociocentric networks capturing friendships 
over the course of the semester, participants were asked to freely nominate the peers 
within the class who they “considered to be their friends”. Although the method does 
not measure actual observed behavior, we opted for this name generator approach as 
it has been shown to produce reliable estimates of behaviors (i.e Coie, Dodge, & 
Coppotelli, 1982). To improve ecological validity of the measure, participants were 
free to nominate any other member of their respective cohort and, to reduce recall-
accessibility bias, an alphabetical list of all participants’ forenames and surnames 
were provided. Nominations between peers were coded 1, with non-nominations 
coded 0, and non-nominations due to non-responses coded as NA. Nomination data 
were specified as directed adjacency matrices for all four timewaves capturing 
friendship and contained all friendship nominations within the sample. See Table 5 
for descriptive statistics.  
 
Work-related (instrumental) advice networks. Networks were constructed by 
participants freely nominating peers within the class who they were “most likely go to 
for advice and support on assignments and coursework”. Again, to improve 
ecological validity of the measure, participants were free to nominate any other 
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member of their respective cohort and, to reduce recall-accessibility bias, an 
alphabetical list of all participants’ forenames and surnames were provided. 
Nominations between peers were coded 1, with non-nominations coded 0, and non-
nominations due to non-responses coded as NA. Nomination data were specified as 
directed adjacency matrices for all four timewaves capturing advice and contained all 




Analytical Strategy. Analyses were conducted using stochastic actor-oriented 
models for the coevolution of networks and behaviors (SAOMs: Burk, Steglich & 
Snijders 2007; Snijders, Steglich & Schweinberger 2017) using RSiena software 
(Ripley, Snijders, Boda, Voros, & Preciado, 2016). SAOMs are suitable for assessing 
our hypotheses, as they examine the effects of a specific dynamic attribute, in this 
case prestige and dominance, on network dynamics and also the concurrent effects of 
the network dynamics on the dynamic attribute.  
 
To do this, SAOMs estimate latent, temporal changes in both network 
relationships and dynamic attributes as time-aggregated outcomes a series of 
individual decisions (Steglich, Snijders & Pearson 2010). SAOMs use the initial 
observed networks and attributes as the starting point of estimation. From this, 
SAOMs simulate the latent continuous-time changes using a rate function, whereby 
the overall observed changes between measurement points are decomposed into the 
smallest possible opportunity for change. This opportunity for change is called a 
microstep and, during this, an actor is randomly selected and provided the opportunity 




To assess the processes that are driving change over time, SAOMs use an 
objective function. During a microstep, where an actor is presented an opportunity to 
make a single change in both network ties and dynamic attribute, the actor evaluates 
their possible choices and weights their decision on the composition and structure of 
the network and the expression of theoretically-relevant attributes and individual 
differences of the actors that comprise the network. When evaluating their 
opportunity for change, actors aim for higher values in the objective function, 
assessing all possible choices that they can make and ultimately making an optimal 
change, with a small amount of randomness, which maximises their objective 
function (Snijders, 2001, 2009). Positive estimated parameter values that comprise the 
objective function indicate that the process assessed would increase the likelihood of 
creating or maintaining a tie, or increasing the value of the dynamic attribute, whereas 
a negative estimate would suggest a tendency away from creating ties or reducing the 
value of the dynamic attribute. For a general introduction on SAOMs refer to Snijders 
et al. (2010).  
 
Model specification. Data from the two cohorts assessed were combined and 
analysed as one large network by specifying structural zeros between classrooms to 
indicate that relationships between the two cohorts could not exist (Ripley et al. 
2018). There were no substantial differences in parameter estimation between the two 
cohorts. Alongside the effects directly relating to our hypotheses, we specified several 
structural and theoretically-relevant covariate effects within the current models. To 
control for the structural interdependencies of the data and to assess the structural 
processes that govern the development of friendship and advice networks, we 
specified five elementary structural effects. These effects account for the general 
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tendency for actors to become more selective when nominating friends and advisors 
over time (outdegree), the tendency for actors to reciprocate nominations over time 
(reciprocity), the tendency for actors to form transitive groups (i.e. if i is friends with j 
and j is friends with h, then i is more likely to become friends with h over time: 
Geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners), and two effects that assess the 
tendencies for degree-differentiation (indegree popularity and outdegree activity). We 
controlled for the tendency for actors to make friends with, or ask advice from, peers 
within their task groups (same task group) and the tendency towards gender 
homophily (same gender).  
 
To examine the effects related to our hypotheses on the impact of dominance 
on friendship and advice network dynamics, we specified effects that captured the 
effect of dominance on indegree nominations (dominance receiver), outdegree 
nominations (dominance sender) and the tendency for dominant individuals to 
selectively assort with friends expressing a similar level of dominance (dominance 
similarity). In relation to our hypotheses the impact of prestige on friendship and 
advice network dynamics, we specified effects that captured the effect of prestige on 
indegree nominations (prestige receiver), outdegree nominations (prestige sender) 
and the tendency for prestige individuals to selectively assort with friends expressing 
a similar level of prestige (prestige similarity). We included concurrent indegree 
effect of friendship dynamics on prestige and dominance dynamics (indegree) and an 
effect that captured an influence effect (average alter), which captures the tendency 
for actors to increase or decrease their expression of prestige and dominance based on 
the average levels of prestige or dominance expressed among their friends. However, 
an outdegree did not meet the criteria for inclusion based on score-type tests (Ripley 
et al., 2018). This indicated that an individual’s outdegree effect for both friendship 
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and advice had relationships that encompassed zero and, thus, were not included in 
the models.   
 
To test our hypotheses relating to the multiplexity of friendship and advice, 
our final model included cross-network effects of friendship and advice. Dyadic-level 
effects, which include the main effect of friendship on forming advice ties (direct 
association: and visa-versa) and the tendency to reciprocate advice ties with 
friendship ties (reciprocal friendship: and visa-versa) met the criteria for inclusion in 
the score-type tests. Two individual-level effects met the inclusion criteria and were 
specified in the final model. These were the tendency friendship indegree to impact 
advice indegree popularity (friendship indegree popularity interaction), and for 
friendship outdegree to impact advice outdegree activity (friendship outdegree 
activity interaction).  
 
 Model-building procedure. In line with the recommended specification of 
SAOMs (Burk, Steglich & Snijders, 2007; See also Ripley et al. 2018), both the 
friendship and advice models were built using a step-wise procedure that prevents 
model over-specification. In the initial step, a base model was specified that allowed 
the elementary structural effects to be freely estimated, whilst the theoretically 
relevant covariate parameters were fixed to zero and their contribution to the 
objective function was assessed through score-type tests. If the score-type tests 
indicate that the parameter’s effect is significantly different from zero, and thus the 
parameter does have a unique impact on the model, then it was selected for inclusion 
in the final, full model. Therefore, all parameters that achieved α < .05 in the score-
type test and theoretically relevant control variables were included in the full final 
models to ensure that their unique contributions to the model were partialed out. We 
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present three models: two uniplex network models that assess friendship and advice in 
isolation (see Table 8) and a multiplex model that evaluates friendship and advice in 
unison. The final models yielded good convergence, with overall maximum 
convergence t-ratios <.25 and individual parameter t-ratios <.10 (as outlined in Ripley 
et al., 2018). We controlled for time-heterogeneity of effects (Lospinoso, 
Schweinberger, Snijders, & Ripley, 2011) and the models indicated adequate 
goodness-of-fit (Ripley et al., 2018; Schweinberger, 2012). Unless otherwise stated, 
the results reported in following section are from our full final multiplex network-




Means, standard deviations and Spearman’s rank correlations between prestige 
and dominance can be found in Table 7 which indicates that prestige was significantly 
related to prestige, and dominance with dominance, at all time waves and that prestige 
and dominance had no significant, or a weak negative correlation, throughout the 
study. Moreover, as shown in Table 7, items capturing prestige and dominance had 
excellent internal consistency at all timewaves (α’s >.81).  
 
As shown in Tables 2 and 3, descriptive statistics for the friendship and advice 
networks indicate that the current networks were in line with data requirements for 
longitudinal social network analysis (Snijders, Steglich & Van de Bunk, 2010; 
Veenstra & Steglich, 2012). Individuals, on average, nominated 1.97 friends and 1.52 
advisors throughout the study, and there was adequate levels of stable friendship and 
advice ties between time waves, exhibiting between 32% and 53.3% stable ties (as 
shown by the Jaccard index in Tables 2 and 3). Throughout the study there was a 
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relatively low percentage of missing data, all timewaves below 7%, which RSiena 
handles by using the last observation carried forward technique (Huisman & Steglich, 
2008).  
 
4.3.1. Friendship network dynamics 
 
 Effects of dominance on friendship network dynamics. The negative 
dominance receiver parameter in the uniplex friendship model (shown in Table 8) 
indicates that the individuals higher in perceived dominance were marginally less 
likely to be nominated as friends over time (θ = -0.042, SE = 0.023, p = 0.059), 
providing evidence in support of our hypothesis (H1a). However, this effect became 
more marginal in the full multiplex model (θ = -0.045, SE = 0.026, p = 0.093) 
Interestingly, in relation to hypothesis 2a, the current results suggest that there was a 
significant tendency for those high in dominance to nominate friends (θ = 0.081, SE = 
0.030, p = 0.007). There was a positive, significant similarity effect for dominance for 
friendship selection (θ = 1.063, SE = 0.472, p = 0.025), indicating that individuals 
tended to nominate friends who were perceived as expressing a similar level of 
dominance to themselves.  
 
 Effects of prestige on friendship network dynamics. Prestige had no significant 
impact on incoming friendship nominations (θ = 0.002, SE = 0.023, p > 0.10) or 
outgoing friendship nominations (θ =0.039, SE = 0.029, p > 0.10). Nor was there a 
significant tendency for individuals to select friends who exhibited a similar level of 




 Effects of friendship on dominance dynamics. The positive, significant rate 
parameters within the current model indicate that there was a substantial amount of 
change in and individual’s perceived dominance between observed timewaves (see 
Table 5). The linear and quadratic shape effects capture the basic trajectory of 
dominance over time, suggesting that there was some linear change in dominance 
over time (see Table 5).  Results provide evidence in support of our prediction that 
having higher indegree friendship nominates will reduce an individual’s perceived 
dominance (H5a: θ = -0.026, SE = 0.011, p = 0.022). The positive average alter effect 
for dominance (H4a: θ = 0.012 SE = 0.005, p = 0.017), indicates that the average level 
of an individual’s friend’s perceived dominance increased their perceived dominance.  
 
 Effects of friendship on prestige dynamics. As shown in Table 5, there was a 
significant rate of change in prestige between observed time waves and the shape 
parameters indicate that there was some non-linear change in prestige over time. In 
our uniplex models (See Table 5) results align with our predictions (H5b), higher 
incoming friendship ties significantly increased an individual’s perceived prestige (θ 
= 0.028, SE = 0.012, p = 0.016). Our uniplex models also support our hypothesis that 
prestige may spread through friendship (expressive) network ties (H6b) and indicate 
that the average levels of perceived prestige expressed by their friends significantly 
increases their prestige over time (θ = 0.040, SE = 0.010, p = 0.036). However, the 
effect diminished when assessing the influence effects of both networks on prestige 
and was not included in the multiplex model. 
 
Cross-network (multiplex) effects of advice on friendship network dynamics. 
Advice nominations had a strong direct effect on friendship nominations (θ = 3.522, 
SE = 0.452, p < 0.001), indicating that if individuals nominated someone as an 
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advisor, then they were likely to nominate them as a friend over time. Individuals 
further tended to reciprocate friendship nominations with advice nominations (θ = 
1.500, SE = 0.435, p < 0.001). 
 
Within-network effects on friendship network dynamics. The positive, significant rate 
parameters shown in Table 5 show that there was a significant amount of change in 
friendship between observed timewaves. The outdegree (density) parameter captures 
the general tendency to create and maintain ties. The negative parameter estimate (θ = 
-5.300 SE = 0.326, p < 0.001) indicates that individuals were likely to be selective in 
their nominations. Individuals had a strong tendency to reciprocate the friendship 
nominations that they receiver (θ = 0.874, SE = 0.303, p = 0.004) and tended to form 
transitive groups, such that friends of friends were nominated as friends (θ = 1.251, 
SE = 0.181, p < 0.001). There was no significant tendency for an individual’s 
indegree to predict their future indegree (θ = -0.159, SE = 0.132, p >0.10), but 
individuals who nominated many friends were likely to nominate additional friends 
over time (θ = 0.736, SE = 0.072, p < 0.001).  
 
 Covariate effects on friendship network dynamics. Our uniplex results indicate 
that there was a tendency towards gender homophily in friendship selection (θ = 
0.178, SE = 0.086, p = 0.019), indicating that males tended to nominate males, whilst 
females were more likely to nominate females. However, this became non-significant 
in our multiplex model ((θ = 0.013, SE = 0.097, p >0.10). The same team parameter 
controlled for a multi-level aspect of the current design and accounted for the 
tendency for individuals to nominate friends within the task groups that they worked. 
Results indicate that there was a substantial tendency for individuals to nominate task 
group members as friends (θ = 0.961, SE = 0.180, p < 0.001).  
 
 100
   
 
4.3.2. Advice network dynamics 
 
 
 Effects of dominance on advice network dynamics. As expected, results 
indicate that dominance did not have any substantial impact on incoming advice ties 
(H7a: θ = -0.013, SE = 0.028, p > 0.10), nor on asking for advice (H8a: θ = 0.024, SE 
= 0.026, p > 0.10). There was a tendency for individuals to ask for advice from others 
who expressed a dissimilar level of perceived dominance to themselves (H9a: θ = -
1.229, SE = 0.478, p = 0.011).  
 
 Effects of prestige on advice network dynamics. In line with our predictions, 
those high in prestige were nominated more as advisors (H7b: θ = 0.100, SE = 0.033, 
p = 0.002) and those high in prestige were less likely to ask others for advice (H8b: θ 
= -0.107, SE =0.033, p < 0.001). Results further indicate that individuals did not 
display a significant tendency to selectively nominate advisors who exhibit a similar 
level of perceived prestige as themselves (H9b: θ = 0.246, SE =0.474, p > 0.10). 
 
 Effects of advice on dominance dynamics.  In the uniplex advice model 
(shown in Table 5), an individual’s dominance decreased alongside the amount of 
indegree advice ties that they receive (θ = -0.034, SE =0.016, p = 0.035), which 
supported our hypotheses (H11a). Interestingly, results suggest that the perceived 
levels of dominance of an individual’s advisors increases that individual’s perceived 
dominance (H10a: θ = 0.049, SE =0.018, p = 0.007). However, the effect diminished 
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when assessing the influence effects of both networks on dominance and was not 
included in the multiplex model. 
 
 Effects of advice on prestige dynamics. Incoming advice ties increased an 
individual’s perceived prestige (H11b: θ = 0.071, SE =0.019, p < 0.001). Results 
further support our hypotheses (H10b), indicating that the average level of an 
individual’s advisor’s perceived prestige significantly increased the individual’s 
prestige over time (θ = 0.075, SE =0.026, p = 0.004). 
 
 Cross-network effects of friendship on advice network dynamics. Results 
demonstrate that there was a direct effect of friendship nominations with advice 
nominations (θ = 3.804, SE = 0.336, p < 0.001), such that individuals were more 
likely to nominate their friends as advisors over time. Individuals tended to 
reciprocate advice ties with friendship ties (θ = 1.919, SE = 0.307, p < 0.001).  The 
positive significant mixed indegree popularity parameter (θ = 0.841, SE = 0.359, p = 
0.02) indicates that individuals who are nominated as a friend by many peers are also 
more likely to be nominated by others as an advisor. The negative significant mixed 
outdegree activity parameter (θ = -0.692, SE = 0.183, p < 0.001) suggests that those 
who nominate many friends were less likely to nominate many advisors. 
 
Within-network effects on advice network dynamics. As shown in Table 5, 
there was a significant rate of change in advice ties between observed periods and the 
negative outdegree parameter indicates that individuals were selective about whom 
they asked advice from (θ = -5.444, SE = 0.685, p < 0.001). In our uniplex models, 
individuals tended to reciprocate the advice nominations that they received (θ = 
1.899, SE =0.166, p < 0.001). However, this effect was non-significant in our 
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multiplex models (θ = -0.496, SE = 0.32, p >0.10). Individuals tended to form 
transitive groups (θ = 1.468, SE = 0.491, p = 0.003), such that individuals were likely 
ask the advisor of their advisor for advice. The was a significant negative effect of an 
individual’s previous advice indegree on their future incoming advice nominations (θ 
= -1.100, SE = 0.421, p = 0.009). However, there was a significant tendency for 
individuals who have high outgoing advice nominations to nominate more advisors 
over time (θ = 1.004, SE = 0.115, p < 0.001). 
 
 Covariate effects on advice network dynamics. Uniplex results suggest that 
there was no significant tendency for individuals to ask work-related advice from 
others of the same gender (θ = 0.138, SE = 0.089, p > 0.10). However, multiplex 
results indicate that there was a significant tendency for individuals to ask advice 
from others of the same gender (θ = 0.233, SE = 0.102, p = 0.026). There was a strong 
tendency for individuals to ask those within their respective task groups for advice (θ 




As summarised in Table 1, we find empirical support for most predictions 
derived from our hypotheses. Individuals tended not to nominate those high in 
dominance as friends over time and that, when individuals nominated friends, they 
selectively chose those who expressed a similar level of dominance to themselves. 
Dominance was not related to advice and had no impact on choosing or being chosen 
as advisors. Moreover, an individual’s perceived dominance reduced when others 
nominated them as friends or advisors, and there were peer influences on an 
individual’s perceived dominance, with friends’ and advisors’ dominance positively 
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impacting an individual’s dominance. In relation to prestige, the present findings 
confirm the majority of our predictions and indicate that prestige has a strong 
bidirectional relationship with instrumental support. Those high in prestige were 
sought more as advisors and were less likely to ask for advice. Similarity in prestige 
had no impact on the initial selection of either friends or advisors but found that the 
prestige of an individual’s friends and advisors increased their prestige over time. Our 
results further demonstrate that receiving friendship ties and being asked for advice 
increased an individual’s prestige over time. Furthermore, the present findings shed 
light on the multiplex nature of instrumental and expressive ties, highlighting that 
advice ties and friendship ties have direct effects upon one another.  
 
While the existing body of literature has identified the relationships that 
prestige and dominance have with preferences for instrumental relationships, often 
operationalized as advice or food sharing (Hawkes & Bliege-Bird, 2001; Henrich & 
Broesch, 2011; Torló & Lomi, 2017; Weissner, 2005) and expressive relationships, 
frequently measured as preference for social partners or friends (Barclay, 2013; Torló 
& Lomi, 2017; Willer, 2009), the extant literature has theorised that these 
relationships to flow in a single ‘causal’ direction and evidence has been derived from 
experimental or cross-sectional observations, limiting the opportunity to observe 
bidirectional effects. The current research synthesises these literatures, outlining that 
social hierarchy is inherently relational and operates within complex, dynamic social 
networks. We further proposed that networks of expressive and instrumental ties, 
which are two interconnected facets of human cooperation that have coevolved, both 
guide and are guided by the trajectories of prestige and dominance across many 
contexts. By taking this approach, the present research makes an important 





 4.4.1. Implications for the dual model of social hierarchy 
 
The dual model of social hierarchy proposes that humans attain social rank 
through dominance, by harbouring traits that provoke fear among others, and prestige, 
founded upon skill, knowledge and prosociality (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Henrich & 
Gil-White, 2001). The current research extends this model by demonstrating that 
these dynamics are intrinsically related to human social networks. Taken together, the 
present findings emphasise the distinction between prestige and dominance, highlight 
the divergent associations that prestige and dominance have with social networks and 
lend support to a growing body of empirical literature that highlights the prestige-
dominance distinction (Cheng et al., 2010, 2013; Garfield & Hagan, under review; 
Redhead, 2016; von Rueden et al., 2008). The finding that prestige has a strong 
impact on the selection of instrumental ties, with those high in prestige having high 
indegrees, while dominance had no association, suggests that prestige and dominance 
have distinct implications for relationships that individuals foster. These findings, in 
combination with our findings that receiving advice nominations in fact decreases an 
individual’s perceived dominance, further imply that dominance does not impact and 
is not contingent on networks of cooperative relationships. In contrast to this, our 
results suggest that prestige has an important, bidirectional relationship with these 
networks of cooperation, and both fosters cooperation in groups and is propagated by 
such cooperation. 
 
The present findings highlight the connection that prestige has with 
instrumental support and lend empirical support for the association that prestige may 
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have with cultural learning (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Individuals ask advice from 
those high in prestige and, in turn, prestige is transmitted through these ties over time, 
with the average levels of prestige of an individual’s advisors increasing that 
individual’s prestige over time. The association that such instrumental network ties 
produce over time allows individuals to learn skills and acquire knowledge within 
their context and, thus, boosts the individual’s capacity to not only acquire resources 
and skill in a valued domain, but also ability to confer benefits to others. However, 
there will always be a discrepancy between these initially lower-prestige individuals 
and those higher-prestige advisors in the positions that they occupy within a 
hierarchy. Our findings suggest that receiving an incoming advice tie increases an 
individual’s prestige, suggesting that these incoming ties signal an individual’s ability 
and willingness to confer benefits. Alongside this such instrumental networks emerge 
through transitive processes, such that if individual h was the advisor of individual i, 
and j was the advisor of h, then i is likely to also ask advice from j. As an example, 
should individual h’s prestige increase due to prestige being transmitted through 
advice ties with those higher in prestige, here individual j, then this not only increases 
the likelihood of h gaining advise nominations, but also of their advisor, j, receiving 
further advice nominations.  
 
The present findings shed light on the association that dominance has with 
positive network ties. However, given the main components of a dominance profile 
(i.e. aggression, narcissism), those high in dominance are likely to engage in negative 
affect expressive ties (henceforth referred to as negative ties) with those whom they 
are proximate with. Negative ties represent a recurring set of negative judgements and 
behavioural intentions towards another person that amount to relatively destructive 
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relationships that are characterised by conflict (Labianca & Brass, 2006; Labianca, 
2014).  
 
While these ties seem, in most collaborative group settings, to have a 
deleterious impact on group and individual outcomes (Baldwin, Bedell & johnson, 
1997; Labianca, 2013), in other settings an individual high in dominance may wield 
these negative relational behaviors with success. The current approach posits that 
dominance may only be efficacious in the social systems where expressive ties are not 
necessarily based on positive affect and social rank is not principally contingent on 
providing instrumental support. Rather, when individuals send expressive ties to 
others in an attempt to lessen the costs that they may be both willing and able to 
impose. For example, individuals high in dominance-related traits and bullies are 
popular and high-ranking in developmental hierarchies, with those proximate to them 
being friends with them as friends are less likely to become victims of bullying 
(Hawley, 1999; Pellegrini & Long, 2003; Redhead, Cheng & O’Gorman, 2018; 
Sijstema et al., 2009. Thus, the varying success of such negative ties may be 
inherently linked with the varying success of dominance between contexts and 
societies. 
 
4.4.2. Network multiplexity and cooperation  
 
 The present findings build upon the notion that human social life is patterned 
by multiple relationships and provides empirical evidence that demonstrates that these 
relationships concurrently impact one another. These networks of relations show 
striking structural similarities in ways that they emerge and may solve a number of 
issues relating to coordination and cooperation that may have been encountered 
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during human evolution (Apicella et al., 2012; Boyd & Richerson, 1988; Nowak, M., 
2005; Von Rueden & Van Vugt, 2015). The current research builds upon this 
literature, hypothesising and finding that equivalent acts of cooperation, that is 
instrumental network ties (operationalized as advice), both facilitate and are expedited 
by expressive network ties that promote positive affect (operationalized as 
friendship). We further demonstrate that individuals have a strong tendency to 
reciprocate expressive ties with instrumental ties and visa-versa, and that these 
networks are relatively distinct domains, having limited individual-level associations 
(i.e. interactions between degree), except the positive impact that in-degrees of 
expressive ties have with in-degree popularity in instrumental ties.  
 
 Given the bi-directional association that these cooperative ties have with one 
another, the present research establishes that instrumental and expressive network ties 
are two interlocking components of human cooperation. Instrumental networks are 
different forms of cooperative behaviours, which are important in human groups as 
we often exhibit high levels of interdependence for subsistence (Winterhalder, 1986). 
Expressive ties facilitate these cooperative acts of instrumental support, especially 
when the interests of individuals may diverge. Our results indicate that individuals are 
more likely to give advice to friends, which is in-keeping with theory relating to the 
evolution of cooperation (Majolo et al., 2006; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996; Trivers, 
1971). Importantly, the present findings revealed that, when assessing the emergence 
of expressive and instrumental ties in union, individuals were not likely to directly 
reciprocate instrumental ties with instrumental ties, which seems plausible given the 
simultaneous association that prestige has with expressive ties. Rather, individuals in 
the current sample indirectly reciprocated these instrumental ties with expressive ties, 
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which emphasises both the importance of the multiplexity of these networks and also 
of prestige for the stable and enduring cooperation often observed in human groups. 
 
4.4.3. Limitations and future directions 
  
 
Whilst the current research had a number of significant strengths, there were 
limitations that should be addressed in future research. One such limitation is that data 
are derived from North American undergraduate students. Such populations may not 
be representative of the world’s populations and our findings may be constrained to 
collaborative group behaviours in WEIRD settings. Future research in non-WEIRD 
settings, and comparative longitudinal cross-cultural examinations of the hypotheses 
posed would provide more ecologically-valid tests of such relationships and allow for 
empirical tests of when dominance is successful.  In combination with this, the 
present research—akin to the majority of the extant social network literature—
focussed primarily on ‘positive’ instrumental and expressive ties. Future research 
should aim to assess the hypothesised association that prestige and dominance have 
with negative ties across a broad range of ecologies where divergences may emerge as 
a consequence of potential differences in environmental pressure, rank-related norms 
or the overall structure of the social networks. 
 
One surprising result was that prestige was not associated with friendship in 
the current sample. Individuals invest in social relationships to accrue social capital 
and those high in social rank may focus their attention on different types of social 
relationships in different contexts. In the current context individuals within the 
classrooms were all working in groups to complete a task and, therefore, their goals 
 
 109
aligned. In contexts where the interests of group members converge, high-ranking 
group members are often task-oriented and associated with instrumental support ties 
and expressive ties are less important for facilitating cooperation and team 
effectiveness (Thye, 2000; Yukl, 2008; Van Vugt, Hogan & Kaiser, 2008). Moreover, 
individuals in the current sample may have friendships outside of the classrooms—be 
they physical or online friendships.  Thus, the present network boundary and context 
is limited to assessing friendships that occur within the classrooms and may not 
capture important, emotionally close friendships that may occur outside of the 
boundary, limit the efficacy and motivation to forge friendships with others, and in 
turn dampen the relationship that it has with prestige. Future research assessing 
contexts where expressive ties are of paramount importance for facilitating 
instrumental ties, such as when the interests of group members substantially diverge 
(Thye, 2000; Yukl, 2006; Van Vugt, Hogan & Kaiser, 2008), and track expressive ties 
over a longer period of time, will provide much need insight to the bidirectional 





The present findings make several theoretical and methodological 
contributions to the existing literature, emphasising not only the importance of time, 
but also the concurrent weighting that social relationships have on processes related to 
social hierarchy. Overall, the current research highlights that processes of social 
hierarchy and cooperation are dynamic, interlocking components of human sociality 







Table 4.  
Outline of dynamic network processes, their predicted relationships with dominance and prestige, a brief explanation for the prediction and the effect 
observed in the current research. 
Dynamic network process Predicted effect  Effect found 
 a. Dominance b. Prestige  Multiplexity a. Dominance b. Prestige Multiplexity 
       
Friendship (Expressive network ties)       
1. High incoming friendship nominations  Negative  Positive - Negative/Null Null - 
2. High outgoing friendship nominations Negative Positive - Positive Null - 
3.  Similarity based on initial selection of 
friends (network selection) 
Positive Null - Positive Null - 
4. Similarity based on network influence 
from friendship 
Positive Positive - Positive Positive/Null - 
5. Incoming friendship ties increase 
perceptions of the profile 
Negative Positive - Negative Positive/Null - 
6. Outgoing friendship ties increase 
perceptions of the profile 
Null Null - Null Null - 
       
Advice (Instrumental network ties)       
7. High incoming advice nominations  Negative /Null Positive - Null Positive - 
8. High outgoing advice nominations Negative Negative - Null Negative - 
9. Similarity based on initial selection of 
similar advisors (network selection) 
Null Null - Null Null - 
10. Similarity based on network influence 
from advice 




11.  Incoming advice ties increase 
perceptions of the profile 
Negative Positive - Negative Positive - 
12. Outgoing advice ties increase 
perceptions of the profile 
Null Negative - Null Null - 
       
Cross-network (multiplex) processes       
13. Expressive ties will lead to the 
formation of instrumental ties.  
- - Positive - - Positive 
14. Instrumental ties will lead to the 
formation of expressive ties. 
- - Positive - - Positive 
15. Individuals will reciprocate expressive 
ties with instrumental ties. 
- - Positive - - Positive 
16. Individuals will reciprocate 
instrumental ties with expressive ties. 
- - Positive - - Positive 





Descriptive statistics friendship networks. 
 Friendship Network 
 TW1  TW2  TW3  TW4 
Densitya 0.008  0.009  0.008  0.009 
Average degree 1.89  2.08  1.87  2.04 
Number of ties 436  475  423  450 
Asymmetrical dyads  434  382  512  344 
Mutual dyads 196  268  146  246 
Missing data 2.4%  3.3%  4.6%  6.3% 
Tie changes        
   Creating ties (0  1)  155  111  186  
   Dissolving ties (1  0)  115  160  146  
   Stable ties (1  1)  302  209  256  
Jaccard index b  52.8%  53.3%  43.5%  
Note. N = 236 x T = 4. a Density was calculated as N of ties divided by the total number of 
ties. b Jaccard index represents the fraction of stable ties relative to created ties, dissolved ties 




Descriptive statistics for advice networks. 
 Advice Network 
 TW1  TW2  TW3  TW4 
Densitya 0.006  0.007  0.007  0.006 
Average degree 1.402  1.569  1.736  1.348 
Number of ties 323  358  391  298 
Asymmetrical dyads  392  380  436  354 
Mutual dyads 114  156  150  94 
Missing data 2.4%  3.3%  4.6%  6.3% 
Tie changes        
   Creating ties (0  1)  187  165  84  
   Dissolving ties (1  0)  153  123  146  
   Stable ties (1  1)  160  146  199  
Jaccard index b  32%  44%  46.4%  
Note. N = 236 x T = 4. a Density was calculated as N of ties divided by the total number of 
ties. b Jaccard index represents the fraction of stable ties relative to created ties, dissolved ties 







Descriptive statistics for and Spearman’s rank correlations between prestige and dominance. 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Missing data 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Prestige T1 5.48 (2.86) 5% 
a .88 - - - - - - - 
2. Prestige T2 5.55 (2.82) 3% .369*** 
a .89 - - - - - - 
3. Prestige T3 5.52 (2.83) 3% .318*** .677*** 
a .88 - - - - - 
4. Prestige T4 5.46 (2.80) 3% .249*** .611*** .765*** 
a.90 - - - - 
5. Dominance T1 5.47 (2.84) 5% -.063 -.097 -.173** -.152* 
a .82 - - - 
6. Dominance T2 5.57 (2.76) 3% -.065 -.054 -.063 -.034 .518*** 
a .86 - - 
7. Dominance T3 5.49 (2.88) 3% -.037 .016 -.088 -.079 .479*** .565*** 
a .91 - 
8. Dominance T4 5.59 (2.78) 3% -.103 .026 -.084 -.129
† .421*** .531*** .613*** a .93 
Note.  
a Cronbach’s Alpha (α) reliabilities. 
† 





Table 8.  
Uniplex Network-Behavioural Dynamics of Friendship, Instrumental Advice, Dominance and Prestige. 
 Friendship Dynamics Advice Dynamics 
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  Parameter 
Estimate 









Network Dynamics      
Rate t1-t2 2.268*** 0.186 NA <0.001 4.669*** 0.488 NA <0.001 
Rate t2-t3 2.206*** 0.198 NA <0.001 3.009*** 0.302 NA <0.001 
Rate t3-t4 3.377*** 0.282 NA <0.001 2.357*** 0.246 NA <0.001 
Outdegree (Density)  -4.948*** 0.266 0.007 <0.001 -5.607*** 0.312 0.004 <0.001 
Reciprocity 2.173*** 0.142 8.785 <0.001 1.899*** 0.166 6.679 <0.001 
Transitive Group 











Indegree Popularity (sqrt)  -0.011 0.116 0.989 >.10 0.050 0.139 1.051 >.10 
Outdegree Activity (sqrt) 0.655*** 0.062 1.925 <0.001 0.832*** 0.074 2.298 <0.001 
Same Gender  0.178* 0.086 1.195 0.019 0.138 0.089 1.093 >.10 
Same Team 1.849*** 0.135 6.354 <0.001 2.450*** 0.141 11.588 <0.001 
Dominance Receiver -0.042* 0.023 0.959 0.059 -0.015 0.022 0.985 >.10 
Dominance Sender 0.054* 0.023 1.056 0.018 0.002 0.031 1.002 >.10 
Dominance Similarity 0.769* 0.363 2.158 0.035 -0.432 0.358 0.649 >.10 
Prestige Receiver 0.018 0.021 1.018 >.10 0.087*** 0.027 1.091 0.001 
Prestige Sender 0.025 0.023 1.025 >.10 -0.120*** 0.031 0.887 <0.001 
Prestige Similarity 0.348 0.307 1.416 >.10 0.440 0.383 1.553 >.10 
     
Dominance Dynamics      
Rate t1-t2 18.512*** 2.524 NA <0.001 17.737*** 2.377 NA <0.001 
Rate t2-t3 14.446*** 2.475 NA <0.001 14.178*** 1.931 NA <0.001 
Rate t3-t4 12.419*** 2.124 NA <0.001 12.071*** 1.629 NA <0.001 
Linear Shape 0.066* 0.029 NA 0.022 0.072* 0.028 NA 0.011 










Indegree Effect -0.026* 0.011 0.974 0.022 -0.034* 0.016 0.967 0.035 
Average Alter 0.029† 0.017 1.029 0.093 0.049** 0.018 1.050 0.007 
         
Prestige Dynamics      
Rate t1-t2 27.866*** 3.827 NA <0.001 26.327*** 3.939 NA <0.001 
Rate t2-t3 9.375*** 1.172 NA <0.001 9.167*** 1.459 NA <0.001 
Rate t3-t4 5.542*** 0.731 NA <0.001 5.496*** 0.745 NA <0.001 
Linear Shape -0.064* 0.029 NA 0.028 -0.117*** 0.036 NA 0.001 
Quadratic Shape 0.002 0.004 NA >.10 0.004 0.006 NA >.10 
Indegree Effect 0.028* 0.012 1.028 0.016 0.071*** 0.019 1.074 <0.001 
Average Alter 0.040* 0.019 1.041 0.036 0.075** 0.026 1.078 0.004 
Note. 
N = 236 X T = 4. Significance tests were performed by dividing the estimates by their standard error to produce a t-value that is normally 
distributed under the null hypothesis. Maximum convergence t-ratio < 0.25 and parameter t-ratios < 0.10.  
† 











Table 9.  
Multiplex Network-Behavioural Dynamics of Friendship, Instrumental Advice, Dominance and Prestige. 
 Friendship Dynamics Advice Dynamics 
  Parameter 
Estimate 









         
Network Dynamics      
Rate t1-t2 2.628*** 0.235 NA <0.001 7.906*** 0.962 NA <0.001 
Rate t2-t3 2.340*** 0.192 NA <0.001 3.968*** 0.410 NA <0.001 
Rate t3-t4 3.950*** 0.326 NA <0.001 2.861*** 0.296 NA <0.001 
Outdegree (Density)  -5.300*** 0.326 0.005 <0.001 -5.444*** 0.685 0.004 <0.001 
Reciprocity 0.874** 0.303 2.397 0.004 -0.496 0.320 0.609 >.10 
Transitive Group 











Indegree Popularity (sqrt)  -0.159 0.132 0.853 >.10 -1.100** 0.421 0.333 0.009 
Outdegree Activity (sqrt) 0.736*** 0.076 2.088 <0.001 1.004*** 0.115 2.729 <0.001 
Same Gender  0.013 0.097 1.013 >.10 0.233* 0.102 1.262 0.026 
Same Team 0.961*** 0.180 2.614 <0.001 1.585*** 0.151 4.879 <0.001 
Dominance Receiver -0.045† 0.027 0.956 0.093 -0.013 0.028 0.987 >.10 
Dominance Sender 0.081** 0.030 1.084 0.007 0.024 0.026 1.024 >.10 
Dominance Similarity 1.063* 0.472 2.895 0.025 -1.229* 0.478 0.293 0.011 
Prestige Receiver 0.002 0.023 1.002 >.10 0.100** 0.032 1.105 0.002 
Prestige Sender 0.039 0.029 1.477 >.10 -0.107*** 0.033 0.899 0.001 
Prestige Similarity 0.265 0.328 1.288 >.10 0.246 0.474 1.279 >.10 
         
Cross-Network Effects         
Advice: Direct Association 3.522*** 0.452 33.852 <.001     
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Reciprocal Advice 1.500*** 0.435 4.482 <.001     
Friendship: Direct 











Reciprocal Friendship - - - - 1.919*** 0.307 6.814 <.001 
Friendship: In-Degree 





















         
Dominance Dynamics      
Rate t1-t2 18.261*** 2.349 NA <0.001 - - - - 
Rate t2-t3 14.636*** 1.743 NA <0.001 - - - - 
Rate t3-t4 12.326*** 1.859 NA <0.001 - - - - 
Linear Shape 0.065* 0.026 NA 0.013 - - - - 
Quadratic Shape 0.003 0.004 NA >.10 - - - - 
Indegree Effect -0.026* 0.011 0.974 0.022 - - - - 
Average Alter 0.012* 0.005 1.012 0.017 - - - - 
         
Prestige Dynamics      
Rate t1-t2 - - - - 25.73*** 3.376 NA <0.001 
Rate t2-t3 - - - - 9.416*** 1.469 NA <0.001 
Rate t3-t4 - - - - 5.632*** 0.681 NA <0.001 
Linear Shape - - - - -0.103*** 0.033 NA 0.001 
Quadratic Shape - - - - -0.002 0.005 NA >.10 
Indegree Effect - - - - 0.053*** 0.017 1.054 <0.001 
Average Alter - - - - 0.028*** 0.009 1.028 <0.001 
Note. 





distributed under the null hypothesis. Maximum convergence t-ratio < 0.25 and parameter t-ratios < 0.10.  
† 








The dynamics of cooperation and 









Cooperation is often motivated by opportunities to enhance social status. Schools lure 
philanthropists with naming rights to buildings. Donors to charities tend to give according to 
publicized contribution category thresholds (Harbaugh 1998). In general, people contribute more 
to public goods when their identity and the amount they give are made visible to others (Rege & 
Telle 2004; Hardy and van Vugt 2006; Bereckzei et al. 2007).  
 
By acquiring reputations for greater ability and willingness to confer benefits (i.e. prestige), 
individuals are granted greater access to contested material and social resources (i.e. status). 
Several evolutionary models describe these links, including costly signalling (Bliege Bird, Smith, 
and Bird 2001; Gintis, Smith and Bowles 2001), reputation-based partner choice (Roberts 1998; 
Barclay and Willer 2007), and service-for-prestige (Willer 2009; Price and van Vugt 2014). 
According to these models, generously sharing valued and difficult-to-acquire resources, labour, 
or information results in group-wide favouritism in subsequent exchange, advantageous 
alliances, political influence, or mating opportunity.  
 
However, cooperation is as likely to be a consequence as to be a cause of status differences, for 
at least four reasons. First, greater access to contested resources enhances individuals’ ability to 
build prestige and increase their social following via cooperation. Status is self-reinforcing 
(Merton 1968). Second, status may motivate continued generosity, in order to signal that one’s 
status is justified or one’s leadership is trustworthy (Blau 1964). Such generosity on the part of 
high status individuals may become normative, i.e. “noblesse oblige”. Third, cooperation on the 




prestige-biased imitation (Henrich et al. 2015). Fourth, by forming cooperative partnerships with 
high status individuals, group members elevate their own status by gaining access to high status 
individuals’ information (Henrich and Gil-White 2001), resources, or coalitions. 
 
Unifying these models is the hypothesis that a group’s cooperation network and its distribution 
of (prestige-based) status have an inherently dynamic relationship. Cooperation and status 
hierarchy have coevolved in human groups. Despite much research on cooperation and status, 
there are no tests of this hypothesis in small-scale societies. Experiments demonstrate positive 
effects of cooperation on status differences (Milinski et al. 2002; Harrell 2018) and status 
differences on cooperation (Eckel et al. 2010; Baldassari and Grossman 2013; Fiddick et al. 
2013), but few test for a dynamic relationships (but see Willer 2009). Doing so can parse the 
unique, bidirectional effects that status and cooperation have on one another.  Field studies in 
traditional societies find that individuals who receive more social support or wield more political 
influence are skilled and generous food producers (Gurven et al., 2000; Sugiyama and Sugiyama, 
2003; Patton 2005; von Rueden et al. 2008; Nolin 2012; Bliege Bird and Power, 2015; Ready 
and Power, 2018), share valued information (Schniter et al. 2015; Smith et al. 2017), or make 
costly contributions to collective action (Price 2003; Lyle and Smith 2014; Glowacki and von 
Rueden 2015; Macfarlan and Lyle 2015). However, extant field studies are cross-sectional, so 
they lack tests of dynamics and their interpretation is subject to potential endogeneity or reverse 
causality problems (See Chapter 3). 
 
In a community of Tsimane forager-horticulturalists in Amazonian Bolivia, we study the 




egalitarian, in that there is no coercive leadership and minimal material wealth to contest. Men in 
the village wield more overt political influence than women, in part due to a division of labour 
that constrains women’s networking beyond the extended household (von Rueden et al. 2018). 
For this study, we focused our attention on men. We collected three waves of panel data on all 
men in the village (avg. n=80). Wave 1 of the data was collected in 2009, wave 2 in 2014 and 
wave 3 in 2018. At each wave, men listed other adult men who shared food with them or assisted 
them in hunting, fishing, logging, or horticultural labour over the previous six months (see 
Figure 1a). At the same time, a sample of these men photo-ranked all other adult men on two 
measures of status: influence during village meetings and respect (see Figure 1b). Peer-ratings 
can be an efficient and accurate method for producing quantitative data from local knowledge 
(Reyes-Garcia et al. 2016; Stibbard-Hawkes et al. 2018). For example, Werner’s study of status 
among the Mekranoti of Brazil (1981) relies on peer ratings, which correlate strongly with his 
observational measures. 
 
Using longitudinal social network analysis, we test two predictions: (1) higher status individuals 
are more likely to gain cooperation partners, and (2) individuals increase their social status by 
cooperating with higher status individuals. The first prediction reflects a process of network 
selection (tie formation) while the second prediction reflects a process of network influence (ties 
affect individuals’ attributes: Steglich et al., 2010). Both predictions depart from models of the 
evolution of cooperation, which rely on network selection but between similar behavioural types 
(Santos et al. 2006; Lehmann & Keller, 2006; Nowak 2006). Instead, we posit tie formation 
predominantly between different behavioural types and, in turn, similarity of connected 




not aim to choose partners of similar status to themselves, at least initially. This is because of a 
market-like competition between higher status individuals, and also between those low in status, 
with high status individuals aiming to increase or maintain their followership and those low in 
status seeking high status cooperation partners to boost their own status and also gain access to 
the resources that high status other possess. 
 
Our analytical approach is stochastic actor-oriented modelling (SAOMs: See Snijders et al. 
2010). SAOMs estimate the node-level (individual actor), dyad-level (partner), and network-
level (group) mechanisms driving change in network ties and in the attributes of actors. 
Network-level effects include the density of the network, but we also include dyad-level (i.e. 
reciprocity) and individual-level (i.e. indegree popularity) structural effects. Our models include 
several covariates at both the node and dyad levels: age, weight, height, upper body strength, 
income, and kinship of cooperators. We analyze our two photo-ranked status measures as a 
single dependent ‘behaviour’ and our three size and strength measures as a single covariate, 
according to a maximum likelihood factor analysis. See SI for descriptives of actor covariates 
and details of the factor analysis. As a reliability check, we compare men’s status to a cross-




5.2.1. Ethnographic Setting 
The Tsimane live in small villages in the neotropics of central Bolivia. Their economy is based 




Food sharing and collaboration in productive activities tend to be concentrated within extended 
families residing in the same or nearby households (Hooper et al., 2015). However, unrelated 
village members will regularly visit each other to socialize and drink shocdye’ (chicha), an 
alcoholic beverage fermented from manioc and maize (Hooper et al., 2013). The sexual division 
of labour is pronounced. Women average approximately 9 offspring over their lifetime and do 
the large majority of direct childcare and food processing (McAllister et al., 2012). The Tsimane 
have no documented history of intervillage warfare. Within villages, conflicts tend to be resolved 
by the parties directly involved. For many of the conflicts that remain unresolved, third parties 
within the extended family or in the village may step in to help mediate. Villagers also hold 
meetings to respond to incursion by illegal loggers or other colonists, negotiate with itinerant 
merchants, or coordinate projects with the Bolivian government or NGOs. The Tsimane 
remained largely unconnected to Bolivian society until the mid twentieth century with the arrival 
of Protestant and Catholic missionaries (Chicchón, 1992). Average income is <$2 (US) per day 
from sale of horticultural products and sporadic wage labour with loggers and ranchers.   
 
5.2.2. Data Collection 
Three waves of panel data, including status rankings and reported cooperation partners, were 
collected from the entire adult male population (above 21 years old) of one Tsimane village. 
Data were collected in 2009 (n=72), 2014 (n=78) and 2017 (n=89). Growth in adult male 
population size is due to immigration, in addition to more boys entering adulthood than adult 
men dying. A single wave of the panel data was collected in 2008/2009 from all adult men in 
another Tsimane village (n=73). Fieldwork was approved by the institutional review boards of 




participants provided informed consent, and methods were approved by the Tsimane government 
and village leaders.  
 
5.2.3. Cooperation Networks 
Networks of cooperation were constructed using a ‘name generator’ approach, with men freely 
listing other men within the village who had shared meat with them or assisted them in hunting, 
fishing, logging, or horticultural labour over the previous 6 months. Networks were sociocentric, 
binary, and directed. For the longitudinal analysis, the population was restricted to adult men 
(avg. n=68) who were present within the village in at least two waves of data collection (see 
Figure 2a-c). The composition change observed in the networks was modelled through the 
method of joiners and leavers (Huisman & Snijders, 2003). See SI for further description of the 
networks. 
 
5.2.4. Social Status 
To generate status rankings at each wave and in each village, roughly half of the adult men in 
each village were randomly selected as rankers (Von Rueden et al., 2008, 2010). The rankers 
represented most ages and all extended families within their village. Each ranker was shown two 
arrays of 8 photographs, each array a subset of other men from their community. Rankers were 
asked to rank the men in each array from highest to lowest according to “who is most respected”. 
Photos were PolaroidsTM of the top-half of each man’s body, set against as neutral a background 
as possible. Rankers evaluated two additional arrays of photos according to “whose voice carries 





The particular photos in each array were selected according to a matrix based on a projective 
plane. Each number in the matrix corresponded to a photo, and each vector in the matrix 
corresponded to a particular photo array. By picking photo arrays according to vectors in these 
matrices, we (1) minimized the number of photos each ranker evaluated, while (2) ensuring 
comparison of every photo to every other photo and (3) ensuring an equal number of rankings of 
each man. A maximum likelihood factor analysis indicated that the two photo-ranked status 
measures comprise a distinct factor that has good internal consistency in each village and at 
every time wave (with α >.70 throughout). Thus, we evaluate status as the average of the two 
photo-ranked measures. See SI for additional explication of the photo-ranking procedure and 
factor analysis.  
 
Our confidence in the validity of the photo-ranking is strengthened by ethnographic observation. 
In the village assessed longitudinally, influence ranking in 2009 predicted who spoke more 
frequently during community meetings attended by CvR that year (r= 0.53, p< 0.001, n= 73). 
The same was true for influence ranking and community meetings attended by CvR in 2014 
(r=0.67, p=0.002, n=49). 
 
5.2.5. Covariates 
All demographic data used to age individuals and determine kinship come from reproductive 
history interviews first collected from 2003-2005 and updated annually thereafter (Gurven et al. 
2007). Individuals were analyzed as kin if they were brothers or father and son (whether 
consanguineal or in-law). This definition of kinship reflects the concentration of Tsimane social 




children. At each wave, household income was determined by asking men about all potential 
sources of income over the past year, including wage labour and sales of forest and horticultural 
goods. Every 1-3 years, clinicians employed with the Tsimane Health and Life History Project 
(THLHP: http://www.unm.edu/~tsimane) measured participants’ height and weight with a 
portable stadiometer and a digital weigh scale, respectively. Shoulder and chest strength were 
measured with a Lafayette Manual Muscle Tester and grip strength was measured with a 
Smedley III dynamometer. We summed these values to create a composite upper body strength 
measure. A maximum likelihood factor analysis indicated that height, weight, and upper body 
strength comprised a distinct factor with adequate internal consistency. Thus, we averaged these 
size and strength measures to analyze them as a single covariate. See SI for covariate 
descriptives. 
 
5.2.6. Analytical Strategy 
Analyses were conducted using stochastic actor-oriented modelling (SAOMs: See Snijders et al. 
2010) using RSiena software (Simulation Investigation for Empirical Network Analysis: RSiena 
version 1.2-4 in R 3.4.2; Ripley et al., 2018). SAOMs estimate latent changes in a network, and 
‘behaviours’ within that network, between observed time points.  These changes are modelled as 
a continuous-time process, and actors are assumed to control their outgoing ties and the 
expression of ‘behaviours’ in a succession of multiple small steps (termed ‘microsteps’: Snijders 
et al., 2010).  SAOMs estimate the rate of opportunities for change and further estimate the node-
level (individual actor), dyad-level, and network-level mechanisms driving change using an 
evaluation function.  A positive parameter estimate would indicate that the parameter produced a 





For the longitudinal network analysis, a network-behaviour co-evolution SAOM was specified. 
This procedure combines SAOMs for a one-mode network with a dependent ‘behaviour’ variable 
(Snijders, Steglich & Schweinberger, 2007) to simultaneously assess the temporal relationship 
that cooperation network dynamics (the dependent one-mode network) have with status (the 
dependent ‘behaviour’). The model was built using the recommended step-wise procedure. 
Endogenous network effects, kinship, age, income and physical strength and size were controlled 
for within the evaluation function. The group mean of the actor covariates is substracted from 
each actor’s score and are stored within the SAOM data objects (Ripley et al. 2018). These 
centered scores are used for calculations and allow for more comparable estimates between 
covariates. Further details on model specification and model building procedure can be found in 
the Supplementary Information. The model had good convergence, with an overall maximum 
convergence t-ratio of 0.17 and individual parameter t-ratios <0.10, and controlled for any time-
heterogeneity of effects (Lospinoso, Schweinberger & Snijders, 2011). For the cross-sectional 




5.3.1. Within-Network Effects on Cooperation Dynamics 
The results shown in Table 10 present the parameter estimates (θ ) that indicate the log-
likelihood, the odds ratios and significance of effects. There was a significant rate of change in 
cooperation ties throughout the observed period, with changes in cooperative ties peaking 




in time between observations Results suggest that actors had a strong tendency to reciprocate 
cooperative partnership ties over time (θ = 1.55, SE = 0.121, p < 0.001). We also find a strong 
tendency for transitive groups of cooperation partners to form (θ = 1.422, SE = 0.098, p < 0.001). 
This indicates that individuals attend to, and are more likely to send ties to, who their cooperative 
partners are cooperating with, such that if individual i nominated individual h as a cooperative 
partner and individual h nominate individual j, then over time individual i was more likely to 
nominate individual j.  The negative degree-related parameters, indegree popularity (θ = -0.533, 
SE = 0.113, p < 0.001) and outdegree activity (θ = -0.306, SE = 0.077, p < 0.001), indicate that 
there was a tendency towards relative egalitarianism in both indegree and outdegree within the 
network, such that an individual’s previous degree did not substantially increase their future 
degree. This suggests that acts of cooperation were relatively evenly distributed throughout the 
network.   
 
5.3.2. Actor Covariate Effects on Cooperation Dynamics 
Individuals were highly likely to form cooperative partnerships with their close kin (θ = 0.484, 
SE = 0.092, p < 0.001). The positive alter parameter for body size and strength (θ = 0.015, SE = 
0.006, p = 0.01) indicates that actors nominated those who were physically larger and stronger as 
cooperation partners. Results show that there was no significant relationship between physical 
size and strength and outdegree nominations, nor was there a tendency for actors to selectively 
cooperate with those similar to themselves in physical size and strength. Income did not relate to 
indegree nominations of cooperation partners but had a marginally significant effect on an 
actor’s outdegree nominations (θ = 0.032, SE = 0.018, p = 0.079), with those high in income 




tendency for actors to preferentially select those similar to themselves in income as cooperation 
partners (θ = 0.278, SE = 0.132, p = 0.039). There was a marginally significant tendency for 
older individuals to receive higher numbers of cooperation partner nominations (θ = 0.007, SE = 
0.004, p = 0.057), but they were less likely to nominate cooperation partners themselves (θ = -
0.012, SE = 0.004, p = 0.006).  There was no tendency for individuals of similar age to nominate 
each other as cooperation partners.  
 
5.3.3. The Effects of Status on Cooperation Dynamics  
We find support for our prediction regarding the effect of status on cooperation network 
dynamics. Results show that there was a significant tendency for those perceived high in status to 
be nominated as cooperation partners (θ = 0.059, SE = 0.028, p = 0.036). However, there was no 
significant tendency for status to impact outdegree nominations, nor was there selection-based 
homophily according to status. 
 
Cross-sectional analysis of Tsimane men’s cooperation network in another community is 
consistent with our longitudinal results. Status associates with higher indegree and lower 
outdegree nominations. See SI for specifics of this additional cross-sectional network analysis. 
 
5.3.4. The Effects of Cooperation on Status Dynamics 
As shown in Table 1, there was a significant amount of change in status over time, with change 
in status peaking between period 1 and 2 (θ = 6.697, SE = 1.638,  p < .001), however the 
difference between periods is not substantial (status rate period 2-3: θ = 5.620, SE = 1.218,  p < 




suggesting that there is some non-linear change in status over time. However, neither effect was 
significant. The positive total alter estimate indicates that the combined statuses of an actor’s 
cooperation partners had a positive effect on their own status (θ = 0.036, SE = 0.018, p = 0.05), 
while controlling for all other effects within the model. An actor’s status rises to become similar 
to that of their cooperation partners. Neither age nor size and strength impacted status dynamics. 
Income had a marginally significant effect on status dynamics (θ = 0.040, SE = 0.021, p = 




Using a novel social network approach, we provide the first longitudinal evidence in a traditional 
human society that inter-individual differences in social status structure the formation of 
cooperative partnerships, and that networks of cooperation contribute to the acquisition of status 
over time. Furthermore, status motivates cooperation independent of direct reciprocity and kin 
assortment. We found larger effects on cooperative tie formation from kinship and reciprocity 
than from either status or income, which accords with previous cross-sectional social network 
analyses of cooperation in traditional societies (Lamelera: Nolin 2012; Mayangna/Miskito: 
Koster and Leckie 2014; Mpimbwe: Kasper and Borgerhoff Mulder 2015; rural India: Power 
2017; Nunavik: Ready and Power 2018). The observed similarity across previous studies in 
effect sizes despite large variation in network density (<0.01–0.39) and average degree (3.4–
13.1), and in the present findings over time, indicates that these multiple processes may 





Among the Tsimane, men who are respected and influential in community decision-making (i.e. 
high status) were more likely to be nominated over time as sharing food or assisting in hunting, 
fishing, logging, and horticultural labour. This result replicated in a cross-sectional analysis of 
Tsimane men in a second community. One explanation of these results is that higher status 
Tsimane men are more likely to share food and seek out cooperation opportunities with diverse 
community members. Political influence may hinge on maintaining coalitional support via 
generosity (Blau 1964) and widespread social networking. Previous work with the Tsimane 
found that politically influential men have reputations for generosity, whose effect on influence 
is largely mediated by coalitional support (von Rueden et al. 2008). But why seek respect or 
political influence in this relatively egalitarian context? Immediate benefits include resolving 
conflicts or steering community debates in directions that, while favourable to the community, 
are particularly favourable to oneself or family members. Among the Tsimane, these debates 
often concern the rights of households to sell timber from community forest, contracts with 
NGOs and local government, and conflicts over arable land, sexual jealousy, adultery, theft, and 
other conflicts. Longer-term benefits include lower stress (von Rueden et al. 2015a) and 
reproductive gains within and outside marital unions (von Rueden et al. 2011), which may be 
due to enhanced mate value and greater social support for one’s family during periods of 
particular need, such as illness (Gurven et al., 2000; Sugiyama and Sugiyama, 2003). 
 
Independent of their generosity, high status individuals are likely to be desirable as cooperation 
partners. Lower status individuals may anticipate access to information (Henrich & Gil-White 
2001) or coalitional support that may increase their own status, and cooperation with high status 




study of adults in an industrialized society found that individuals are more generous with better-
connected members of their social network (Curry and Dunbar, 2011). Individuals who engage 
in cooperation with higher status individuals may also mimic their prosocial behaviours (Henrich 
et al. 2015), which increases similarity in prestige and thus in status. Despite our finding that 
higher status Tsimane men are no more likely to report others as cooperating with them, we find 
evidence that cooperation with higher status individuals increases one’s own status. The 
acquisition of social status is a function of social connectedness to high status group members. 
 
The effects of status on cooperation and cooperation on status are independent of the kinship of 
cooperators and other attributes of Tsimane men, including their age, body size and strength, and 
income. Older men nominated fewer cooperation partners, which may reflect increasing 
concentration of cooperation within the extended family as older men’s productivity and 
mobility wane. Size and strength associate with political influence in the Tsimane (von Rueden 
et al. 2008), which may be due to their contribution to leader charisma (von Rueden et al. 2015b) 
and coordination ability (von Rueden et al. 2014). However, body size and strength predict 
acquisition of cooperation partners independent of Tsimane men’s status, perhaps because 
physical formidability is desirous in an ally in the event of conflict. Size and strength may also 
associate with production skill, as is the case for hunting ability in other traditional societies 
(Apicella 2014). 
 
Tsimane cooperation partners tend to assort based on income, but not on status or the other 
attributes we evaluated. Such income homophily may be a signal of incipient stratification by 




accelerated in recent decades. In contrast, cooperation dynamics may be helping sustain relative 
egalitarianism in Tsimane men’s political status, due to cooperation among status dissimilar men 
who subsequently influence each other’s statuses. Political egalitarianism need not depend 
primarily on coordinated levelling, as is often emphasized (Boehm 1999). When status diffuses 
through cooperative relationships, the otherwise self-reinforcing nature of status is kept in check 
(Bothner et al. 2010). 
 
In general, the present findings suggest that models of the evolution of cooperation should 
consider (1) the networked structure of human cooperation as well as (2) the relative status of 
cooperators. Furthermore, our findings highlight the importance of longitudinal observational 
approaches, which provides greater external and ecological validity that experimental designs, 
and can fully parse the selection and influence processes driving homophily in networks 
(Steglich, Snijders & Pearson, 2010). While mathematical models, cross-sectional field studies, 
and experimental evidence have suggested that individuals selectively assort with cooperation 
partners who display similarity in cooperativeness (i.e. Apicella et al., 2012; Fu et al., 2012; Di 
Stefano et al., 2015), the methodological paradigms rarely parse effects of network selection and 
network influence on actor similarity. Cooperative ties may influence cooperation independent of 
tie selection: cooperation can increase or decrease via social influence (Fowler & Christakis 
2010; Jordan et al. 2013). Among the Tsimane, similarity in status between cooperators is not 
caused by individuals initially choosing others who are of similar status, but rather may result 





Across human societies, socio-ecological variation in the sexual division of labour, subsistence 
strategies, mobility, monopolizability of material wealth, community size and density, and other 
factors should pattern cooperation, status hierarchy, and their dynamic interaction. In some 
contexts, status hierarchy may be at odds with cooperation (Cronin et al. 2015). However, status 
in any human organization or society is unlikely to be gained or maintained without 
demonstrating value to others. Sometimes status-motivated cooperation can be highly 
competitive or overtly self-aggrandizing. In more stratified small-scale societies, chiefs and Big 
Men sponsored lavish feasts or gift exchanges, not only to signal their personal qualities but also 
to generate indebtedness and reveal others’ weaknesses (Hayden 1995). The present study of the 
Tsimane provides a fruitful platform for future longitudinal studies in other societies, to 
determine how particular socio-ecological factors contribute to the relationship between 













Figure 1b: a Tsimane man helping resolve a dispute over land, which is illustrative of largely 









Figure 2a-c: cooperation network over time. The cicles (nodes) represent individuals within the 
community. The size of these nodes was dependent on their indegree nomination, the more 
nominations they received, the larger the node. The grey lines between them representing the 
cooperation ties. Arrows indicte the direction in which the nomination was made. The gradient of 



















Parameter estimates, standard errors and odds ratios for the network-behaviour dynamics of 












Cooperation rate (period 1) 37.168*** 8.672 NA 4.286 (<.001) 
Cooperation rate (period 2) 11.023*** 1.104 NA 9.986 (<.001) 
Outdegree (density) -0.270 0.347 0.763 -0.780 (.438) 
Reciprocity 1.550*** 0.121 4.711 12.819 (<.001) 
Tendency towards transitivity a  1.422*** 0.098 4.145 14.537 (<.001) 
Indegree popularity (sqrt) -0.533*** 0.113 0.587 -4.699 (<.001) 
Outdegree activity (sqrt) -0.306*** 0.077 0.736 -3.973 (<.001) 
Main effect of kinship 0.484*** 0.092 1.623 5.286 (<.001) 
Status alter 0.059* 0.028 1.061 2.138 (.0359) 
Status ego 0.016 0.027 1.016 0.572 (.569) 
Status similarity 0.272 0.216 1.313 1.259 (.212) 
Physical strength and size alter 0.015** 0.006 1.015 2.621 (.011) 
Physical strength and size ego 0.000 0.007 1.000 -0.030 (.976) 
Physical strength and size 
similarity 0.075 0.257 1.077 0.291 (.772) 
Income alter -0.024 0.016 0.976 -1.506 (.136) 
Income ego 0.032† 0.018 1.033 1.782 (.079) 
Income similarity 0.278* 0.132 1.321 2.105 (.039) 
Age alter 0.007† 0.004 1.007 1.921 (.057) 
Age ego -0.012** 0.004 0.988 -2.837 (.006) 
Age similarity 0.124 0.237 1.132 0.523 (.603) 
Behaviour Dynamics 
Status rate (period 1) 6.697*** 1.638 NA 4.090 (<.001) 
Status rate (period 2) 5.620*** 1.218 NA 4.615 (<.001) 
Status linear shape -0.019 0.077 0.825 -0.251 (.803) 
Status quadratic shape -0.025 0.017 NA -1.451 (.151) 
Status total alter 0.036* 0.018 1.036 2.017 (.047) 
Effect from Physical strength and 
size  0.003 0.008 1.003 0.350 (.727) 




Effect from age -0.002 0.005 0.998 -0.447 (.656) 
 
a Tendency towards transitivity was measured using the geometrically weighted shared 
edgewise partners effect (GWESP), which has an / = .69. For further elaboration of the 
effect, see SI.  











5.5. Supplementary Information 
 
 
5.5.1. Photo Ranking of Status 
Each ranker evaluated the photos with no one else present but CvR. The rankers were made 
aware of the confidentiality of their individual rankings. Verbal instructions were translated into 
the Tsimane’ language from Spanish and then, as a test of the accuracy of translation, back-
translated into Spanish by Tsimane’ men from other communities. 
 
To select the photo arrays presented to rankers, matrices based on different projective planes 
were used in different villages and at different waves. We used a matrix whose number of unique 
values best corresponded to the number of adult men (>21 yrs) to be ranked. For example, a 
matrix based on the projective plane of order 9 (containing 91 unique numbers) was used in the 
final wave of data collection, in which 89 adult men were ranked, in addition to two males not 
quite 21 years old. Based on the matrix, each man was ranked ten times, each time in an array of 
ten photos. Thus, each man could receive a status score ranging from 10 (lowest) to 100 
(highest). For comparison, photo-ranked scores in each village and at each wave were 
transformed to match in range. 
 
5.5.2. Factor Analysis 
Our analysis of status, income, and the size/strength measures as distinct attributes of actors is 
supported by a maximum likelihood factor analysis with promax (oblique) rotation. Included in 
the analysis were the two photo-ranked status measures, income, height, weight, and upper body 
strength from the first wave of data collection. The factor analysis was suitable for the items 




Bartlett’s test of sphericity (cB15 = 109.21,  < 0.001. Furthermore, the communalities 
between most factors were above the recommended value of 0.3, whilst upper body strength was 
0.293 and income 0.169. All diagonals within the anti-image correlation matrix were above the 
recommended value of .5.  
 
We extracted two correlated latent factors. As shown in SI Table 1, influence and respect loaded 
highly and positively onto the first factor, while the size and strength measures loaded positively 
onto the second factor. Although income loaded onto the status factor, it did not meet a minimum 
loading of 0.4 and was thus retained as a covariate apart from status and the size/strength 
measures. The status and size/strength factors were correlated (r = 0.37) and had eigenvalues of 
2.75 and 1.23, respectively.  The extracted factors accounted for 67% of the total variance (46% 
by status and 21% size and strength).  
 
Given the results of the factor analysis, and in order to limit multicollinearity, we analyzed status 
as the average of influence and respect, and we analyzed height, weight, and upper body strength 
as their sum. 
 
5.5.3. Network Descriptives 
After censoring for individuals present in only one time wave, the composition of the 
cooperative partnership network initially comprises 60 actors, increases to 74 actors in time wave 
two and falls to 70 actors in the final time wave. The average number of cooperation partner 
nominations ranged between 3.4 and 7.8. The Jaccard index, a measure of tie stability between 




elapsed between waves. 20.5% of ties remained the same between time wave 1 and 2, and 30.1% 
remained the same between time wave 2 and 3. Notably, the network at time wave 2 shows 
reduced density, which may correspond with the major flooding and crop loss that occurred that 
year (Trumble et al., 2018). Men may have concentrated cooperation with relatives, due to 
mobility constraints from the flooding or insufficient food to share widely. Cross-culturally, the 
frequency of unpredictable food-destroying natural hazards associates with increased restriction 
of food-sharing to relatives (Ember et al. 2018). 
 
5.5.4. Covariate Descriptives 
To fit the current data requirements for SAOMs (See Ripley et al., 2018), covariates were 
transformed into ordinal percentile rankings with 10 levels that were approximately equally 
distributed. This transformation ensured that 1 encompassed the lowest scorers (the 10th 
percentile) and 10 the highest scorers (the 90th percentile). Kinship was treated as an undirected 
network, where binary edges within the network indicated whether the respective dyad were kin 
(indicated by 1) or non-kin (indicated by 0). See SI Table 2 for descriptive statistics for all 
covariates included in the SAOM.  
 
5.5.5. Stochastic Actor-Oriented Model (SAOM) Description and Specification 
SAOMs estimate latent temporal changes in networks and behaviours as outcomes of a sequence 
of decisions made by the actors that comprise the networks (for further elabouration and 
mathematical description see Ripley et al., 2018; Snijders 2001, 2009, 2016; Snijders, Steglich & 
Schweinberger 2007). To do this, SAOMs use data from an initial observed time point as a 




data. Change is assumed to occur in continuous time through a Markov process, and, unlike other 
longitudinal network models (i.e. Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models, for a 
comparison see Block et al., 2017), actors are given agency and are assumed to control their 
outgoing ties through a succession of steps (Snijders, 2001). The opportunities for actors to make 
such changes are decomposed into the smallest possible step, termed a microstep, and is 
measured by a rate function (Snijders, 2009). During a microstep an actor is randomly selected 
and has the opportunity to create, terminate or maintain a tie within the network. When presented 
this opportunity for change, an actor evaluates all of their possible choices given the composition 
of the current network, weighting certain choice based on endogenous structural processes (i.e. 
reciprocity and transitivity), and exogenous mechanisms that may make a certain choice optimal 
(i.e. to cooperate with kin). These factors that may be driving the change are measured using an 
objective (or evaluation) function. Actors aim to maximize their objective function and, after 
assessing all possible choices, the actor will make the optimal choice (with a small amount of 
randomness: Snijders et al., 2010). Thus, positive parameter estimates in the models indicate that 
a parameter makes a positive contribution to the objective function and therefore increases the 
average tendency for actors to create and maintain ties. Negative parameter estimate suggest the 
converse. Convergence of the model indicates that the parameter estimates are able to very 
closely simulate the actual measured networks and behaviours. 
 
We specified our SAOM using the recommended stepwise procedure to avoid model over-
specification (Ripley et al., 2018). An initial base model was specified and included only 
elementary endogenous structural effects that are inherent in the development of networks (i.e. 




further endogenous and exogeneous mechanisms were included in the base model to assess 
whether inclusion of the parameter made a unique contribution to the objective function and 
substantially improved model fit. In the score-type tests the parameter being assessed for 
inclusion is fixed to zero in the model and is then estimated. If the parameter’s estimate is 
significantly different from zero then it would make a substantial impact and should be included 
within the full model. A full model was then specified and included all parameters that achieved 
an α < .05 in the score-type tests. The parameters included in the final model are described in 
detail below. See SI Table 3 for a mathematical and graphical description of all included effects.  
 
Within-Network Effects.  Five effects were included to capture and control for the structural 
tendencies of the cooperation network dynamics. The first, outdegree or density, measured how 
selective individuals were in choosing cooperative partners.  The tendency to reciprocate 
cooperative partnerships and to form transitive groups (i.e. if  → e and e → ℎ, then  → ℎ) were 
also included.  Two-degree related effects, indegree popularity and outdegree activity, were 
included to capture the tendency to differentiate in degree, which assessed whether an actor’s 
anterior indegree/outdegree predicted their future indegree/outdegree. 
 
Covariate Effects. A total kinship (both affinal and consanguineal kin) network was modelled as 
a binary dyadic varying covariate, and one effect, assessing its direct association (i.e. how the 
presence of a kinship tie directly impacted the presence of a cooperation tie), was included in the 
model. An ego, alter and similarity effect were included to test our hypotheses regarding the 
impact that status has on cooperation dynamics. The ego effect measures the impact of the 




positive contribution to the creation or maintenance of outgoing cooperative partnership ties. The 
alter effect assesses whether covariate impacts indegree nominations, with a positive estimate 
suggesting that the covariate has a positive contribution to the creation or maintenance of 
incoming cooperative partnership ties.  The similarity effect captures the selection of cooperative 
partners based on similarity in the given covariate. Ego, alter and similarity effects were also 
included in the model to assess how physical strength and size, income and age affected choice 
in cooperative partners.   
 
Status Dynamics.  We included the total alter effect to assess our hypotheses about the effects of 
the cooperation network dynamics on status.  The total alter effect measures how an actor’s 
cooperative partner’s total value in status influences the actor’s status.  A positive estimate 
would thus suggest that, if an actor’s cooperative partners are high in status, the actor’s status 
would increase.  Several effects were also modelled to fully partial the influence of cooperation 
on status.  The first two, linear and quadratic shape effects, capture the linear trajectory of status 
and the feedback effect of status on itself, respectively. The main effects from physical strength 
and size, income and age on status were also controlled for.  
 
5.5.6. Exponential random graph model (ERGM) description and results 
To assess the reliability of the SAOM results, an exponential random graph model (ERGM) was 
conducted on comparable cross-sectional data in a second Tsimane village. ERGMs assess the 
probability of tie formation in a manner similar to generalized logistic models and allow for the 
inclusion of endogenous (structural) and exogenous (covariate) parameters that impact the 




For detailed outlines of ERGMs see Robins et al. (2007), Lusher, Koskinen & Robins (2013) and 
Snijders et al. (2006). 
 
The ERGM was conducted in the statnet suite of packages in R (v.: R Core Development Team 
2014). The model was built using the guidelines by Goodreau et al. (2007) & Morris et al. 
(2008). The model includes an edges parameter, which is analogous to the outdegree of our 
SAOM, a reciprocity parameter and a parameter assessing the tendency to form transitive groups 
(GWESP: which had a decay of 0.1 and was not fixed). We included node covariate effects to 
assess the impact that status, income, physical strength and size, and age had on cooperative tie 
formations. Directed terms (node indegree/node outdegree) were specified as the cooperation 
network was directed. An edge covariate effect was specified to test the impact that kinship had 
on cooperative ties. See SI Table 4 for covariate descriptives. 
 
The final model reported is the most comparable to our SAOM and has the best fit. The model 
has an MCMC sample size of 40,000 with a burn-in of 20,000 and an interval of 800. There is no 
sign of model degeneracy and there is adequate goodness-of-fit. We also ran the ERGM in 
MPNet (Wang, Robins & Pattison, 2006) to ensure that there were no differences in results 
between our SAOM and ERGM due to the slight differences in estimation procedure between 
packages. There were no qualitative differences in results between the packages.  
 
Results from the ERGM provide a cross-sectional replication of our SAOM (see SI Table 5). The 
structural processes have a comparably large impact on cooperation ties to our SAOM, with a 




reciprocity (θ = 1.442, SE = 0.194, p  <0.001) and transitive groups (θ = -0.453, SE = 0.045, p  
<0.001). Kinship had a substantial relationship on cooperation ties (θ = 1.755, SE = 0.092, p  
<0.001). Status had a positive relationship with indegree ties (θ = 0.051, SE = 0.019, p  = 0.007) 
and a negative relationship with outdegree ties (θ = -0.060, SE = 0.018, p  <0.001). This indicates 
that those high in status were nominated more as cooperators, and they were less likely to 
nominate cooperative partners. A similar relationship was found between physical strength and 
size and cooperation, with those physically stronger and larger receiving more indegree 
nominations (θ = 0.027, SE = 0.007, p <0.001) but being significantly less likely to send 
outdegree nominations (θ = -0.022, SE = 0.008, p = 0.005). Income had a marginally significant 
relationship with outdegree nominations (θ = 0.037, SE = 0.019, p = 0.052), with those higher in 





Factor analysis of status and actor covariates from first wave of data collection in village 1 
 
Table 1.   
structure matrix 
Item Factor 
 1 2 
Influence .999 .349 
Respect .803 .450 
Income .398 .112 
Height .219 .987 
Weight .426 .629 
Upper body strength .330 .629 

























Descriptive statistics for actor attributes in Village 1. 
Variable Mean (SD) Range 
(Min-Max) 
Density 
Status T1 5.47- 
(2.842) 
9 (1-10)  
Status T2   5.449 
(2.608) 
9 (1-10) - 
Status T3 5.535 
(2.772) 
9 (1-10) - 
Status T4  6.054 
(2.619) 
9 (1-10) - 

















Income T1 5.540 
(2.860) 
9 (1-10) - 
Income T2 5.428 
(2.691) 




Income T3 5.653 
(2.752) 
9 (1-10) - 
Age T1 36.07 
(12.791) 
47 (21-68) - 
Age T2 35.159 
(12.352) 
51 (21-72) - 
Age T3 38.189 
(12.705) 
56 (21-77) - 
Kinship T1 10.733
a 22(0-22)b 0.091 
Kinship T2 8.865 
a 24 (0-24)b 0.061 
Kinship T3 10.595
 a 22 (0-22) b 0.076 
Note.  
a Mean degree. 







Network and Covariate effects included in the objective functions of the SAOM model.  
Effect Mathematical Expression Graphical 
Expression 
Interpretation  
Structural Network Effects    
Out-degree (density)  g  
 
 The average tendency for actors to create 
outgoing cooperation ties. 
Reciprocity (recip)  g gg  
 
 
The average tendency actors to reciprocate 
cooperation ties. 
Transitive group formation 
(gwespFF)a   hiB
jA
 g klm1 4 1 4 kil  nnghnjA o 
 
 
The average tendency for closure in the 
cooperation network. 
 
    
In-degree Popularity 
(inPopSqrt)  gg  p ngn  
 
The average tendency for actors to attract 
greater incoming cooperation ties from 




 gg q 	 
 
The average tendency for actors to create 
out-degree cooperation ties due to their 
high current out-degree ties.  
Covariate Effects    
Main effect (centered) of the 
dyadic covariate (X) 
 grsg 4 stug  
 
The effect of having a kinship tie with an 
actor in the kinship network (W) on 
forming a tie with that actor in the 
cooperation network (X). 
Covariate sender (egoX)  gg v  The tendency for actors with high values on a covariate to create greater out-degree 
ties. 















Covariate Similarity (simX)  g g &wg 4 &xwy  
 
 
 The tendency for actors to create ties with 
alters who have similar values to them on a 
given covariate.  
Effects on status dynamics    
Linear shape (linear) )   Expresses the basic drive towards high 
values on status. 
Quadratic shape (quad) )B  Represents the feedback effect of status on 
itself.  
Total alter (totAlt) ) z g)gg {  The tendency for actors to increase their status due to the influence of the sum of 
their alters’ statuses.  
Main covariate effect (effFrom) )    The main effect of an actor’s score on a 
given covariate on their status (status is 







Descriptive statistics for actor attributes in village 2. 
Variable Mean (SD) Range 
(Min-Max) 
Density 
Status  5.480 
(2.863) 
9 (1-10)  
Physical Strength & size 102.384 
(7.224) 
9 (1-10) - 
Income 5.510 
(2.849) 
9 (1-10) - 
Age 38.22 
(13.179) 
9 (1-10) - 
Kinship 12.989a 34(0-34)b 0.074 
Note.  
a Mean degree. 








Parameter estimates, standard error and p-values for ERG model assessing 
village 2.  
Parameter Estimate SE p-value 
Edges -5.22*** 0.8 <0.001 
Mutual 
(Reciprocity) 




0.453*** 0.045 <0.001 
Main effect of 
kinship 
1.755*** 0.092 <0.001 
Status alter 0.051** 0.019 0.007 
Status ego -0.060*** 0.018 <0.001 
Income alter 0.004 0.019 0.825 
Income ego 0.037† 0.019 0.052 
Strength alter 0.027*** 0.007 <0.001 
Strength ego -0.022** 0.008 0.005 
Age receiver -0.003 0.004 0.503 
Age sender 0.002 0.004 0.714 
Null deviance = 10857, df = 7832 
Residual deviance = 2684, df = 7819 
AIC = 2710 
BIC = 2801 














The current body of research proposed that two profiles, prestige and dominance, form 
two components of the dynamic system of human social hierarchy. Through this approach, the 
current research provides an important theoretical contribution to the extant body of literature: it 
integrates the simultaneous effects of time and social structure into the dual model of social 
hierarchy. The theoretical integration of how time and structure allowed the current research to 
advance three overarching hypotheses: 1) That prestige, dominance and social rank will fluctuate 
over time, with changes in one of these processes will impact change in the other; 2) That social 
hierarchies are embedded in social networks, which are as likely to be a consequence as to be a 
cause of differences in prestige and dominance; 3) There are distinct social networks that relate 
to cooperation among humans, which are multiplex (i.e. ties in one network impact ties in the 
other) and inherently linked to social hierarchy. 
 
To uncover whether the relationships between prestige, dominance and social rank 
displayed dynamic change over time, Chapter 3 provides a longitudinal extension of existing 
cross-sectional paradigms that assess social rank in organic, collaborative groups (Anderson & 
Kilduff, 2009a; Cheng et al., 2013; Ridgeway, 1987; Ronay et al., 2012). The present research 
captured peer-perceptions of prestige, dominance and social rank among student task groups 
from the initial point of group formation through to the end of a 16-week semester, when the task 
was complete. Results indicated that prestige, dominance and social rank were related, dynamic 
processes that exhibited smooth non-linear change over time. Findings revealed that prestige had 
a positive impact on social rank and that the relationship between the two processes was 
bidirectional, with social rank concurrently increasing an individual’s prestige over time.  In 





rank during the initial point of group formation—replicating previous findings (Cheng et al., 
2013)—the relationship between dominance and social rank diminished after this point, with 
neither process having a substantial impact on the other over time.  Results from Chapter 3 
further highlight that prestige and dominance are distinct profiles (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; 
Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Maner, 2017), as neither impacted the other over time and the 
processes had divergent longitudinal trajectories with social rank over time. Overall, the results 
outlined in Chapter 3 confirm hypothesis 1 and show that prestige, dominance and social rank 
are dynamic processes.   
 
 Chapter 4 delivered an examination, and offered evidence in support, of hypotheses 2 and 
3. The study examined how prestige, dominance, instrumental network ties and expressive 
network ties simultaneously impact one another. To assess the proposed relationships between 
the four components, the study captured peer ratings of prestige and dominance, and peer 
nominations of work-related advice (instrumental network ties) and friendship (expressive 
network ties) among North American undergraduate students. Results demonstrated that those 
high in prestige were nominated more as advisors and were less likely to ask for advice, while 
dominance has no relationship to the selection of advisors. Findings further suggested that being 
nominated as an advisor increased an individual’s prestige over time and that the prestige of an 
individual’s advisors increased an individual’s prestige overtime. In contrast, the presence of an 
incoming advice ties decreased and individual’s dominance. The present findings suggested that 
prestige did not have a significant impact on nominating or being nominated as friends, whilst 
those high in dominance were marginally less likely to be nominated as friends over time. 
Furthermore, the multiplex models presented in Chapter 4 indicate that friendship and advice 





(and vice versa), that advice ties were reciprocated by friendship ties (and vice versa), and that 
high indegree in friendship caused high indegree in advice, whilst all other actor-level effects 
where non-significant.  
 
 To lend further support to hypothesis 2, Chapter 5 evaluated the impact of prestige status 
in cooperation networks, operationalized as instrumental support ties through nominations of 
food-sharing and help with food-production, among the Tsimane hunter-horticulturalists. The 
study captured the dynamics of peer-ratings of prestige status and these cooperation networks 
among men in one village across a 12-year period. Results demonstrate that those high in 
prestige status were nominated more as individuals who shared food and helped with food 
production but were less likely to nominate others.  Similarity in prestige status was observed to 
be a product of network influence, as opposed to network selection, with the prestige status of 
those with whom an individual shared a cooperative tie increasing that individual’s prestige 
status. These findings were unique of the impact of physical strength and size, kinship, income, 
age and endogenous network processes that typically guide cooperation in small-scale societies 
(i.e. direct reciprocity). Overall, the results of Chapter 5 replicate those relating to prestige status 
and instrumental network ties found in Chapter 4 using a different domain of instrumental 
support among a more ecologically valid population and across a longer period of time. 
Alongside this, those physically stronger and larger were more likely nominated as cooperative 
partners. While physical strength and size may be associated with dominance (), it may also be 






 Taken together, this body of research delivers the first longitudinal assessment of social 
hierarchy and offers initial evidence of the complex dynamics between processes of prestige, 
dominance, social rank and social networks. Through this, the current research provides several 
contributions—both theoretical and methodological—to the existing literature. The following 
section briefly surmises these contributions and acknowledges several limitations to the research, 
which give rise to questions for future enquiry.  
 
 




 The current research builds upon a literature that proposes that individuals gain social 
rank in human hierarchies through dominance, centred on the ability and willingness to inflict 
harm on others, and prestige, which is founded by the ability and willingness to confer benefits 
to others (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Individuals may exhibit stable levels of dispositional 
prestige and dominance, which make them more inclined towards behaviors and interpersonal 
relationships that broadcast either their ability and willingness to inflict harm or confer benefits. 
However, these behaviours and relationships display facultative flexibility over time, and 
potentially between contexts. Natural selection may have favoured more dynamic, proximate 
behavioural displays that communicate an individual’s motivations and dispositions associated 
with rank attainment. Such behavioural plasticity may be associated with the need to adapt to 
stochastic temporal or situational changes in ecological pressures invoked by the environment or 
culture (Baldwin, 1896; Oyama et al., 2001; Reader & Laland, 2002; Richerson, in press; West-






 This contribution provides a fruitful platform for exploring when prestige and dominance 
are effective in human groups. While prestige and dominance seem to be the core routes to high 
social rank in human groups, empirical evidence has shown that the profiles—especially 
dominance—display differing levels of success (Anderson & Kilduff 2009b; Anderson, 
Srivastava, Beer, et al., 2006; Cashdan, 1980; Lukaszewski et al., 2014; Ridgeway & Diekema, 
1989; Kaplan, Hooper & Gurven, 2010; Price & Van Vugt, 2014). The dynamic perspective 
proposed by the present research provides a number of explanations for these findings. First, 
social hierarchy, and thus an individual’s social rank, are situated in context. That is, it is 
reasonable to believe that individuals who are high in social rank in one context may not 
necessarily harbour the traits or express the behaviours that would cause them to be high-ranking 
in a context has different demands, and thus favours different qualities (Fielder, 1967; Hofstede, 
1980; McCann, 1992; Stogdill, 1948, p.65). In sum, there may be context-dependent needs and 
norms in relation to rank acquisition (Anderson et al., 2015; Ridgeway, 2017).  
 
 Second, human groups exhibit several mechanisms that may level the relationship that 
dominance has with social rank, and these mechanisms take time to develop. Dominance seems 
significantly related to social rank when collaborative groups are in their nascent stages or are 
transient (Cheng et al., 2013; Pellegrini & Long, 2003). The efficacy of dominance in such 
groups may be founded on human’s evolved cognitive capacities to extract formidability-
relevant information (Sell et al., 2009), in turn making cue of dominance incredibly salient in 
such groups. However, as shown in Chapter 3, when these groups become more acquainted the 
relationships between dominance and social rank diminish. When individuals in these groups 





about one another, and the perceived value of group members develops (Baumeister, Zhang & 
Vohs, 2004; Bert & Knez, 1996; Dunbar, 1996; Feinberg, Willer & Schultz, 2014). In turn, these 
individuals may be more likely to discuss high dominance counterparts and increasingly dislike 
them due to the negative impact that dominance may have on them (i.e. physical aggression or 
verbal abuse) and they may form coalitional groups that sanction the behaviours associated to, 
and supress, dominance (Boehm, 2009; Boehm & Flack, 2010; Gintis, Van Shaik & Boehm, 
2015). Therefore, the current perspective holds that the effectiveness of dominance on social 
rank in humans is constrained to groups that do not develop such coalitions or normative cultures 
that supress dominance (Hawley, 1999; Henry et al., 2000; Redhead, 2016), when social rank is 
formalized and those high in dominance structurally have inordinate power over valued 
resources (i.e. Magee & Galinsky, 2008), and, as outlined in Chapter 4, when the negative 
expressive ties that dominance is potentially associated with can successfully produce fear and 
coercion.  
 
 The present research indicates that prestige, on the other hand, may flourish in most 
human groups over time. As chapter 3 indicates, prestige is more effective in promoting social 
rank when groups have time to more readily observe more accurate cues to an individual’s 
ability and willingness to confer benefits. These signals to prestige seem to be inherently related 
to cultural learning (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Schniter et al. 2015; Smith et al. 2017), with 
results from Chapter 4 showing that those high in prestige are nominated more as advisors, that 
these nominations increase both their prestige and also facilitate the diffusion of prestige within a 
group. Individuals ask advice to gain knowledge and, by obtaining such knowledge, an 






 The networks of cooperation that relate to prestige are not relationships that operate in 
isolation, they are multiplex and have effects on one another. As overviewed in Chapter 4, 
cooperative relationships involve both acts of instrumental support, such as advice and food 
sharing, and also expressive relational ties, such as friendships, that create positive affect 
(Coleman, 1988). In line with previous multiplex analyses (Kwok, Redhead & Brown, in prep; 
Snijders, Lomi & Torló, 2013), these networks have direct impacts upon one another. The 
present findings indicate that these multiplex relations act as different, but analogous, currencies 
that individuals may exchange to maintain cooperation.   
  
 
6.2. Limitations and future questions 
 
 
The current research has a number of limitations that should be addressed in future 
investigations. First, a large proportion of data that comprises the current research was collected 
from North American undergraduate students. This W.E.I.R.D. (Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) population may not be representative of the populations in 
which the processes emerged, nor of other contemporary populations (Henrich, Heine & 
Norenzeyaga, 2010). While this is a limitation, the use of this population allowed data to be 
drawn from a larger population pool, and many of the current results related to the effects of 
prestige and dominance and the structural emergence of the social networks are complimentary 
to findings from small-scale and non-W.E.I.R.D. groups (i.e.  Apicella et al., 2012; Garfield & 
Hagan, in press; Kasper & Borgerhoff Mulder, 2015; Konecna & Urlacher, 2017; Koster & 
Leckie, 2014; Nolin, 2012; Power, 2017; Power & Ready, 2018; Redhead, 2016; Von Rueden et 





comparative cross-cultural future research may be important to unpick when dominance is 
effective. For example, such comparisons could be between small-scale societies that may have 
higher levels of intergroup conflict, compared to those with low levels; or between groups that 
have low levels of density and structural cohesion paralleled to those with high levels. An 
associated limitation is that, whilst the present findings illuminate that group processes may 
emerge over time to level the effects of dominance on social rank, it does not directly capture the 
mechanisms that drive these processes (i.e. gossip, ostracism). Future research that directly 
measures the emergence and effectiveness of such mechanisms levelling dominance would 
provide important insight into why dominance is not effective in promoting social rank in some 
contexts.  
 
A further limitation is that the current research focussed solely on positive network ties 
and, thus the associations that prestige and dominance have with negative network ties remains 
unclear. This gap in the literature needs to be filled by future research as evidence suggests that 
while the frequency of negative ties is much lower than those of positive, their potency is much 
greater (Labianca, 2013). Alongside this, future research may make further valuable 
contributions to the field by investigating the multiplex associations between prestige, 
dominance, negative and positive ties, such as how warfare and allegiances co-emerge in small-
scale societies. Through this, future research will provide greater insight into the complex 















The current research has shown that human social hierarchy is a complex, dynamic 
system that is embedded in social networks. Through this, the present findings have contributed 
to the existing literature by demonstrating the dynamic relationships that prestige and dominance 
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